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Part I: 
Introduction 
 
 
 
 

  
1 Economic instruments for conservation policies – 
State of the art and the way forward 
This habilitation thesis consists of seven published journal articles and one published book 
chapter. The title “Economic Instruments for Conservation Policies in Federal Systems” cap-
tures the common theme of the following chapters, which address three major areas of eco-
nomic research:  
1) With its core papers on intergovernmental fiscal transfers in environmental and con-
servation policies, the habilitation thesis breaks new ground at the interface of envi-
ronmental economics and public finance, both in theoretical and applied research; 
2) Building on methodological pluralism and interdisciplinary research, it provides new 
insights for ecological economics related to integrative biodiversity research, policy 
analysis, and ecological fiscal transfers;  
3) Through its orientation towards policy relevance and real-world institutions, it con-
tributes to governance research and institutional economics.  
The structure of the thesis is as follows:  
Part I, consisting of chapter 1, introduces the overarching theme of environmental policy 
instruments and discusses the current use of and prospects for economic instruments in con-
servation policies. A number of research gaps are identified which are addressed in the subse-
quent chapters.  
Part II, consisting of chapters 2–5, encompasses four papers focused on a single type of 
policy instrument: intergovernmental fiscal transfers. Although well documented in public 
finance literature, intergovernmental fiscal transfers remain a somewhat neglected instrument 
in environmental policy. Despite being well suited to address the spillover benefits that often 
accrue with conservation policies, there is scant research literature on ecological fiscal trans-
fers compared to other economic instruments such as environmental taxes or tradable permits. 
In fact, very few countries make practical use of them to achieve conservation objectives. 
Thus intergovernmental fiscal transfers are an innovative instrument in conservation policies 
in particular, so that advances in both theory and applied research may prove especially bene-
ficial here. It is against this background that Part II presents the following contributions:  
• the need for integrating nature conservation issues into intergovernmental fiscal trans-
fers is substantiated from an economic and ecological perspective and, building on the 
economic theory of federalism and insights from sustainability science, some initial 
proposals are presented for their integration (chapters 2 and 3); 
• suitable indicators are developed for integrating nature conservation into intergovern-
mental fiscal transfers and, by way of example, the fiscal impacts of using these indi-
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cators are modelled in a spatially explicit way for fiscal equalisation at the local level 
in Saxony, a federal state (Land) in Germany (chapter 4); 
• finally, the design and implementation of existing ecological fiscal transfers to the lo-
cal level in Brazil are investigated, along with their fiscal and ecological effects, and 
the potential for their transfer to other federal countries is examined (chapter 5). 
Part III, consisting of chapters 6–9, combines a number of articles in integrative biodiver-
sity research and applied biodiversity governance, themes that are often neglected in the eco-
nomic analysis of environmental policy instruments. However, when implementing policy 
instruments in societal settings, interdisciplinary research bridging the natural and social sci-
ences is as much a prerequisite as policy-relevant research that responds to the needs of deci-
sion makers and other stakeholders. Both policy design and policy evaluation yield the best 
outcomes when they involve ecologists, economists, legal and other social scientists, as this 
ensures that consideration is given to ecological effectiveness, economic efficiency, adminis-
trative feasibility, social acceptance, and perception by stakeholders. Policy-relevant research 
also responds to current societal developments and prospective changes in legislation which 
may provide windows of opportunity to propose new instruments. Meanwhile, sound empiri-
cal research and case study design are indispensable in making concrete policy recommenda-
tions, taking into account existing formal and informal institutions. In this context, 
• a sound scientific basis is established for integrative biodiversity research and policy 
drawing on ecological, economic as well as broader institutional and social science 
perspectives (chapter 6);  
• theoretical arguments building on the economic theory of federalism are developed to 
provide economic justification for an adequate distribution of conservation competen-
cies in federal systems, serving also as a robust basis for policy recommendations in 
the course of modernisation of the federal structure in Germany (chapter 7);  
• the economic theory of federalism is linked at a theoretical level to an institutional and 
governance-oriented perspective of conservation policies, followed by an examination 
of the design and implementation of ecological fiscal transfers in Brazil in multi-level 
and multi-actor perspective (chapter 8); and, finally, 
• economic, legal and anthropological expertise is combined to analyse the existing le-
gal and institutional framework in Europe; in addition, building on theoretical insights 
from different disciplinary backgrounds and enriched by empirical research from re-
gional case studies in two European member states, recommendations for better coor-
dination of conservation policies in federal systems are proposed (chapter 9).  
The remainder of this introduction is organised as follows: The first section presents a con-
cise analysis of environmental policy instruments, with an emphasis on economic instruments 
(section 1.1). A special focus is placed on the role of the state in environmental and conserva-
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tion policies1. Fiscal instruments are of particular relevance to public decision makers, and in 
this regard the concept of ecological fiscal reform is introduced (subsection 1.1.2). With re-
gard to the field of biodiversity and nature conservation, a number of gaps in the design and 
use of fiscal instruments can be identified (subsection 1.1.3) which, step by step, are filled in 
the course of the chapters that follow. The first section closes with some comments on the 
challenges of implementing policy instruments in federal systems, followed by the introduc-
tion of the concept of biodiversity governance (subsection 1.1.4). The subsequent two sec-
tions of chapter 1 present the background to and main results of the published articles consti-
tuting this thesis (sections 1.2 and 1.3). The articles are grouped into two main sections, mir-
roring the basic structure of the thesis. 
1.1 Economic instruments in environmental and conservation policies 
1.1.1 Economic instruments in environmental policy 
As Oates (1999a, p. xiii) puts it, “economics has three basic and important messages for envi-
ronmental protection”:  
1) an unfettered market system generates excessive pollution. Hence economic reasoning 
argues “for the need of public intervention in the form of environmental regulation” 
(ibid.); 
2) economics offers guidance for setting environmental quality standards, based on cost-
benefit-analysis. However, economic valuation of benefits and costs builds on mar-
ginal analysis and one has to be aware of the limits of its application, from both an 
ecological and a socio-cultural perspective as Vatn and Bromley (1994), Turner et al. 
(2003), Balmford et al. (2008), EPA-SAB (2009) and Ring et al. (2010b), among oth-
ers, point out;  
3) once environmental objectives have been determined – by economic analysis or by po-
litical decision making following a standards and pricing approach (Baumol and Oates 
1988) –, economic analysis provides insights into the design of policy instruments to 
achieve these targets “in the most effective and least-cost way” (Oates 1999a, p. xiv).   
The last of these messages is ultimately about the choice of policy instruments and their 
design and implementation, which is the focus of this habilitation thesis. Early environmental 
legislation generally used so-called command-and-control approaches, often prescribing defi-
nite pollution control techniques to polluters. Economic analysis has shown in many studies 
                                                 
1  Although the term environmental policy is sometimes used as an overarching term to include conservation 
issues, here it is distinguished from the term conservation policy. Conservation policies include nature conserva-
tion, landscape protection as well as the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity. In short, conservation 
policies involve biota, i.e. living organisms and their associated (eco-)systems. In contrast, environmental policy 
deals with the abiotic aspects of environmental protection and degradation. This distinction is commonly made 
in environmental and conservation laws as well as in the assignment of competencies to expert authorities in 
many countries (e.g., in Germany: Environmental Protection Agency / Umweltbundesamt and Federal Agency 
for Nature Conservation / Bundesamt für Naturschutz). 
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that this approach entails high costs for the polluter and for society. Economic argumentation 
is in favour of incentive-based policy instruments, i.e. environmental taxes or tradable permits 
that introduce a price as a market signal to polluters. The price signal leaves it to the polluter, 
in consideration of the cost structure of their business, to decide how to adapt: whether to pay 
for continued pollution or to adopt emission control technologies to avoid polluting the envi-
ronment (Hansmeyer and Schneider 1990; Oates 1999a).  
Building on the economic theory of public goods and the related theory of externalities as 
cornerstones, environmental economics literature and textbooks over the last 30 to 40 years 
have consistently presented the basic structure of environmental problems as consisting in a 
firm polluting the environment through air or water emissions (e.g., Baumol and Oates 1975, 
1988; Siebert 1978; Fisher 1981; Endres 1985; Turner et al. 1993; Cansier 1996; Feess 2007). 
In environmental policy analysis, the economist’s task is then to find the most effective and 
least-cost way to achieve a certain environmental standard. Economic research focused ini-
tially on improving the effectiveness and efficiency of single environmental policy instru-
ments (e.g., Endres 1985). Subsequently, investigations turned towards evaluating and im-
proving real-world instrument mixes, given that legal, planning, fiscal, and other economic 
instruments exist in parallel (Gawel 1991; Sterner 2003; OECD 2007; Lehmann 2010).  
Early discussions among economists were related to whether price-driven environmental 
taxes and charges or quantity-related tradable permits would be more efficient to achieve a set 
target (e.g., Weitzman 1974; Siebert 1976; Bonus 1981, 1998; Endres and Finus 2002). Re-
cent literature (in the context of global climate change, for example) discusses these ap-
proaches in combination, recommending a quantity ceiling as a long-term stabilisation target 
of greenhouse gas emissions, but then using taxes, permit trading or in some circumstances 
regulation to meet short-term policies, on condition that they are consistent with the long-term 
goals (Pizer 2002; Hepburn 2006; Stern 2007). Further developments in environmental policy 
analysis include a broadening of the areas of application of economic instruments beyond 
emissions policies and point sources (e.g., Sterner 2003), and some authors discuss economic 
instruments in a political economy framework (e.g., Michaelis 1996). Substantial progress has 
also been made in the context of life-cycle management, material flow analysis (e.g., Op-
schoor 1994), and the sustainability concept (e.g., Panayotou 1994; van den Bergh and van 
der Straaten 1994).  
Nevertheless, much of the discussion in environmental economics and, specifically, eco-
nomic analysis of policy instruments is still focused on environmental pollution and degrada-
tion and on the internalisation of negative externalities. Hence there is a need for more re-
search on conservation economics compared to the extensive literature available on environ-
mental economics and related analysis of policy instruments, a need addressed by this thesis. 
But what has been the prevailing focus of conservation economics so far? 
In the early 1970s and 1980s, resource conservation economics concentrated on economic 
valuation of the benefits of preserving valuable landscapes; this was frequently used to sup-
port decision making in large public infrastructure projects based on cost-benefit-analysis 
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(Fisher 1981; Hampicke 1991; EPA-SAB 2009). One famous case was the Hells Canyon pro-
ject in the United States, involving the construction of a hydropower dam in a wild canyon, 
where the benefits of preserving the landscape of the canyon were compared to the costs of 
alternative options for generating energy (Krutilla and Fisher 1975; Fisher 1981). When 
Hampicke (1991) published the first German textbook on nature conservation economics, 
there was much less economic analysis available that focused on nature and biodiversity con-
servation as such. Most of the scientific literature and empirical studies conducted in conser-
vation economics to date have dealt with the economic valuation of the benefits of conserva-
tion. Compared to the valuation literature available, far less work exists on policy instruments 
in nature and biodiversity conservation. Thus a more specific need within conservation eco-
nomics can be said to be policy analysis and economic instruments in conservation policies, 
themes which are addressed in the following chapters.  
In contrast to environmental policies dealing with pollution and negative externalities, bio-
diversity and nature conservation policies are much more associated with the provision of 
public goods and services, which involves positive externalities. There are few incentives – be 
it for public or private actors – to engage in conservation activities when conservation costs 
are borne locally, whereas most conservation benefits cross local boundaries (Perrings and 
Gadgil 2003). If such spatial externalities or spillovers are not adequately compensated for, 
they may lead to an underprovision of the public goods and services concerned, such as water 
protection zones or nature reserves and their management (Bergmann 1999; Ring 2004).  
Public support programmes, subsidies and payments for environmental services are impor-
tant instruments used to compensate private actors for their conservation-related costs and the 
benefits they provide to society. Furthermore, taxation (e.g. through land tax exemption), 
charges and fees may be used to internalise these positive externalities (TEEB 2009). With 
regard to public actors, intergovernmental fiscal transfers constitute a suitable means to ad-
dress spillover benefits in the provision of public goods and services. This category of instru-
ment, its role in financing local services and, more specifically, the problem of spatial exter-
nalities associated with the provision of public goods and services has been extensively cov-
ered in public finance literature (e.g., Dahlby 1996; Bird 2000; Bird and Smart 2002; Bird and 
Tarasov 2004; Spahn 2004; Boadway and Shah 2007). However, the public finance literature 
does not touch (or does so very rarely), let alone cover, the field of nature conservation. This 
leads us to a basic research gap consisting in a lack of environmental economic, public fi-
nance and conservation research focusing on the internalisation of positive externalities in the 
context of conservation policies by way of intergovernmental fiscal transfers. Chapters 2 to 5 
and chapters 7 and 8 contribute towards filling this gap.  
Although the basic argument of the following sections and chapters builds on the economic 
theory of externalities, this is not to say that there is any optimal level of pollution (in the case 
of negative externalities), or any optimal level of conservation (in the case of positive exter-
nalities). On the one hand, environmental and conservation externalities are complex and arise 
in so many contexts that it is practically impossible to determine precisely their correct size. 
Externalities are in fact “the result of interactions between human activities and the integrated 
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physical and biological processes of the environment” (Vatn and Bromley 1997, p. 137). The 
environmental pricing and standards approach, as a second-best approach in environmental 
economics, early on reflected and acknowledged the difficulties in determining “correct” 
benefits and costs in the context of environmental problems (Baumol and Oates 1971). On the 
other hand, given the ignorance and uncertainties attending (global) environmental change 
(Ring 1997), the many unknown thresholds of ecological systems, and not least continual 
changes in the individual and collective values of many amenities in an evolving world (Vatn 
and Bromley 1994), adaptive learning processes are essential, calling for policies that point in 
the right direction, e.g., through gradually increasing price signals in the context of ecological 
fiscal reform (Ring 1997), rather than assuming “once and for all correct policies” (van den 
Bergh and Gowdy 2000).  
Building on the research needs identified above, the following two subsections explore 
these issues further, and highlight recent academic as well as policy developments. First, sub-
section 1.1.2 concentrates on fiscal instruments in general and introduces the concept of eco-
logical fiscal reform. It is argued that relevant instruments and concepts also need to address 
conservation policies, which is actually a rather recent development, introduced and called for 
not least by the author of this thesis. Subsection 1.1.3 then moves on to fiscal instruments for 
biodiversity and nature conservation policies, with a focus on those instruments capable of 
addressing positive externalities, i.e. rewarding the benefits of conservation. The first section 
here covers public compensation payments geared towards private actors, while a second, 
more detailed section on intergovernmental fiscal transfers responds to a number of research 
gaps addressed by the different chapters of this thesis. Finally, subsection 1.1.4 discusses in-
struments for conservation policies in the wider framework of integrative biodiversity re-
search and applied biodiversity governance.  
1.1.2 From environmental taxes to ecological fiscal reform 
Due to the nature of many ecological goods and services as public goods, the state – and thus 
public decision makers – has an essential role to play in environmental and conservation pol-
icy, including the integration of biodiversity policy into all relevant policy sectors. For public 
decision makers, an important means of promoting biodiversity conservation is via public 
finance policy and related fiscal instruments. Public finance can be defined as the way in 
which the government exerts influence on the economy through its public revenues and 
spending decisions (Musgrave et al. 1990; Zimmermann and Henke 1994; Andel 1998).  
On the public revenue side, key governmental levies (Abgaben) include taxes, charges and 
fees (e.g., Hansjürgens 1992; Zimmermann and Henke 1994; Cansier 1996; Gawel 1999). 
Taxes are payments into the general government budget with no specific return to whoever 
pays the tax. They primarily serve fiscal functions. Fees and user charges are payments for 
specific services provided by public institutions to the individuals or firms paying the fee, 
such as entrance fees or fees for waste disposal. Emission or effluent charges often involve 
earmarking the revenues gained for environmental purposes (OECD 1997a). In Germany, the 
public revenues derived from so-called special charges (Sonderabgaben, e.g., the sewage 
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charge) need to be earmarked for the benefit of the “group of payers” of the respective charge 
(Hansjürgens 1993; Cansier 1996).  
Environmental levies are especially relevant for making those pay who pollute or overuse 
the environment and thereby contribute to the loss of biodiversity and ecosystems. However, 
they may also be relevant for rewarding those who conserve and sustainably use the environ-
ment when positive externalities exist. Fiscal revenues provide a number of options for reduc-
ing the existing tax burden of those who engage in biodiversity conservation, for example tax 
exemptions on property taxes, when a landowner agrees to relinquish his rights to future land 
development (Boyd et al. 2000).   
On the public expenditure side, there are multiple ways to include the conservation and 
sustainable use of biodiversity and ecosystems more effectively in public decision making. 
Here, we can basically distinguish between fiscal instruments addressing public actors and 
those addressing private actors (Ring 2004). Public actors, i.e. local, regional and national 
governments, usually have tax revenues from their own sources but, depending on the coun-
try’s financial constitution, may also rely on intergovernmental fiscal transfers to fulfil their 
public functions, such as providing schools and education, health and social care, etc. To a 
certain extent, the indicators used for the redistribution of tax revenues among different levels 
of government do indeed provide incentives to realign the behaviour of public actors. For pri-
vate actors, public spending includes a wide array of subsidies, transfers and payments to in-
dividuals and businesses for different purposes (social transfers, technological subsidies, etc.). 
During the last three decades there have been numerous publications and initiatives to im-
prove the design and implementation of taxes and charges to better account for environmental 
pollution (e.g., Nutzinger and Zahrnt 1989; Hansjürgens 1992; Ring 1994; Ring 1997; OECD 
1997a; Gawel 1999; COM 2007; EEA 20102). Taking a combined look at the public revenue 
and expenditure side, the concept of environmental or green tax reform has attracted increas-
ing attention (UPI 1988; Nutzinger and Zahrnt 1989; Görres et al. 1994; OECD 1997b, 
Schlegelmilch 1999). The basic idea of an environmental tax reform consists in introducing 
environmental taxes, thus greening public income, and using these additional revenues both 
for ecologically and socially motivated goals. Developed during the late 1980s and imple-
mented in several European countries from the late 1990s onwards, the early focus on the 
public revenue side was on energy taxes (Ring 1997; BMU 2004; Dresner et al. 2006; Klok et 
al. 2006). This focus was soon enlarged to include other eco-taxes and fiscal policies more 
broadly (see Box 1.1; Ewringmann 1995; OECD 2005; World Bank 2005). 
                                                 
2  The European Environment Agency (EEA) and the OECD have jointly created an online database on eco-
nomic instruments in environmental policy. The database contains information on the use of economic instru-
ments such as environmentally related taxes and charges, environmentally motivated subsidies, tradable permits, 
and deposit refund systems. In addition, it outlines voluntary policy approaches such as environmental agree-
ments, negotiated with industry, and public programmes in which firms can volunteer to participate. The data-
base is updated at regular intervals; generally speaking, the information is more complete for taxes.  
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 Box 1.1: Ecological fiscal reform 
“… is a strategy that redirects a government’s taxation and expenditure programmes to create an 
integrated set of incentives to support the shift to sustainable development” 
National Round Table on the Environment and the Economy, Canada (2002) 
Ecological fiscal reform refers to a range of taxation and pricing measures which can raise fiscal 
revenues while furthering environmental goals. The basic idea consists in setting incentives for re-
source use while providing financial resources for both ecologically and socially motivated goals. 
There has been much discussion about the so-called double dividend for improved environmental 
protection and lower unemployment (or less distortion of the tax system), i.e. using revenue from 
eco-taxes to reduce unemployment and labour taxes (e.g., Görres et al. 1994; Goulder 1995; Bov-
enberg and van der Ploeg 1998; Patuelli et al. 2005). Many organisations are now promoting the 
concept internationally to address environmental objectives, while creating revenues for poverty 
reduction and pursuing the Millennium Development Goals (e.g., OECD 2005; World Bank 2005). 
Only recently, the concept of ecological fiscal reform has expanded to address land-use issues, 
biodiversity conservation and ecosystem services provision (Meyer and Schweppe-Kraft 2006; 
Ring 2008a). 
 
In the economic literature, theoretical debates around the “double dividend” of an environ-
mental tax reform attracted much attention (e.g., Goulder 1995; Bovenberg and van der Ploeg 
1998). The concept of double dividend implies the joint occurrence of an environmental and 
an economic benefit. Higher pollution taxes, such as energy or carbon taxes, improve the en-
vironment, while distortionary labour-related taxes can be lowered through revenue-recycling, 
eventually boosting employment (see Bosquet 2000 and Schöb 2005 for overviews). Patuelli 
et al. (2005) present a meta-analytical synthesis of simulation studies on environmental tax 
reform and the double dividend. They conclude “that the total effect of an environmental tax-
and-recycle policy has a significant influence on the economic variables (second dividend) 
when employment is used” (ibid., p. 564) but is much less clear, when effects on GDP are 
analysed.  
It comes as no surprise that the exact definition of the “double dividend” and the design of 
the simulation study do influence the results. Therefore, Patuelli et al. (2005) strongly rec-
ommend that policy design and implementation should not be based on just one type of eco-
nomic model to simulate the effects of an environmental tax reform. Similarly, van den Bergh 
and Gowdy (2000) reason that the potential double dividend may be systematically underes-
timated with equilibrium analysis, recommending evolutionary models to shed light on long-
term processes such as large-scale tax revisions over long periods.  
Taking an ecological or biodiversity-related view of fiscal reform is relatively recent and 
needs to be strengthened in order to account for the positive externalities of conservation poli-
cies (Meyer and Schweppe-Kraft 2006; Ring 2008a). Taking this broader view of ecological 
fiscal reform, fiscal instruments are increasingly being used as effective mechanisms to 
achieve conservation objectives, to provide incentives for conservation, and to raise funds for 
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conservation purposes (OECD 1999; Emerton et al. 2006). Beyond that, fiscal instruments are 
central to social policies and the redistribution of wealth and income. Thus they are especially 
suited to combine biodiversity and ecosystem conservation with sustainable livelihood issues 
and poverty reduction (e.g., OECD 2005; World Bank 2005), an indispensable perspective for 
the design and implementation of policy instruments in developing countries.  
1.1.3 Fiscal instruments addressing positive externalities in conservation policies 
Due to the non-linearities, complementarities, uncertainties and often unknown thresholds 
associated with ecological systems (MA 2005a; TEEB 2008; EPA-SAB 2009; Naeem et al. 
2009; Ring et al. 2010b), the ecological foundations of conservation policies are more com-
plex compared to many other environmental issues. This has consequences for economic 
analysis, and the economic foundations of conservation policies are hampered by a number of 
considerations.  
Economic valuation as one basis for conservation policies may be limited by ecological, 
but also by social and cultural considerations (Turner et al. 2003; Ring et al. 2010b). Eco-
nomic valuation builds on marginal analysis and thus involves the substitutability of the ob-
ject to be valued. If species or ecological processes are complementary to each other and are 
not substitutable, a key requirement for marginal economic analysis is lacking from an eco-
logical perspective (Ring 1997; Balmford et al. 2008). From a social or collective choice per-
spective, social norms and institutions are crucial for societal decision making (Vatn and 
Bromley 1994). For example, both societies and citizens may decide to put an infinite value 
on certain ecological goods for cultural or religious reasons, be it a species, a sacred wood or 
a special cultural landscape, and not expose it to a cost-benefit calculus (e.g., Spash 2000). In 
both cases, decision making needs to consider multiple criteria, building on ecological, eco-
nomic and social considerations. Furthermore, non-use values, such as existence, bequest and, 
to some extent, option values play a much greater role in conservation policies compared to 
other environmental issues. All these characteristics make it more difficult to define conserva-
tion issues through market mechanisms alone (Hampicke 1991; Gowdy 1997; OECD 1999; 
Turner et al. 2003; MA 2005b; Spash and Vatn 2006; TEEB 2008).  
Nevertheless, as in environmental policy, many goods and services associated with nature 
and biodiversity conservation and their sustainable use are public goods and services. Thus 
governments from the local up to the global level play a powerful role in valuing nature’s 
“public” services to society as a whole, by issuing regulation and property rights, through 
economic instruments as well as informational and communicative instruments, to name but a 
few (e.g., McNeely 1988; OECD 1999; Sterner 2003; Unnerstall 2004; MA 2005b; TEEB 
2009; Ring et al. 2010a).  
Over many decades, continuous improvements have been undertaken to realign perverse 
subsidies and to use taxes, charges and tradable permits to internalise negative externalities 
(EEA 2010). The complementary task of internalising the positive externalities of providing 
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ecological public goods and services has gained comparatively less attention3, although 
greater moves in this direction have become apparent more recently (OECD 1999; MA 
2005b; TEEB 2008). Taxes, charges and fees as well as intergovernmental fiscal transfers, 
subsidies, public support programmes and compensation payments are important instruments 
to reward the often unrecognised benefits of biodiversity conservation (Emerton et al. 2006; 
TEEB 2009). During the last decade – and elaborated first in a developing countries context – 
the concept of “Payments for Environmental Services” (PES) finally put the internalisation of 
positive externalities centre stage (Landell-Mills and Porras 2002; Wunder et al. 2008).  
It is against this background that I will discuss in more detail two types of fiscal instru-
ments involving public expenditure: government-financed compensation payments to private 
actors and intergovernmental fiscal transfers addressing public actors.  
1.1.3.1 Compensating land users for environmental services  
In the European Union (EU) and its member states, as well as in many other countries, public 
compensation payments for the provision of environmental goods and services focus almost 
exclusively on private land users, be it in agriculture, forestry or aquaculture (Ring 2008b). 
Agri-environmental and conservation programmes need to be continuously monitored and 
improved to increase their ecological effectiveness and economic efficiency (Baldock et al. 
2002; Wätzold and Schwerdtner 2005; Hampicke et al. 2006; Claasen et al. 2008; Wätzold et 
al. 2008b). In contrast to the bulk of intergovernmental fiscal transfers, which are provided as 
lump-sum transfers, such compensation schemes involve specific payments to land users that 
are to be spent for a given purpose. The European agri-environmental and conservation 
schemes usually require matching funds on the side of the implementing national and regional 
governments, thereby increasing the overall budget of the respective public programme. 
Through these programmes, land users can apply for compensation payments that compensate 
them for the benefits they forego through using less intensive agricultural practices or through 
implementing active conservation measures.  
One crucial task of all these programmes is the identification of a baseline for payments: 
What measures can be expected from land users as standard, apart from any claims for com-
pensation? The continuing debate on the “principles of good agricultural practice” (gute fach-
liche Praxis der Landwirtschaft) and related minimum conservation standards in German na-
ture conservation law reflects the difficulties involved in reaching a societal consensus on 
these controversial issues (Bauer et al. 1996). Nevertheless, a baseline and its enforcement are 
essential from an economic perspective, because of its influence on the ecological effective-
ness and efficiency of the respective programme. Another major problem lies in the strategic 
behaviour of participating land users who have an incentive to claim higher compensation 
costs than those actually incurred, because their compensation payment is based on (esti-
mated) conservation costs. Regulators in turn may encounter significant transaction costs in 
                                                 
3  For early exceptions from a conservation NGO background, cf. McNeely (1988). 
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terms of information and negotiation costs for specifically tailored compensation payments 
that reflect the actual conservation costs of programme participants (Wätzold and 
Schwerdtner 2005).  
Land users may also benefit from public compensation programmes that account for dam-
age caused by wildlife. The aim of damage compensation payments is to compensate land 
users (mostly farmers and fishermen) partly – or, in exceptional cases, fully – for the damage 
caused by protected species. Examples include wolf compensation schemes, which compen-
sate for damage to livestock (Fourli 1999), and compensation for damage to fishing gear 
caused by seals (chapter 9, Similä et al. 2006). Although compensation payments for wildlife 
damage can be essential in preventing the culling of protected and highly endangered species, 
they are often associated with – or even create – a negative perception of wildlife due to their 
focus on “damage”. In this context a change of perspective can be identified in many coun-
tries, away from damage compensation schemes towards developing public payments related 
to the abundance of wild animals or towards supporting measures to provide feeding habitats 
for protected species (chapter 9; Schwerdtner and Gruber 2007). In this way, rather than being 
compensated for damage caused by otters feeding on commercial carp, a carp pond farmer 
may be rewarded for the environmental service of “feeding” otters with extra carp. This extra 
carp is provided with the help of public monies, based on society’s demand that the otter 
should be strictly protected.  
However, as in the agri-environmental and conservation programmes mentioned above, 
strategic behaviour and windfall profits made by participating land users need to be taken into 
account when it comes to both damage compensation and environmental service payments. 
Regarding damage compensation schemes, regulators may again encounter high transaction 
costs due to the difficulty of assessing the actual damage caused by the protected species cov-
ered in the programme (the damage may be caused by another species or even by bad man-
agement practices). For environmental service payments, a regular monitoring of species is 
required in order to relate compensation to species abundance. Schwerdtner and Gruber 
(2007) discuss the pros and cons between these two options in terms of their related transac-
tion costs.  
At the global scale, “Payments for Environmental Services” (PES) developed as a mecha-
nism to pay land users for the provision of environmental services, compensating them for the 
conservation benefits of environmentally sound land management, which implies higher local 
costs (Landell-Mills and Porras 2002; Wunder 2005; Pagiola and Platais 2007; Engel et al. 
2008; TEEB 2009). Wunder (2005, p. 3) defines a PES scheme as “a voluntary transaction 
where a well-defined environmental service (or land use likely to secure that service) is being 
‘bought’ by a (minimum one) service buyer from a (minimum one) service provider if and 
only if the service provider secures service provision (conditionality).” The conditionality of 
environmental service provision relates to the above-mentioned baseline of compensation 
payments. A service provider needs to provide an environmental service that is additional to 
existing behaviour or practices in order to be eligible for the payment.  
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The PES concept originated in the context of developing countries and was associated 
more with private-private interactions, involving market transactions around environmental 
services provided by private agents. For example, a company providing drinking water to 
large cities pays compensation to upstream land users for maintaining forest cover or using 
less fertiliser as a means of keeping drinking water as clean as possible. However, many PES 
schemes involve public agencies and payments from public budgets to private land users. The 
PES programme in Costa Rica, which is widely regarded in the literature as an early and in-
novative programme, provides public compensation payments to land users for environmental 
services such as greenhouse gas mitigation, water services, scenic value and biodiversity 
(Landell-Mills and Porras 2002; Pagiola 2008). In this sense, “traditional” agri-environmental 
programmes in Europe and the United States can also be regarded as payments for environ-
mental services (e.g., Baylis et al. 2008; Ring 2008c; Vatn 2008).  
From an economic perspective, the efficiency of PES programmes and the various criteria 
influencing it have been a focus of interest (Pagiola 2005; Claasen et al. 2008). Wunder et al. 
(2008) have analysed a set of user- and government-financed PES programmes in developed 
and developing countries with respect to design, costs, environmental effectiveness and live-
lihood outcomes. They found that user-financed PES schemes were generally better targeted 
and more closely adapted to the local conditions and requirements. The schemes also had bet-
ter monitoring and a greater willingness to enforce conditionality. Government-financed pro-
grammes, by contrast, sought to achieve far more additional objectives than user-financed 
programmes, thereby lowering their effectiveness and the efficiency of environmental service 
provision. 
1.1.3.2 Towards ecological intergovernmental fiscal transfers  
In federal systems, tax revenues are redistributed from national to state and further on to local 
governments in order to provide decentralised jurisdictions with monies to fulfil their public 
functions: building schools and hospitals, or constructing and maintaining roads. These inter-
governmental fiscal transfers serve allocative, distributive and fiscal functions (e.g., Lenk 
1993; Zimmermann 1999; Boadway and Shah 2007). Their specific design is regulated in 
financial constitutions and fiscal equalisation laws. Fiscal transfer systems are located in the 
realm of ministries of finance, which rarely consider ecological matters (Ring 2002). The 
same holds for public finance literature on intergovernmental fiscal transfers, where environ-
mental and conservation issues are of no specific interest (e.g., Bird and Tarasov 2004; 
Boadway and Shah 2007). Environmental, resource and ecological economic literature in turn 
have largely missed this type of policy instrument in its potential for realising ecological ob-
jectives. Consequently, ecological fiscal transfers addressing long-term and precautionary 
conservation issues between different levels of government rarely exist in environmental and 
conservation policies or real-world politics, an insight resulting from analysis in chapters 2 
and 3 (Ring 2001, 2002). 
For example, Sterner (2003) in his otherwise very comprehensive book on Policy Instru-
ments for Environmental and Natural Resource Management does not even include the term 
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fiscal transfer or fiscal grants in his index. Public budget-financed payments address only pri-
vate agents (ibid., p. 102ff.). Although he covers the direct provision of public goods by pub-
lic agencies (ibid., p. 74f.) and acknowledges, among other things, the provision and mainte-
nance of natural parks, only the traditional instruments of taxes, charges and fees are men-
tioned as ways of internalising negative externalities. Internationally, little scholarly literature 
exists on the use of intergovernmental fiscal transfers to achieve conservation objectives. 
Where such transfers are supported theoretically, few options have been suggested regarding 
their design and implementation. Thus intergovernmental fiscal transfers represent an innova-
tive instrument in conservation policies in particular, requiring advances in both environ-
mental and ecological economic theory as well as applied research.  
In Germany, some initial steps have been taken towards promoting ecological fiscal trans-
fers. The expert council for the environment has been recommending the use of intergovern-
mental fiscal transfers to acknowledge the provision of environmental goods and services 
especially by rural and remote areas since the mid-1990s (SRU 1996; Ewers et al. 1997). The 
Federal Agency for Nature Conservation has principally been interested in assessing the po-
tential of intergovernmental fiscal transfers for conservation objectives, evidenced so far in its 
request for a brief expert comment on federal-state relationships (Seitz 2001) and in an initial 
study it commissioned on state-local relationships (Perner and Thöne 2005; Perner and Thöne 
2007). Seitz, in his comment from a public finance view, does not acknowledge any potential 
for considering conservation issues in German fiscal equalisation between the federal and the 
state governmental level (Länderfinanzausgleich).4 By contrast, legal scholars Czybulka and 
Luttmann (2005), drawing on their expert statement for the German Green Party, and 
Kloepfer (2006) argue in favour of integrating conservation into German fiscal equalisation 
from the federal to the state level. From a public finances and planning perspective, Perner 
and Thöne (2005, 2007) suggest the very first options for integrating nature conservation into 
fiscal equalisation at the local level in Germany. However, none of the few existing proposals 
have been considered for integration into the German fiscal transfer system so far. Alternative 
options and further arguments substantiating the integration of nature conservation into fiscal 
transfer systems are required, including the development of suitable conservation indicators.  
In this habilitation thesis, the need for integrating nature conservation issues into intergov-
ernmental fiscal transfers is substantiated from an economic and ecological perspective. 
Building on the economic theory of federalism and on insights from sustainability science, 
starting points for such integration are presented in chapters 2 (Ring 2002) and 3 (Ring 2001). 
For this purpose, the thesis also provides – for the first time – an empirical review in chapters 
2 and 3, updated by chapter 4 (Ring 2008a), of how and to what extent ecological public func-
                                                 
4  A similar tendency has been observed for environmental taxes and the concept of ecological fiscal reform in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s. Once certain environmental policies become political reality – usually pushed by 
stakeholder groups outside the realm of public finance – options for such instruments tend to be discussed more 
optimistically, even within public finance. However, this is a hypothesis deriving from more than 20 years of 
research in this field; providing scholarly evidence for it through a careful analysis of public finance literature in 
combination with the actual design and implementation of policies would require yet another study.  
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tions have thus far been integrated into German fiscal equalisation; this is done by means of a 
textual analysis of the 13 fiscal equalisation laws in force in the German Länder.  
An important issue in designing intergovernmental fiscal transfers relates to the choice of 
indicators for their distribution. This task holds for any public goods and services alike. For 
specific transfers, the selection of indicators is quite straightforward. They are usually based 
on objective indicators closely related to the purpose of the specific transfer. The more sub-
stantive part of intergovernmental fiscal transfers is distributed as general or lump-sum trans-
fers, on the basis of the fiscal capacity and the fiscal needs of the respective jurisdictions. 
Whereas fiscal capacity is comparatively easy to determine, the adequate fiscal need of a ju-
risdiction has been the focus of much research and political debate from both a theoretical and 
practical perspective (Zimmermann 1996; Shah 2007a). The choice and quantification of suit-
able indicators, as well as their adaptability to changing economic, political and social condi-
tions keep coming up as relevant research questions. A basic tension exists between the direct 
identification of a more realistic and “adequate” fiscal need of a jurisdiction on the one hand 
and approaches that build on widely available indicators such as inhabitants or area of a juris-
diction on the other, both of the latter being commonly used indicators for identifying fiscal 
needs in many countries. Although the “direct” identification of fiscal needs may be more 
accurate, it nonetheless entails systematic weaknesses and political disadvantages (Lenk 2009, 
p. 29). The indicator-based identification of fiscal needs, although a second-best solution, 
continues to be the more transparent and flexible system. 
The few existing studies on the integration of conservation-related public functions into in-
tergovernmental fiscal transfers propose comparatively complicated indicators. Köllner et al. 
(2002) present a biodiversity-related indicator for amending the fiscal transfer system in Swit-
zerland (a rather difficult approach per se due to the complexity and manifold biodiversity 
indicators available), whereas Perner and Thöne (2007) suggest a so-called “eco-points” ap-
proach, based on landscape planning procedures and relevant indicators. However, landscape 
plans – an additional feature in German local and regional land-use planning addressing na-
ture conservation and landscape protection – are not even available for all municipalities in 
Germany. 
Thus building on the empirical review of ecological public functions in German fiscal 
equalisation laws, this thesis develops and applies an easy and widely available area-related 
indicator for integrating nature conservation into intergovernmental fiscal transfers. Taking as 
an example the fiscal transfer system at the local level in Saxony, a federal state (Land) in 
Germany, the fiscal impacts for Saxon municipalities of using this indicator are modelled in a 
spatially explicit way for the fiscal year 2002 in chapter 4 (Ring 2008a), presenting two dif-
ferent options for using this indicator.  
Spatially explicit modelling and GIS tools can help to illustrate the consequences of eco-
logical fiscal transfers where they have not yet been introduced. Fiscal transfer schemes are 
country-specific and highly politicised due to the substantial financial flows involved. Build-
ing on existing fiscal transfer schemes and integrating suitable ecological indicators can help 
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decision makers in promoting innovative solutions. For Switzerland, Köllner et al. (2002) 
developed a model based on biodiversity indicators and cantonal benchmarking for intergov-
ernmental fiscal transfers. Ring (2008a) suggested ways of incorporating protected areas into 
the intergovernmental fiscal transfer system at the local level in Saxony, Germany. Such a 
spatially explicit analysis of the fiscal impacts of ecological fiscal transfers for local govern-
ments, based on a real-world fiscal transfer system, has not been published previously. 
For the development of a suitable indicator, it also proved helpful to take a look outside 
Europe and investigate fiscal transfer systems in Latin America. In Brazil, several states have 
already introduced “conservation units”, a protected area-based indicator, for the redistribu-
tion of value-added tax (ICMS) from state level to municipalities, starting from 1992 (Ring 
2008b). So far, little to no notice has been taken in Germany and other European countries of 
experiences with the ecological ICMS in Brazil. Most of the early literature on this new in-
strument is written in Portuguese (e.g., Loureiro 1998; 2002) and has been made available to 
an international readership only through grey literature and one book chapter in English 
(Grieg-Gran 2000; May et al. 2002). Chapter 5 of this thesis presents a thorough review of the 
ecological ICMS, including an examination of the design and implementation of this oldest 
scheme of ecological fiscal transfers to the local level in terms of its fiscal and ecological ef-
fects (Ring 2008b). In addition, the potential of the scheme to be transferred to other federal 
countries is examined, based on the experience of those Brazilian states that have imple-
mented the ecological ICMS so far.  
Portugal has very recently become the first European country to amend its local govern-
ment financing law to account for Natura 2000 sites, the European Union’s network for pro-
tected areas of major community significance (Prates 2008; Ring 2008a; Ferreira 2009).5 
Thus both Brazil and Portugal use protected areas as an easily available indicator to account 
for biodiversity and nature conservation. Many countries, including several German states, 
already use the area of a municipality, district or province as an indicator for assigning fiscal 
transfers (Ring 2002, 2008a), so it is only a small and cost-effective step to consider “pro-
tected area” as a basis for an indicator that takes account of nature conservation in fiscal trans-
fer mechanisms. In contrast to the landscape planning indicators proposed by Perner and 
Thöne (2005), an indicator based on protected areas is already available statistically and can 
be directly introduced into existing fiscal transfer procedures.  
Indicators for the redistribution of tax revenues among different levels of government also 
provide incentives to realign the behaviour of public actors, as the increase of protected areas 
in Brazilian states with ecological fiscal transfers has shown (see chapter 5). However, in 
most countries today, this kind of incentive mechanism works only to attract more businesses, 
inhabitants and construction projects, followed by land-use activities that destroy, fragment 
and degrade natural habitats and thus serve to exacerbate the continuing loss of biodiversity. 
The management and opportunity costs associated with protected areas powerfully shape their 
                                                 
5  Given the Brazilian experience, it may be no coincidence that a Portuguese speaking country in Europe took 
this step first.  
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image as an obstacle to economic development, leading to commonly encountered local op-
position to protected areas (Bauer et al. 1996; Stoll-Kleemann 2001). If intergovernmental 
fiscal transfers included consideration of biodiversity and ecosystem-related indicators when 
allocating taxes to lower governmental levels, public decision makers might be expected to 
take care of nature as a basis for public revenues in a similar way that they take care of their 
other tax bases today. 
Choosing the right indicators is but one task associated with fiscal instruments; the other 
relates to their concrete design and implementation. In this context, governance research plays 
an increasingly important role: proposals to solve biodiversity problems are of little use, if 
they neglect to take account of governance issues. This leads us to the next topic of biodiver-
sity governance.  
1.1.4 Biodiversity governance: Coordinating institutions, levels and actors for the 
conservation and sustainable use of nature and biodiversity 
At the core of governance research lies the desire to understand how decisions are made and 
what furthers their successful implementation (Kissling-Näf and Kern 2002). Notwithstanding 
the manifold uses of the governance concept in recent years, the two major approaches to 
governance research relate to the political and social sciences on the one hand and to econom-
ics on the other (Brunnengräber et al. 2004). The understanding of governance in economic 
literature has been strongly influenced by Coase (1937; 1960) and by Williamson (e.g., 1979; 
1996) who, with their work on transaction cost economics and the governance of contractual 
relations, contributed greatly towards shaping the field of New Institutional Economics. Os-
trom, a political scientist, strongly shaped economic governance research with her theoretical 
and empirical work on the evolution of institutions for collective action, which she applied to 
the management of common pool resources such as forests, fisheries, grazing lands, and irri-
gation systems (see Ostrom 1990; 1999; 2005). She has been regarded as representing a sepa-
rate school of public choice theory (Mitchell 1988) and is a good example of the close interre-
lationship between political science and economics in governance research. Another strand of 
economic governance research can be found in political economy, also a field closely related 
to political science. According to Lütz (2004), the discourse on governance in political econ-
omy centres on the characteristics and functioning of modern market economies and their 
governing institutions.  
Although fiscal federalism deals explicitly with the economic analysis of decision making 
at different levels of government, it has been much less discussed in the context of govern-
ance research. As a subfield of public finance, fiscal federalism is concerned with understand-
ing “which functions and instruments are best centralised and which are best placed in the 
sphere of decentralised levels of government” (Oates 1999b, p. 1120). In other words, fiscal 
federalism deals with the assignment of public functions, expenditures and revenues to the 
proper level of government (Musgrave 1959; Oates 1972). Thus the design and implementa-
tion of intergovernmental fiscal relations, including the incentive effects of fiscal instruments 
on the jurisdictions, has received considerable attention in the field of public finance. How-
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ever, the institutional arrangements surrounding policy making and administration, which 
vary widely in terms of the form and membership of relevant decision-making bodies, have 
not yet received adequate attention. In addition to the incentive regime associated with govern-
ance structures, the success of different institutional arrangements also depends on the interac-
tions of those structures with other formal and informal institutions in a country (Shah 2007b). 
Some work has been done, under the heading of “environmental federalism”, on applying 
the economic theory of federalism, its principles and approaches, to environmental problems 
(e.g., Zimmermann and Kahlenborn 1994; Oates 1999b; Oates 2001; Kloepfer 2002). How-
ever, few authors explicitly link environmental federalism to the concept of governance, a gap 
that is addressed in chapter 8 of this habilitation thesis (Ring 2008c). Given the challenge of 
managing globalisation and providing global public goods, the international literature has 
only recently begun to take a more comprehensive approach to public finance (Kaul et al. 
2003). In response to global challenges such as climate change and the global loss of biodi-
versity – to name but the most pressing environmental challenges on the global scale – a New 
Public Finance has emerged that addresses economic, social and environmental problems, 
explicitly taking account of sustainability issues (Kaul and Conceição 2006a). The new ap-
proach to public finance explicitly encompasses a governance perspective, addressing local, 
national and global issues, as well as public and private sector interaction relating to the pro-
vision of goods and services. Applying this perspective to nature and biodiversity conserva-
tion constitutes one of the major innovative contributions of this thesis.  
Environmental governance is defined by Paavola and Adger (2005) as the management of 
all environmental resources, including renewable and non-renewable resources such as miner-
als, soils, water and forests. It also includes environmental resources that have been the focus 
of more recent interest, such as biodiversity, the ozone layer and atmospheric sinks. Environ-
mental governance involves multi-level and multi-actor governance, i.e. the coordination of 
environmental decisions and various actors across governmental levels, from the local, re-
gional and national levels up to the international level (Ring 2008c). During the last decade 
the concept of governance has attracted substantial attention from the environmental sciences, 
not least as a concept that facilitates an integrative approach to sustainable development and, 
more specifically, sustainable land use from the perspectives of various social scientific disci-
plines (Adger et al. 2003; Brunnengräber et al. 2004; Köck 2005; Görg 2007). 
“Biodiversity governance” is understood here as a subfield of environmental governance, 
including the analysis of the formal and informal institutions of nature and biodiversity con-
servation as well as the related interplay of multiple governmental levels and actors. The de-
sign and implementation of policy instruments for their conservation and sustainable use rep-
resent a challenge in federal systems, where various public and private actors at different lev-
els of government are engaged in continual interaction (Ring 2008c). This applies even more 
in times of global environmental change, with climate change and biodiversity loss calling for 
international collective action and subsequent implementation of relevant policy goals and 
instruments at European, national, subnational and local levels (MA 2005a; Stern 2007; 
TEEB 2009). 
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Literature on linking nature and biodiversity conservation to the economic theory of feder-
alism is comparatively rare, a gap that is addressed in the following chapters. Within this con-
text, the spatial distribution of conservation benefits and costs deserves special attention 
(Döring 1998; Revesz 2000; List et al. 2002; Wätzold et al. 2008a). The local costs versus 
global benefits of many conservation-related public goods and services are a key justification 
for designing policy instruments that internalise these spillover benefits in order to ensure 
adequate provision of these goods and services (Perrings and Gadgil 2003; see chapters 7 and 
8; Ring 2004, 2008c). Regarding the choice of instrument, intergovernmental fiscal transfers 
to local governments are a suitable means of internalising these spatial externalities in the 
public sector; for private actors, compensation payments or payments for environmental ser-
vices can offer incentives for providing the services required.  
Looking at policies and instruments through a governance lens reveals new perspectives 
for economic analysis in the field of public finance (cf. Kaul and Conceição 2006b):  
Firstly, the analysis of governance structures focuses on the division of responsibilities be-
tween governmental levels. The assignment of public functions to the appropriate levels of 
government is a familiar topic in public finances, and fiscal instruments such as intergovern-
mental fiscal transfers are specifically designed to address mismatches between functions and 
the financial resources available to fulfil these functions. The perspective missing in this re-
spect is a more systematic treatment of ecological public functions and their integration into 
intergovernmental fiscal transfers (see chapter 2; Ring 2002). With respect to compensation 
payments in conservation policies, the coordination of instruments between governmental 
levels is far from a trivial task. For example, as demonstrated in chapter 9 (Similä et al. 2006), 
European framework regulation relating to conservation policy is highly complex in terms of 
its interplay with European state aid regulation, the purpose of which is to avoid market dis-
tortion. European Union member states tend to interpret conservation and state aid regulations 
in different ways, leading to damage compensation programmes in some countries losing EU 
approval due to the state aid regulations in force. Related to the issue of multi-level govern-
ance is the problem of potential mismatches between policy instruments and the ecological 
scale of the conservation challenges the instruments aim to address (Levin 2000; Young 2002; 
Cash et al. 2006).  
Secondly, governance structures are analysed with respect to responsibilities divided be-
tween public institutions, civil society and the private sector (see chapter 6 and 8; Jentsch et 
al. 2003; Ring 2008c). Conservation policies and instruments are, by their very nature, a result 
of hierarchical decision making, because they are issued by the public sector. However, the 
use of economic instruments in conservation policies already introduces a market-oriented 
element. Furthermore, any policy instrument will ultimately prompt reaction by its addressees 
and other indivuals and groups affected (or even non-affected), be they local governments, 
non-governmental organisations, companies, land users or citizens. Policy analysis in a gov-
ernance perspective is thus not restricted to the instrument in question, its primary addressees 
and intended objectives. Instead, biodiversity governance assumes a more comprehensive 
perspective and includes the interplay between the public and private sector, and between 
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different actors. For example, in the case of ecological fiscal transfers in Brazil, policy analy-
sis would always address fiscal impacts on local governments and ecological effects relating 
to environmental and conservation objectives. The governance perspective offers a more ex-
plicit treatment of relationships between governmental levels and addresses the interplay be-
tween different societal actors – in this case, the evolving public-private partnerships between 
local governments and land user associations that arise from the introduction of ecological 
fiscal transfers (see chapter 8; Ring 2008c). 
These thoughts on biodiversity governance bring to a close the first section on economic 
instruments in environmental and conservation policies. The following two sections of chap-
ter 1 present the background to and main conclusions from the published articles constituting 
this habilitation thesis. The articles are grouped into two main sections (sections 1.2 and 1.3), 
mirroring the structure of the thesis. 
1.2 Integrating local ecological services into intergovernmental fiscal 
transfers 
This section refers to Part II of the thesis, encompassing chapters 2–5. It addresses a selection 
of articles on the design and use of intergovernmental fiscal transfers in environmental and 
conservation policies, breaking new ground at the interface of environmental economics and 
public finance.  
Sustainable development is closely linked to land-use practices. Sustainable land use in 
turn requires a variety of conservation efforts and services, not least at the local level. Despite 
this, there are few incentives for local actors to engage in environmental and conservation 
activities when costs are borne predominantly at the local level, whereas ecological benefits 
cross local boundaries (Perrings and Gadgil 2003). This is the case for a number of ecological 
services, for example water protection or nature reserves. Decisions on the designation of the 
respective protected areas are often taken by institutions above the local level, whereas the 
practical, everyday consequences in terms of management measures or land-use restrictions 
are borne by local actors, often without any – or with insufficient – compensation. Such spa-
tial externalities or spillover benefits – if not adequately compensated – lead to an underprovi-
sion of the public goods and services concerned (Bergmann 1999; Ring 2004).  
In contrast to the vast literature available on compensation payments for land users, com-
paratively few publications exist with regard to local public actors. However, it is just as im-
portant to consider local governments, because they hold decision-making, financing and im-
plementing competencies for a number of land use-related issues. Although these competen-
cies differ from country to country, land-use planning competencies in particular along with 
the implementation of various land-related measures are often decentralised and entail consid-
erable consequences for conservation outcomes.  
In the subsections to follow, each of the four articles in Part II (“Integrating local ecologi-
cal services into intergovernmental fiscal transfers”) is briefly introduced and the main results 
presented. Chapters 2 and 3 substantiate the need for integrating nature conservation issues 
44 I   Introduction 
into intergovernmental fiscal transfers from an economic and ecological perspective. In addi-
tion, starting points for such integration are presented, building on the economic theory of 
federalism and insights from sustainability science. In chapter 4, suitable indicators are de-
vised for integrating nature conservation into intergovernmental fiscal transfers. By way of an 
example, the fiscal impacts of using these indicators are modelled in a spatially explicit way 
for fiscal equalisation at the local level in Saxony, a federal state (Land) in Germany. Finally, 
chapter 5 investigates the design and implementation of existing ecological fiscal transfers to 
the local level in Brazil, along with their fiscal and ecological effects, and examines the poten-
tial to transfer this system to other federal countries. 
Meanwhile, national and international studies increasingly draw on the material provided 
by chapters 2, 4 and 5 of this thesis (e.g., Swedish Environmental Protection Agency 2005; 
Hajkowicz 2007; Fernandes 2008; Ferreira 2009; Irawan and Tacconi 2009; Kamal-Chaoui 
and Robert 2009; Köllner 2009; Kumar and Managi 2009a, b; TEEB 2009). 
1.2.1 Ecological public functions and fiscal equalisation at the local level in Germany 
This chapter was published as “Ring, I. (2002). Ecological public functions and fiscal equali-
sation at the local level in Germany. Ecological Economics 42(3): 415–427” (Impact factor 
2008: 1,912). 
The article starts from the assumption that sustainable development requires the acknowl-
edgement and appropriate financing of ecological, economic and social public functions at all 
levels of government. Whereas the significance of socio-economic functions has a compara-
bly long tradition in federal systems, a corresponding consideration of ecological functions 
has yet to be fully realised. In this context, the article introduces and defines the term “eco-
logical public functions”, a concept new to the literature at this point. Building on the defini-
tion provided by Ring (2002), it is now referred to and used in international scientific litera-
ture (Holmgren 2006; Hajkowicz 2007; Fernandes 2008; Kumar and Managi 2009a, 2009b). 
Continuing on a conceptual level, the article presents essential public finance principles 
such as the decentralisation rule for the provision of public goods and services (Musgrave 
1959; Oates 1972) and the principle of fiscal equivalence (Olson 1969) and links them to the 
provision of ecological public goods and services. Starting with a concise review of environ-
mental federalism (based, e.g., on Huckestein 1993; Hansjürgens 1996; Scheberle 1997; 
Oates 1999b), the spatial dimension of environmental resources (Smith et al. 1997) and the 
mobility of environmental compartments (e.g., Hansjürgens 1996 for highly mobile air pollut-
ants) receive special attention in the process of selecting appropriate levels of government for 
the provision of ecological goods and services. Although public goods and services associated 
with less mobile environmental compartments – e.g., many land use-related services, such as 
water resources protection and nature conservation – are more efficiently provided at decen-
tralised levels, spatial externalities often exist which require appropriate solutions. Given that 
the diseconomies of large-scale operation call for local provision of ecological services, these 
externalities may be internalised through intergovernmental fiscal transfers, compensating 
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local governments for the spillover benefits of its local expenditure. As already suggested by 
Olson (1969) for other public goods (such as education), this solution can readily be applied 
to ecological public goods and services.  
Building on these conceptual foundations, the article presents original empirical research. 
The status quo of and perspectives for integrating ecological public functions into intergov-
ernmental fiscal transfers to the local level are investigated. For this purpose, the 13 intergov-
ernmental fiscal transfer laws of the German Länder are analysed with regard to their consid-
eration of environment- or conservation-related public functions (or their lack of the same). 
Area-related indicators are identified as an initial, indirect approach to acknowledging eco-
logical public functions. However, by far the most widely used option for considering eco-
logical public goods and services are special purpose matching grants. The article concludes 
with a number of policy options aimed at taking better account of ecological public functions 
in German fiscal equalisation at the local level. 
1.2.2 Ökologische Aufgaben und ihre Berücksichtigung im kommunalen 
Finanzausgleich 
This chapter was published as “Ring, I. (2001). Ökologische Aufgaben und ihre Berücksichti-
gung im kommunalen Finanzausgleich. In: Spehl, H., Held, M. (Eds.), Vom Wert der Vielfalt. 
Zeitschrift für angewandte Umweltforschung, Sonderheft 13: 236–249”. 
While Ring (2002) was written for an international readership, Ring (2001) was published 
in a widely read German journal for applied environmental research. The latter article is more 
specific regarding the presentation and examination of the German fiscal transfer system as 
well as the suggestions put forward for ecological fiscal transfers. Intergovernmental fiscal 
transfer systems are highly context-specific. Thus a German scholar or decision maker will 
naturally expect – and require – more detailed knowledge of the German federal system; this 
is of less interest to a foreign scholar, who will be more interested in insights of a generic na-
ture and in their suitability for transfer. 
The local governmental level in Germany is characterised by a comparatively high level of 
autonomy, with far-reaching planning authority related to communal land-use issues. Local 
governments have their own public revenue sources, consisting mainly of real estate and 
business taxes, and their local share of income taxes. Depending on a municipality’s fiscal 
capacity, intergovernmental fiscal transfers on average account for up to 30 % of overall mu-
nicipal revenues in western Germany or even 50 % in eastern Germany (Karrenberg and 
Münstermann 2000).  
Given the importance of intergovernmental fiscal transfers for the provision of local public 
goods and services, ecological public functions need to be given adequate consideration. 
Since the 1970s, German environmental and conservation policies have been realised through 
a complex legal and institutional framework, which assigned numerous functions to different 
governmental levels. However, these policies still suffer from insufficient financial resources 
compared to other, more traditional policy fields. The situation is even more serious for con-
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servation-oriented tasks compared to environmental pollution with its technical and infra-
structure-oriented bias (Kaule 1991; Henle 1995; Steffens 1997). Early German publications 
proposed ecological fiscal transfers in the context of sustainable land use and the acknowl-
edgement of ecological services provided by rural areas to urban agglomerations (SRU 1996; 
Ewers et al. 1997; Bergmann 1999; Rose 1999). 
Based on a status quo analysis of the various German fiscal equalisation laws at the local 
level, a number of options are presented for systematically integrating neglected ecological 
functions and indicators into the existing legal framework. The empirical analysis shows that 
end-of-pipe and infrastructure-related ecological functions are already firmly integrated by 
way of conditional grants. However, precautionary functions such as nature and resource con-
servation issues are still largely absent. Therefore, a comprehensive consideration of ecologi-
cal public functions in Germany calls for the integration of nature conservation issues and 
corresponding indicators into the system of intergovernmental fiscal relations. As regards the 
types of grants used, there is an obvious lack of general, lump-sum transfers based on conser-
vation-related indicators comparable to the role played by existing socio-economic indicators.  
1.2.3 Compensating municipalities for protected areas. 
Fiscal transfers for biodiversity conservation in Saxony, Germany 
This chapter was published as “Ring, I. (2008a). Compensating municipalities for protected 
areas. Fiscal transfers for biodiversity conservation in Saxony, Germany. GAIA 17/S1: 143–
151” (Impact factor 2008: 0,653). 
The years prior to this publication saw conceptual developments and more probing analy-
ses of ecological fiscal transfers, especially in Europe. Köllner et al. (2002) developed a 
model based on biodiversity indicators and cantonal benchmarking for fiscal transfers in 
Switzerland. Perner and Thöne (2005), in a study commissioned by the German Federal 
Agency for Nature Conservation, suggested ways of including nature conservation in com-
munal fiscal transfers. Finally, Portugal actually implemented conservation-related indicators 
in real-world policy making, the first European country to do so. With effect from January 
2007, Portugal amended its communal financing law, acknowledging Natura 2000 sites and 
other protected areas as indicators for intergovernmental fiscal transfers from the national to 
the local level (de Melo and Prates 2007; Prates 2008; Ferreira 2009). 
In addition to summarising these trends, Ring (2008a) presents an updated investigation of 
ecological fiscal transfers in Germany since 2006, using the same empirical methodology as 
in Ring (2001, 2002). In the meantime, all sparsely populated states in Germany (Branden-
burg, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania and Saxony-Anhalt) had begun to use land area as an 
indicator for general lump-sum transfers, in addition to Rhineland-Palatinate, a state with a 
higher average population density. Earmarked fiscal transfers still represent the most common 
method of including ecological public functions in communal fiscal transfers.  
The main body of this article introduces a model of the intergovernmental fiscal transfer 
system from state level to local level in Saxony, Germany, one that has been enlarged to in-
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clude designated protected areas: national and nature parks, EU-Natura 2000 sites, biosphere, 
nature and landscape reserves. Apart from the introduction of an area-based ecological indica-
tor, the model reproduces intergovernmental fiscal transfers in Saxony as of 2002, building on 
real social and economic data. In order to obtain the ecological indicator, nature conservation 
units (CUs) were identified in each municipality by overlaying Geographic Information Sys-
tem (GIS) layers of the various categories of protected areas over a total of 537 municipal 
borders in Saxony. 
Two ways of integrating CUs into the Saxon fiscal transfer system are presented along 
with the modelling results. The first model considers CUs within the calculation of general 
lump-sum transfers by “translating” CUs into the generic indicator of inhabitants. Thus in 
addition to the main existing approach for determining municipal fiscal needs based on in-
habitants and an additional approach specific to Saxony based on schoolchildren, a new addi-
tional “conservation approach” is suggested. In the second model, a specified amount of the 
overall transfer sum is set aside for distribution according to the share of CUs a municipality 
holds in relation to its total area. Both models lead – albeit to varying degrees – to higher 
transfers to rural communities in particular, thereby acknowledging the latter’s ecological 
services to society. Using a GIS, results for both models are presented in a spatially explicit 
way in the form of maps. 
1.2.4 Integrating local ecological services into intergovernmental fiscal transfers: 
The case of the ecological ICMS in Brazil 
This chapter was published as “Ring, I. (2008b). Integrating local ecological services into 
intergovernmental fiscal transfers: The case of the ecological ICMS in Brazil. Land Use Pol-
icy 25(4): 485–497” (Impact factor 2008: 1,821). 
Building on a concise introduction to environmental federalism and associated principles 
of public finance, this article presents a detailed case study from Brazil. The Brazilian federal 
system was chosen for investigation because the country is the first worldwide to have gained 
practical experience with ecological fiscal transfers from state to local level. The article 
analyses the policy instrument “ICMS Ecológico”, which was first introduced by a few states 
in Brazil during the 1990s (Loureiro 1998, 2002; Grieg-Gran 2000; May et al. 2002). Part of 
the revenue from this value-added tax is redistributed to the local level on the basis of eco-
logical indicators. In this way, the state level uses fiscal transfers to compensate municipali-
ties for the existence of protected areas within their territories and some other ecological ser-
vices provided at the local level.  
The core of this article consists in a review and analysis of the ICMS Ecológico in Brazil, 
presenting the different ways such an instrument may be implemented in a federally organised 
country. Back in 1992, the state of Paraná was the innovator state that began to adopt the 
ICMS Ecológico, acknowledging protected areas for watershed protection and biodiversity 
conservation as indicators for fiscal transfers. Since that time, 12 out of 26 states in Brazil 
have introduced the ecological ICMS (Figure 1.1). 
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Source: Ring et al. (2010a). Cartography and Geographical Information System: Kindler, Helmholtz Centre for 
Environmental Research – UFZ. 
Figure 1.1: Brazilian states with ICMS Ecológico legislation (2008). 
All twelve use conservation units as the core indicator for allocating ecological fiscal trans-
fers; the other environment- or conservation-related indicators in use vary from state to state. 
Various other states that do not yet have this instrument are debating its merits and actively 
considering its introduction.  
The indicator “conservation units” has been introduced by all states with ICMS Ecológico 
legislation. Conservation units are defined according to the National System of Conservation 
Units in Brazil and relate to the categories of protected areas for biodiversity conservation. 
Depending on the land-use restrictions associated with the different categories, the states 
choose their own conservation weights for each of the categories (Grieg-Gran 2000). In addi-
tion to taking the size of protected areas within municipal borders as a quantitative indicator, 
some states have implemented (much needed) quality indicators (Loureiro 2002; May et al. 
2002). In this way, the existence of strictly protected and well-managed national parks gives 
rise to higher ecological fiscal transfers than, for example, environmental protection areas or 
buffer zones.  
 1   Economic instruments for conservation policies 49 
The states of Paraná, Minas Gerais, Rondônia and São Paulo have been implementing the 
instrument for several years. In Paraná, 50 % of all municipalities now benefit from ecologi-
cal fiscal transfers; in Minas Gerais, 30 % of the municipalities receive fiscal transfers based 
on conservation units. Since the introduction of the instrument, both states have seen a con-
siderable increase in protected areas at all governmental levels, although in relative terms, the 
incentive effect was most outstanding at the local level (May et al. 2002). This demonstrates 
rather nicely that instead of these protected areas being continuously perceived as obstacles to 
economic development, they are increasingly welcomed at the local level, not least as a 
source of – at times – substantial fiscal revenues. For some municipalities in rural and remote 
areas with low economic and agricultural productivity, ecological fiscal transfers may even 
represent the main revenue source. 
The Brazilian experience illustrates that ecological fiscal transfers can represent both a 
means of compensation for land-use restrictions and an incentive to value and engage in more 
conservation activities at the local level. The article concludes with some reflections on the 
environmental policy developments now necessary in Brazil and with some comments on 
transferability: the positive experiences with introducing ecological indicators into the Brazil-
ian system of intergovernmental fiscal transfers make it worth to presenting it as an innova-
tive example that could potentially be transferred to other federal systems, not least the Euro-
pean Union and its member states. European decision makers are certainly interested in learn-
ing from this kind of innovative policy: Immediately upon publication, this article was se-
lected for inclusion in the Science for Environment Policy Newsletter issued by the European 
Commission, the DG Environment News Alert Service (Science for Environment Policy 2008).  
1.3 Applied biodiversity governance: 
Interdisciplinary and policy-relevant contributions 
This section introduces Part III, containing chapters 6–9 of the thesis. Chapters 6 and 9 are 
two multi-authored articles with authors from different disciplines. Chapter 7 provides an 
economic perspective on nature conservation competencies in the then ongoing “Modernisa-
tion of the Federal Structure” in Germany. Chapter 8 was a contribution to a research sympo-
sium and book project, focusing on the shifting boundaries between “public” and “private” in 
natural resource governance. 
Environmental research – often associated with the origin and development of ecology – 
always required the collaboration among different natural scientific disciplines (Daschkeit 
1998). Interdisciplinary environmental research integrated knowledge from physics, chemis-
try, biology and the earth sciences. Today, it is widely recognised that scientific understand-
ing of many aspects of global and environmental change is directly related to an understand-
ing of human activities (e.g., Costanza 1991; Balstad Miller 1994; MA 2005a).  
What is the added value of interdisciplinary research between economists and ecologists on 
the one hand, and between economists and other social scientists on the other? Firstly, eco-
nomics benefits considerably from insights gained in collaboration with ecologists and other 
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social scientists. Public goods and services associated with nature and biodiversity conserva-
tion are by their very nature complex; they include largely heterogeneous goods and involve, 
among other factors, complementary relationships among species and restricted substitutabil-
ity of ecosystem functions (Jentsch et al. 2003; Naeem et al. 2009; Ring et al. 2010 a, b). 
Since the economic costs and ecological benefits of conservation measures are heterogeneous 
in space and over time, only ecological-economic research can provide policy recommenda-
tions based on complex realities (Johst et al. 2002; Wätzold et al. 2006; Wätzold et al. 2008a). 
Hence, economic analysis of conservation policies and instruments must build on and inte-
grate the latest results of ecological research, if those policies and instruments are to be able 
to actually achieve conservation objectives. 
Secondly, economics also benefits from other social sciences in that the latter provide theo-
ries and methods to understand human behaviour and perceptions – be it on an individual ba-
sis or related to social groups – that economic reasoning cannot capture (Vatn 2005). Only 
with this wider approach, and focusing on the formal and informal institutions of environ-
mental decision making, is it possible to design and implement conservation policies and in-
struments that fit with social realities. The economically best designed compensation pay-
ments for conservation measures are useless if eligible applicants – frustrated at not being 
involved in the selection of large protected areas from the very beginning of the relevant 
planning processes – do not use them (Stoll-Kleemann 2001).  
Thirdly, ecologists and other social scientists in turn benefit greatly from integrating an 
economic perspective into their research design. Conservation policies are still based largely 
on conservation biology and ecological sciences, but could have a much greater impact if 
economic principles and efficiency considerations were better integrated (Hampicke et al. 
2006). Economics provides methodologies and instruments that help achieve given conserva-
tion goals at far lower costs; moreover, scarce resources for conservation policies last longer 
and achieve more conservation objectives when used cost-effectively (Wätzold and 
Schwerdtner 2005; Wätzold et al. 2008a, b; TEEB 2009).   
Truly interdisciplinary research is often called for but still difficult to realise. Ring et al. 
(1999) present several stages of cross-disciplinary cooperation. The most advanced stage is 
integrative interdisciplinary research: Researchers from different disciplinary traditions start 
their collaboration “by reconceptualising and jointly defining the research problem. Interdis-
ciplinary research often leads to reconsidering the nature of the problem in order to reach a 
commonly accepted problem description as a basis for subsequent project work” (Ring et al. 
1999, p. 6). Although easily said, this is often ignored. Nevertheless, it provides the basis for 
both chapter 6 – written by ecologists and economists in the course of preparing a research 
agenda for integrative biodiversity research at a large research centre – and chapter 9, which 
analyses policies for biodiversity conflict reconciliation. Chapter 9 was written by legal scien-
tists, an anthropologist and an economist, but builds on research results gained in close col-
laboration with conservation biologists and ecologists in a large EU-funded research project. 
Coordinated by Klaus Henle and Irene Ring (UFZ), the project involved about 60 researchers 
from the natural and social sciences across Europe who developed strategies for coping with 
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conflicts between species protection and economic development, using fish-eating vertebrates 
and fisheries as a model case (Klenke et al. 2010).  
In addition to interdisciplinary contributions, Part III includes a focus on applied and pol-
icy-relevant research in a governance context. Chapter 6 discusses the prerequisites of socially 
meaningful and policy-relevant biodiversity research, while chapters 7–9 are policy-relevant 
research contributions in themselves.  
Chapters 7 (in German) and 8 (in English) both apply the concept of governance to biodi-
versity conservation and link it to the economic theory of environmental federalism. Theoreti-
cal arguments building on the economic theory of federalism are developed to justify in eco-
nomic terms a sound distribution of conservation competencies in federal systems, serving as 
a scholarly basis for policy recommendations in the course of the modernisation of the federal 
structure in Germany (chapter 7). In this context, the spatial distribution of conservation bene-
fits and costs deserves special attention (see also Revesz 2000; List et al. 2002; Perrings and 
Gadgil 2003; Wätzold et al. 2008a).  
Biodiversity governance involves the coordination of policies, instruments and actors 
across several governmental levels, captured by the terms multi-level and multi-actor govern-
ance (chapter 8, Ring 2008c). In addition, the governance concept has to be seen in relation to 
different modes of environmental decision making. Decisions can be taken by governments, 
in which case hierarchical decision making is the rule, representing the traditional command-
and-control approach to environmental policies. They may also be subject to market mecha-
nisms, provided adequate property regimes are defined first (Vatn 2005). Last but not least, 
decision making may be located in the realm of civil society, represented by citizens or non-
governmental organisations.  
It is against this background that chapter 8 elaborates some theoretical links between the 
economic theory of federalism and an institutional and governance-oriented perspective on 
conservation policies. The chapter then proceeds to examine the design and implementation 
of ecological fiscal transfers in Brazil in a multi-level and multi-actor perspective. Referring 
to the ICMS Ecológico in Brazil, a state-driven policy instrument, the various public-private 
partnerships that developed with the practical implementation of the instrument are addressed,  
thus showing how it exemplifies hybrid forms of governance and reflects a “blurring of the 
sharp dichotomy between public and private in practice” (Sikor et al. 2009, p. 2).  
Finally, chapter 9 combines economic, legal and anthropological expertise in an evaluation 
of policy mixes at different governmental levels in Europe relevant to the resolution of con-
flicts between species protection and fisheries. It analyses the options and limitations con-
tained in European Union-level framework regulation aimed at resolving biodiversity-related 
conflicts at national and local levels. Regional case studies are drawn from Finland and Ger-
many. Building on legal and institutional analyses at different levels of decision making, rec-
ommendations are elaborated for a better coordination of conservation policies in federal sys-
tems. 
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1.3.1 Biodiversity. Emerging issues for linking natural and social sciences 
This chapter was published as “Jentsch, A., Wittmer, H., Jax, K., Ring, I., Henle, K. (2003). 
Biodiversity. Emerging issues for linking natural and social sciences. GAIA 12(2): 121–128” 
(Impact factor 2008: 0,653). 
The article discusses new dimensions of the challenges involved in linking the natural and 
social sciences to conduct integrative biodiversity research. The insights presented result from 
the preparation of a biodiversity research plan as part of the Helmholtz Association’s research 
programme on the “Sustainable Use of Landscapes”, running from 2003–2008. To make bio-
diversity research both scientifically sound and policy-relevant, the authors argue, “methods 
and tools to link the natural and social sciences have to be adjusted to the specific issue under 
consideration” (Jentsch et al. 2003, p. 121). 
After a brief introduction addressing the relevance of biodiversity for sustained ecosystem 
service provision, the article illustrates the challenges of and potential for integrative research, 
using as examples the key drivers of biodiversity change: disturbances, invasions, and frag-
mentation, as well as biodiversity conservation as a societal process and policy response to 
the ongoing loss of biological diversity. Disciplinary methods and tools, such as biodiversity 
assessment, experimental research and ecological modelling in the natural sciences, or eco-
nomic valuation, policy analysis, the investigation of stakeholder perceptions and participa-
tory methods in the social sciences (to name but a few), need to be appropriately combined in 
order to address the problem in its specific context. 
Following this, a number of promising tools are presented which, in themselves, combine 
knowledge from different disciplines. One of these tools is Integrated Assessment (Horsch et 
al. 2001), which makes it possible to draw upon a variety of methods that integrate knowledge 
from both the natural and social sciences, such as ecological-economic modelling (Johst et al. 
2002; Wätzold et al. 2006) and multi-criteria decision analysis (Drechsler and Burgman 
2004). In a transdisciplinary research framework bridging science and society, these methods 
are best applied in a participatory context (Klauer et al. 2006; Rauschmayer and Risse 2005; 
Rauschmayer and Wittmer 2006).  
Risk assessment is another methodology which – when dealing with invasive species, for 
example – needs to build on the biological impacts of invasive species as well as the expected 
social and economic consequences of biological invasions, all of which are subject to uncer-
tainty. Spatial modelling based on Geographic Information Systems (GIS) provides an oppor-
tunity to visualise land-use changes and may serve as an important tool to demonstrate the 
potential effects of economic instruments and other policy measures to decision makers (e.g., 
Ring 2008a). Ecological-economic modelling and spatial modelling linked to planning tools 
are especially important in the context of increasingly fragmented landscapes, fragmentation 
being among the major drivers of the current loss of biodiversity (Kaule et al. 1999; Henle et 
al. 2004). 
Research on disturbances, biological invasions and fragmentation is framed predominantly 
by natural scientists. This is in contrast to the field of biodiversity conservation, which is un-
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derstood here as a policy response to biodiversity loss involving social processes. Human re-
source use can be considered a starting point of the problem, based as it is on governance 
structures and institutional settings, and on the rules, norms and traditions in a society 
(Kissling-Näf and Kern 2002; Vatn 2005). The authors encourage policy makers to adopt the 
perspective of the “affected actors” (Jentsch et al. 2003, p. 125). Making research relevant to 
stakeholders may pose a real challenge for ecologists and economists, but it is crucial for the 
conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity. Participatory methods involve relevant ac-
tors and stakeholder groups directly in the research process (Moll and Zander 2006) and are 
an important means of conducting socially relevant biodiversity research.  
1.3.2 Naturschutz in der föderalen Aufgabenteilung: 
Zur Notwendigkeit einer Bundeskompetenz aus ökonomischer Perspektive 
This chapter was published as “Ring, I. (2004). Naturschutz in der föderalen Aufgabentei-
lung: Zur Notwendigkeit einer Bundeskompetenz aus ökonomischer Perspektive. Natur und 
Landschaft 79(11): 494–500”. 
In October 2003, the German Parliament and the Bundesrat inaugurated a “Commission on 
the Modernisation of the Federal Structure” which developed proposals, among other things, 
to reallocate legislative competencies between the federal and the state governmental levels in 
Germany. The Commission itself consisted of politicians but had appointed academic experts 
from the juridical, economic and political sciences to provide expert knowledge and advice. 
Although very few of the selected experts had working experience in environmental or con-
servation matters, that did not prevent them from making proposals with far-reaching conse-
quences for environmental legislation. 
Since nature conservation law in Germany at the time was subject to framework regulation 
at the federal level in addition to 16 implementing conservation laws at the state level 
(Länder), a potential change in legislation – be it to strengthen federal competencies or to 
devolve competencies to the state level – might have had serious consequences for conserva-
tion law (Koch and Mechel 2004). Four experts explicitly called for the abolition of the 
framework regulation for nature conservation law, water resources management and some 
other environmental matters in combination with devolving the relevant competencies to the 
state level (Huber 2003; Schmidt-Jortzig 2003; Scholz 2003; Benz 2003). In contrast, Meyer 
(2004) favoured federal competencies for the full range of environmental and conservation 
laws, while Scharpf (2004) argued in a more differentiated way, considering external effects 
and economies of scale in environmental policy. 
Against this background, the article presents economic arguments for and against nature 
conservation competencies at various governmental levels. Nature conservation is a public 
good with benefits accruing predominantly at national and international levels. The costs of 
conservation are distributed unequally, both in terms of economic sectors (agriculture and 
forestry) and in terms of the spatial distribution of protected areas across the various German 
Länder. These findings suggest the need for national-level competencies and standard setting. 
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The economic perspective supports keeping or even strengthening nature conservation com-
petencies at the national level.  
At the end of the Commission’s work, an agreement was reached that all environmental 
and conservation matters should be combined in a unified Environmental Code at the federal 
level, consisting of several books for the different matters involved. Environmental experts 
have long been calling for the bundling of environmental competencies at the federal level 
(Haber, personal communication), as too have conservation NGOs, and now, for the first time 
in German history, it was finally to be realised by the Grand Coalition in the coming legisla-
tive period. Federal authorities and ministries worked under great pressure to draft the new 
Environmental Code. However, in early 2009, the Environmental Code failed due to the resis-
tance of the CDU/CSU parliamentary group, prompted by CSU politicians who requested 
exemptions and extra regulations for the Free State of Bavaria (BMU 2009a, 2009b). Never-
theless, in July 2009 the Bundesrat finally endorsed a new environmental law reform with 
uniform federal requirements both for nature conservation and water legislation (BMU 
2009c). However, the key element of the reform, the so-called “integrated project authorisa-
tion” (Integrierte Vorhabengenehmigung) will not become reality due to political resistance. 
1.3.3 Biodiversity governance: Adjusting local costs and global benefits 
This chapter was published as “Ring, I. (2008c). Biodiversity governance: Adjusting local 
costs and global benefits. In: Sikor, T. (Ed.), Public and Private in Natural Resource Govern-
ance: A False Dichotomy? Earthscan, London, pp. 107–126”. 
This chapter explicitly sets biodiversity conservation and policies in a governance context. 
Biodiversity governance is defined in terms of both multi-level and multi-actor governance. 
Additionally, the development and implementation of policy instruments is linked to a gov-
ernance perspective on different regimes of decision making, including hierarchical decision 
making, market regimes, voluntary solutions, as well as mixed regimes: “Regulation, eco-
nomic incentives, voluntary, informative and communicative instruments on the public side as 
well as activities initiated by civil society continuously interact and are of varying importance 
depending upon the concrete problem” (chapter 8, p. 179f.). In societal reality, policy mixes 
(and thus increasing interaction between public and private spheres) also apply to the field of 
biodiversity governance. 
Furthermore, the chapter provides a link between biodiversity governance and the eco-
nomic theory of fiscal federalism. Fiscal federalism is concerned with the assignment of pub-
lic functions, expenditures and fiscal instruments to different levels of government. Therefore, 
an important link exists between multi-level governance and fiscal federalism, where the spa-
tial characteristics of biodiversity conservation are of importance. Building on the spatial dis-
tribution of conservation benefits and costs and the need for their reconciliation to allow for 
sufficient provision of related goods and services, the chapter proceeds with the necessary 
consequences for intergovernmental fiscal relations and associated fiscal instruments. 
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Finally, the chapter is devoted to a case study focused on the Brazilian ICMS Ecológico as 
an instrument capable of reconciling the local costs and spillover benefits of biodiversity con-
servation. Although a hierarchical, state-governed instrument, it is an economic instrument by 
nature. Furthermore, the ICMS Ecológico emerged as an economic incentive for new forms of 
public-private interaction. Hence, the instrument and its impacts are a good illustration “of the 
shifting boundaries between notions of publics and privates in various aspects” (chapter 8, 
p. 181). 
1.3.4 Protected species in conflict with fisheries: 
The interplay between European and national regulation 
This chapter was published as “Similä, J., Thum, R., Varjopuro, R., Ring, I. (2006). Protected 
species in conflict with fisheries: The interplay between European and national regulation. 
Journal of European Environmental and Planning Law 3(5): 432–445”. 
The article is based on interdisciplinary and applied research results from the EU-funded 
5th framework programme research project “FRAP – Development of a procedural Frame-
work for Action Plans to Reconcile conflicts between the conservation of large vertebrates 
and the use of biological resources: Fisheries and fish-eating vertebrates as a model case”. 
The project was coordinated jointly by the UFZ Departments of Conservation Biology (K. 
Henle) and Economics (I. Ring), with further partners from Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Por-
tugal, Italy, Austria, the Czech Republic and the UK. In each of the selected model regions 
across Europe an interdisciplinary team consisting of natural and social scientists performed 
empirical and participatory research on conflicts between fisheries (or aquaculture, depending 
on location) and protected species: the species investigated were the Eurasian otter (Lutra 
lutra) in Central Europe (Germany, Czech Republic and Austria) and Portugal, the grey seal 
(Halichoerus grypus) in Finland and Sweden, and the great cormorant (Phalacrocorax carbo 
sinensis) in Denmark, Italy, and Germany (Klenke et al. 2010).  
The project’s focus was on a problem that is encountered worldwide (e.g., Conover 2002; 
Woodroffe et al. 2005; Manfredo et al. 2009): Successful public conservation policies at vari-
ous governmental levels have increased some populations of protected species to the extent 
that they are causing damage to human activities including agriculture, forestry, fisheries and 
aquaculture. As a response to growing biodiversity conflicts, public authorities and all parties 
interested in species conservation need to develop strategies for conflict resolution (Treves et 
al. 2006; Ring 2009; White et al. 2009). Otherwise they once again risk species populations 
dwindling, largely for the same reasons why these populations decreased in the past: species 
in conflict with human activities were often hunted by humans who were enduring damage (or 
thought they were), or the species were hunted down and killed for other reasons; or – at the 
very least – they were constricted in their habitat requirements.  
The article itself – as part of the EU project’s work package 4 (Legal and institutional 
framework) – explores the options offered by European regulation and the restrictions it im-
poses on European Member States. Relevant European policy fields are the Common 
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Fisheries Policy, nature conservation regulation (with the Habitats and the Birds Directive), 
EU state aid regulation aimed at avoiding distorted competition within the Common Market, 
and European funds providing financial support to Member States. The interrelationship be-
tween European and national regulation is investigated on the basis of experience with Ger-
man and Finnish biodiversity reconciliation policies.  
Finland and Germany have both developed reconciliation policies for the conflicts between 
nature conservation and fisheries. In Finland, the major conflict relates to grey seals, which 
cause damage to small-scale coastal fisheries. In Saxony, Germany, cormorants and otters are 
causing damage to aquaculture by feeding on carp. Reconciliation policies in both countries 
include a mix of policy instruments and measures including the management of populations, 
protective hunting, support for technical measures and various types of compensation pay-
ments. All these measures are affected by European policy and law, though no special recon-
ciliation policy has been adopted at European level. The article concludes with suggestions 
for better coordination of reconciliation policies between different governmental levels. 
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Abstract 
The concept of sustainability requires the acknowledgement and appropriate financing of eco-
logical, economic and social public functions at all levels of government. Whereas the signifi-
cance of socio-economic functions has a comparably long tradition in federal systems, the 
respective consideration of ecological functions is still waiting to be fully realised. The aim of 
this article is to analyse the roles fiscal federalism and fiscal instruments can play in address-
ing ecological public functions assigned to decentralised jurisdictions in federal systems. For 
this purpose, an investigation of intergovernmental fiscal relations and their significance for 
the local level is carried out by way of example for the Federal Republic of Germany. Based 
on a status quo analysis of the various German fiscal equalisation laws at the local level, the 
article presents options for systematically integrating neglected ecological functions and indi-
cators into the existing legal framework. The empirical analysis shows that end-of-the-pipe 
and infrastructure-related ecological functions are already strongly integrated by way of con-
ditional grants. However, precautionary functions such as nature and resource conservation 
issues are still largely absent. Therefore, a comprehensive consideration of ecological public 
functions in Germany calls for the integration of nature conservation issues and respective 
indicators into the system of intergovernmental fiscal relations.  
Keywords: 
Environmental federalism, environmental sustainability, intergovernmental fiscal relations, 
fiscal grants, local jurisdictions, Germany 
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2.1 Introduction 
Sustainable development has become a key concept within environmental policy analysis. 
When adequately implemented, it adds new elements and criteria to the formulation and 
evaluation of environmental policy (van den Bergh 1996). In its early stages, it developed 
within the context of global environmental problems (e.g. WCED 1987). However, sustain-
able development involves the proper integration of environmental concerns into policy-
making at all levels of decision (Hardy and Lloyd 1994). Its implementation is a task of not 
just environmental institutions but also economic, financial, agricultural and social institutions 
(van den Bergh 1996). Based on the concrete problems in mind, the policy levels and institu-
tions which have to be addressed are international, national, regional and local. Linking these 
thoughts to economic reasoning, the assignment of functions to different levels of government 
is found to be part of the basic theory of fiscal federalism (Oates 1972, 1999). Therefore, 
there is an important link between the implementation of the sustainability concept, environ-
mental policy, and the economic theory of federalism. 
In the following, special attention will be paid to the significance of decentralised levels of 
government for achieving environmental sustainability, such as the local level (i.e. the mu-
nicipal or district level) or the federal state level as an intermediate level below the nation 
states (e.g. the German Länder or the cantons in Switzerland). These administrative levels are 
of prime importance for the regional approach to sustainable development that has previously 
received comparatively little attention (van den Bergh 1996), even though growing interest 
can be noted (Ring et al. 1999; Köhn et al. 2001). 
Due to the public-good nature of many environmental goods and services, an essential step 
to achieve environmental sustainability at the regional level depends on the realisation and 
success of conservation and environmental policies at decentralised jurisdictions. A central 
problem, however, relates to the lack of financial resources for these issues compared to other, 
more traditional and established fields of socio-economic activities. Although ecological pub-
lic functions may be well defined for the various administrative levels in respective laws and 
regulations, the resources in terms of money and personnel necessary to ensure that jurisdic-
tions carry out these functions in a qualified manner are often lacking. This is especially true 
for conservation-oriented tasks (Henle 1995). Consequently, considerable shortcomings in the 
implementation process of relevant policies are almost inevitable (Kneer 1999). To secure the 
adequate provision of environmental goods and services at decentralised levels of govern-
ment, fiscal grants as part of fiscal equalisation at the local level have been increasingly dis-
cussed for Germany (SRU 1996, 2000; Rose 1999; Ewringmann and Bergmann 2000; Ring 
2000, 2001a). Initial initiatives towards integrating biodiversity into intergovernmental fiscal 
transfers are to be noted for Switzerland (Köllner et al. 2002). 
The following contribution is devoted to this kind of fiscal instrument, using the concept of 
sustainability as a normative basis and guiding principle to design intergovernmental fiscal 
relations in federal states. For this purpose, a brief review of basic ideas and principles of en-
vironmental federalism will provide the groundwork for further analysis. Following a defini-
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tion of ecological public functions, their significance and binding nature in legal terms will be 
presented within the context of the European Union. An empirical investigation of ecological 
functions in intergovernmental fiscal relations is then carried out by way of example for the 
Federal Republic of Germany. Specifically, the various fiscal equalisation laws of the German 
states are proposed as a means to integrate ecological aspects and thus help decentralised ju-
risdictions to sustain their natural endowment by offering compensation for their ecological 
services. 
2.2 Environmental federalism and ecological public functions 
2.2.1 Fiscal federalism and the environment 
Fiscal federalism as a subfield of public finance explores the roles of the different levels of 
government and the ways in which they are interrelated through fiscal instruments. It aims at 
improving the performance of the public sectors and the provision of their services by align-
ing responsibilities and fiscal instruments with the proper level of government. Environmental 
federalism links environmental issues with the basic theory of fiscal federalism. The public-
good nature of most environmental goods and services raises the question of which govern-
mental level should best be responsible for their provision. Following the general decentrali-
sation rule for the allocation function of public services (Musgrave 1959; Oates 1972), lower 
levels of government should be assigned the task of providing environmental goods and ser-
vices where appropriate. This way allows the regionally differing preferences of the popula-
tion to be reflected more adequately (Tiebout 1956). 
The general decentralisation rule for allocating public goods and services only applies in 
the absence of economies of scale. In the presence of economies of scale, the provision of the 
public goods concerned should be moved to the adequate, cost-efficient centralised level 
(Postlep and Döring 1996). Furthermore, due to the characteristics of non-rivalry and non-
excludability of many public goods, some of them are associated with spatial externalities 
between jurisdictions (spillovers). Here, the principle of fiscal equivalence advocates achiev-
ing a “match between those who receive the benefits of a collective good and those who pay 
for it” (Olson 1969). Environmental federalism necessitates an additional element concerning 
the principle of fiscal equivalence. It is no longer only the group benefiting that should come 
up with the costs of the public goods and services produced, and consequently, decide on the 
size of the jurisdiction; it is also the individuals responsible for polluting the environment who 
must be considered when deciding on the boundaries of the appropriate jurisdiction. To sum 
up this context, the term “ecological equivalence” has been coined (Huckestein 1993). Döring 
and Fromm (1997) developed a two-step procedure to apply the principle of fiscal equiva-
lence to environmental problems. Firstly, the appropriate jurisdiction of the environmental 
problem concerned has to be determined, including all the parties affected (e.g. polluting and 
harmed individuals). Secondly, a decision on financing public intervention has to be made. 
This decision may follow the polluter-pays principle, but it can also be made on the grounds 
of other principles (e.g. Coase theorem). 
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Due to the specific characteristics of natural resources and environmental quality, the im-
plementation of the general decentralisation rule begs a differentiated view. This is reflected 
in the ongoing debate on the responsibilities of the national or even supranational level versus 
the state or local governmental level in setting environmental standards or carrying out other 
environmental functions (Döring 1997; Scheberle 1997; Oates 1999). 
In the United States, far-reaching proposals have been put forward under the banner of 
“devolution” to return environmental standard-setting and policy-making from the national 
level to local and state governments and even, wherever possible, to private individuals 
(Anderson and Hill 1996). By contrast, Smith et al. (1997) highlight the importance of the 
information necessary, and the relevance of specific details to the application of conceptual 
models of federalism that “are especially important in structuring the jurisdictional responsi-
bilities for the design and implementation of different aspects of environmental policy”. The 
spatial dimension of environmental resources, particularly their linkages in creating spillover 
effects, must be considered when evaluating the costs of attaining any ambient quality level. 
Environmental goods require the production component of the delivery of local public goods 
to be more carefully investigated. This is a difference compared to most discussions in fiscal 
federalism that more often focus on available alternatives for financing public intervention or 
on preference heterogeneity in its implication for the amounts and types of public goods pro-
vided by different jurisdictions (Smith et al. 1997). For Canada, a critical view of passing too 
much responsibility from the federal to the provincial level is presented by Harrison (1996). 
In Europe, environmental federalism has been rediscovered and extensively discussed 
since the Treaty of Maastricht on European Union of 1992 that fundamentally strengthened 
the principle of subsidiarity (Huckestein 1993; Hansjürgens 1996; Döring 1997; Oates 1998). 
According to this principle, public policy and its implementation should be allocated to the 
smallest jurisdiction with the competence to achieve the objectives. Despite the firm and ex-
plicit reinforcement of the subsidiarity principle in the new Article 3b of the Treaty, a fair 
amount of leeway is left for interpretation. Therefore, any concrete implementation of envi-
ronmental policy has to go into the specific detail of the matter concerned. For example, the 
discovery and dissemination of basic knowledge about environmental harm and about the 
effectiveness of various policy instruments need to be assigned to a more centralised level of 
government, for this kind of public good tends to be underprovided at decentralised levels 
(Oates 1998). The same holds for highly mobile environmental compartments and associated 
pollutants that easily cross national boundaries, creating far-reaching spatial externalities 
(Hansjürgens 1996). Sulphur dioxide, carbon dioxide and ozone are typical air pollutants with 
a need for emission policies subject to more centralised governmental levels. 
In contrast, environmental policy associated with less mobile environmental compartments 
is better suited for assignment to lower levels of government. This is due to the lower prob-
ability of causing cross-boundary spatial externalities. Problems of land use and soil contami-
nation, as well as functions associated with inland waters, such as lakes or groundwater re-
sources, can usually be solved within national boundaries. The same holds for many issues 
related to nature conservation and landscape protection. Depending on the type of natural re-
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sources and environmental problems, there is room for even further decentralisation. In the 
federal system of Germany, environmental functions related to land-use planning, water re-
sources and nature conservation are only subject to framework regulation at the national level. 
Practical implementation is delegated to the various state laws, regulating the respective func-
tions of the state, regional and local levels of government. 
Despite the general suitability of some functions to be assigned to lower governmental lev-
els, spatial externalities may also exist requiring appropriate solutions. This is the case for 
special priority areas, e.g. regarding the conservation of rare species or the protection of 
drinking-water resources, that cause costs within the concerned jurisdiction, but externally 
benefit others. Although developed for other public goods, such as education, a solution to 
this kind of problem has already been suggested by Olson (1969). Provided diseconomies of 
large-scale operation call for local provision, these externalities should be internalised through 
government grants from more centralised levels, compensating local government for the ex-
ternal benefits of its expenditures. 
2.2.2 The significance of ecological public functions 
In the literature on environmental federalism, more general and theoretical expositions on 
linking federalism and the environment are often made for the case of environmental pollu-
tion. To stress the importance of natural resources protection on the one hand, and environ-
mental pollution on the other, the use of the more comprehensive adjective “ecological” in-
stead of “environmental” is introduced here for the respective public functions. The term 
“ecological public functions” is also used with reference to the three dimensions of the con-
cept of sustainability, explicitly indicating the need to consider ecological, economic and so-
cial public functions in intergovernmental fiscal relations. 
Concerning concrete areas of public activities, ecological public functions consist of the 
protection and sustainable use of natural resources, living organisms, ecosystems and land-
scapes. These precautionary-type functions also comprise activities aiming at the conservation 
of nature as a sound living basis for human life, including recreational purposes. Furthermore, 
ecological public functions address negative effects of human activities on the environment, 
including environmental pollution in the form of emissions, waste and contaminated sites, but 
also impaired or destroyed landscapes. Consequently, a comprehensive analysis of ecological 
public functions within intergovernmental fiscal relations should highlight precautionary 
functions referring to areas such as soil, water, nature protection, landscape preservation and 
recreation. It should also look at public functions associated with aftercare, such as sewage 
and waste disposal or the rehabilitation of contaminated sites and landscapes. The realisation 
of the concept of sustainability calls for the consideration and appropriate financing of these 
ecological public functions at any governmental level. With reference to the following case 
study, there are basically two arguments on which this claim can be legally founded within 
the European context. 
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The first argument is connected to a country’s membership in the European Union and the 
binding force of its legal framework. Although a few European initiatives can be traced back 
to the 1970s, the first comprehensive approach to environmental policy consisted of the for-
mulation of the First Environmental Action Programme in 1983. Since the Single European 
Act of 1987, a firm legal basis for a common environmental policy was created in the form of 
Articles 130 r–t of the European Treaties (Döring 1997). Finally, the Treaty of Amsterdam on 
European Union (1997) established the principle of sustainable development as part of the 
European legal framework. Firstly, sustainable development is part of the Treaty’s preamble 
as a general principle to be pursued by the Member States. Secondly, in the new Article 2 of 
the Treaty of Amsterdam, the implementation of sustainable development expressly enjoys 
equal rights with the promotion of economic and social progress, and the achievement of high 
employment levels (Frenz and Unnerstall 1999). The principle of sustainable development has 
hence become a leading concept for policy formulation in the Member States, and in combi-
nation with the subsidiarity principle, is waiting to be implemented at the appropriate gov-
ernmental levels. 
The second argument is connected to the development of conservation and environmental 
policies at national levels. As of the 1970s, in many European countries including Germany, a 
sophisticated and complex legal framework came into force that assigned numerous functions 
to different governmental levels. Depending on the design and interrelationship among fed-
eral, state, regional and local ecological functions, respective public expenditures accrue. 
However, as opposed to other public functions existing for many decades and endowed with 
comparatively substantial financial resources to secure the provision of the related public 
goods and services, nature conservation and environmental policy still suffer from a lack of 
financial resources due to their short history and the relatively weak influence of environ-
mental interest groups in the political process (e.g. for Germany, Soell 1989; Kaule 1991). 
2.2.3 Fiscal federalism co-evolving with environmental sustainability 
Both the general principle of sustainable development as adopted at the European level of 
government and the numerous ecological functions already assigned to the various govern-
mental levels within nation states call for consideration of ecological functions in intergov-
ernmental fiscal relations. Obviously, both arguments rest on the normative assumption that 
current legal frameworks, be it the European Treaties or the existing set of rules concerning 
national conservation and environmental policy, are accepted as an orientation for adjusting 
intergovernmental fiscal relations. 
This assumption can be seen to deviate from standard economic studies in fiscal federal-
ism. To determine any optimum level of government for the provision of public goods and 
services, investigations usually abstract from a given legal framework (Hansjürgens 1996). 
By contrast, economic reasoning in the public finance literature aims at identifying the opti-
mal size of the jurisdiction from the angle of economic efficiency. Although this is an impor-
tant standpoint, the primary interest of this article lies in a different direction. 
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Here, we start from the basic viewpoint of sustainable development as a concept necessary 
to be implemented, and seek possible ways of its realisation. Furthermore, although we are 
well aware of the shortcomings and the room for improvement of the present legal frame-
works on nature conservation and the environment, for the purpose of this study we take it as 
a given fact that ecological functions are assigned to different governmental levels. Our con-
cern is instead to contend that intergovernmental fiscal relations in federal systems have not 
yet adequately acknowledged and integrated the development achieved by contemporary so-
cieties in the field of conservation and environmental policy during the last three decades. It is 
argued that fiscal relations and fiscal instruments should mirror societal innovations, co-
evolve with the concept of sustainability, and specifically, help to implement environmental 
sustainability (Ring 1997). In our case this means that the relevant regulations should also 
consider ecological public functions just as they consider social and economic public func-
tions. 
In recent years, a variety of suggestions for the greening of government grants within the 
system of intergovernmental fiscal relations has been put forward for Germany, concentrating 
on fiscal equalisation at the local level. Therefore, the German federal system is chosen as an 
example for further empirical analysis, presenting the status quo of and further perspectives 
for considering ecological public functions in fiscal grants as relevant for decentralised levels 
of government. 
2.3 Fiscal equalisation at the local level in Germany 
2.3.1 Fiscal grants in the German federal system 
Intergovernmental fiscal grants play a distinctive and important role in fiscal federalism that 
can serve a number of different functions. Firstly, the literature emphasises the role of the 
internalisation of spillover benefits to other jurisdictions. Secondly, based on normative con-
siderations of equity, they serve the purpose of fiscal equalisation among different jurisdic-
tions. These equalising grants play a major role in the fiscal system of Germany, as well as in 
other federal systems such as Canada and Australia (Oates 1999). 
In the German federal system, basic regulations concerning intergovernmental fiscal rela-
tions are part of the German Constitution. It was the financial reform of 1969 that fundamen-
tally determined the present system of fiscal federalism (Lenk 1993; Zimmermann and Henke 
1994). The distribution of responsibilities among the federal, state and local level follows the 
principle of subsidiarity. The federal level carries out tasks of a general, usually nationwide, 
character. State and local authorities are politically responsible for regional and local devel-
opment. Federal and state governments draw up their own budgets and bear individual re-
sponsibility for their implementation. In addition, there are some supranational tasks that are 
planned and financed jointly by the federal government and the states. These “joint tasks” 
relate to improvements in the regional structure of the economy and the structure of agricul-
ture, as well as the protection of the coastline or the construction of university buildings 
(Seidel and Vesper 1999). 
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The German system of intergovernmental fiscal relations is based on two major pillars. On 
the one hand, the fiscal equalisation law (Finanzausgleichsgesetz) in its version of 1969, to-
gether with its numerous subsequent amendments, specifically lays down the intergovernmen-
tal fiscal relations between the central level and the states (Länder). Essentially, they cover 
the vertical fiscal relations between the federal level and the state level, and horizontal fiscal 
relations among the states themselves. On the other hand, there are intergovernmental fiscal 
relations within the states that are regulated in the 13 different fiscal equalisation laws of the 
various German Länder addressing fiscal equalisation at the local level (Kommunaler Finanz-
ausgleich). The latter comprises vertical fiscal relations between each state level and its local 
level of government (local and district councils), and in some of the states, horizontal fiscal 
relations between the local councils themselves. Due to the special importance of local juris-
dictions for implementing environmental sustainability at the regional level, further analysis 
will focus on fiscal equalisation at the local level.  
The local government level is given a relatively high degree of autonomy by the German 
Constitution. District councils and local councils (cities and communities) derive their author-
ity by implementing state or federal legislation, or by managing areas for which they have 
sole and direct responsibility. To carry out their functions, local governments require specific 
fiscal instruments (Zimmermann 1999). For this purpose, they rely on their own revenue 
sources such as local taxes and charges. In addition, local governments gain a considerable 
amount of income based on the intergovernmental fiscal relations laid down in the various 
fiscal equalisation laws. As for the vertical flow from the state to the local level, intergovern-
mental fiscal grants represent an important source of local income in Germany. More than 
50 % of average local income in eastern Germany (represented by the German Länder Bran-
denburg, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt and Thuringia) is gained 
from fiscal equalisation at the local level. In West Germany (Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, 
Hesse, Lower Saxony, North Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate, Saarland and Schles-
wig-Holstein), own revenues are higher, but grants from fiscal equalisation still represent al-
most 30 % of average local income (Karrenberg and Münstermann 2000).  
In a number of German states, the greater share of vertical transfers is given in the form of 
“unconditional grants”, i.e. lump-sum transfers to the local level of government to be used in 
any way the recipient wishes. The remaining share of vertical transfers is “conditional”, i.e. it 
is given for specific purposes and partly in the form of matching grants (the grantor only fi-
nances a specified share of the recipient’s expenditure). 
2.3.2 The role of socio-economic functions and indicators 
Intergovernmental fiscal grants play an important role in local and regional development by 
way of securing financial resources to local jurisdictions to carry out their various public 
functions. Nevertheless, in their current mode of implementation as set out in the fiscal 
equalisation laws of the German states, they also represent a source of inequality between 
urban and rural areas. 
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In the German Länder, lump-sum grants are assigned on the basis of the fiscal need of a 
local jurisdiction in relation to its fiscal capacity (revenues based on local taxes, etc.). The 
fiscal need is determined by adding up the “principal” and “additional” approaches. Whereas 
the principal approach has to take into account the general and average fiscal need of the ju-
risdiction, additional approaches are supposed to consider extra community-individual, re-
gional and transregional financial burdens. 
In most German states, the principal approach for allocating lump-sum transfers is defined 
by the product of the number of inhabitants and a weighting factor that increases with the 
population. Accordingly, the more inhabitants a local jurisdiction has, the higher the lump-
sum transfers. The basic argument for this relationship dates back to Brecht (1932), who for-
mulated the “law of the progressive parallel connection between public expenditure and popu-
lation concentration”. Further justification has been put forward by Popitz (1932), who argued 
that urban populations actually have a higher demand for public goods than rural ones. 
Nowadays, both arguments are highly controversial, and in the states of Rhineland-Palatinate 
and Schleswig-Holstein the weighting factor has already been abolished. For other states, the 
weighting factor is subject to much criticism in the public finance literature (Lenk and Birke 
1998). However, even in the absence of the weighting factor, the dominance of an inhabitant-
based indicator generally favours urban areas as opposed to rural areas due to the lower popu-
lation densities of the latter. 
Complementary to the inhabitant-based principal approach, some of the states also have 
additional approaches for allocating lump-sum transfers, e.g. taking into account the number 
of schoolchildren, the social burdens, or the central functions of the local jurisdictions. Usu-
ally, these additional indicators are also related to the socio-economic public functions of the 
jurisdictions. 
Concerning conditional grants for specific purposes, once again great consideration of 
socio-economic functions is to be observed in the various fiscal equalisation laws of the Ger-
man Länder. Here, areas such as transport and road construction, social burdens (e.g. assist-
ance to the unemployed or the poor), health services, education and cultural investments (al-
locations to theatres and opera houses) are explicitly addressed as a potential motivation for 
application. 
To sum up, urban and densely populated areas presently benefit from the system of inter-
governmental fiscal relations due to their socio-economic and cultural functions and the re-
spective indicators, especially those on which lump-sum transfers are based. Conversely, rural 
areas, due to their low population densities, receive a much smaller share of the overall verti-
cal flow. However, rural and remote areas usually provide ecological services for society as a 
whole, such as drinking-water protection, resource provision, the availability of unfragmented 
landscapes that are valuable habitats for endangered species, and recreational purposes. 
Therefore, successful sustainable development strategies have to address both these areas; in 
fact, they have to consider the imbalance between urban and rural areas concerning the spe-
cific land uses in place (SRU 1996; Ewers et al. 1997; Ring 2001b). 
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2.4 Ecological public functions at the local level: Status quo and 
perspectives for Germany 
Ecological public functions are already part of fiscal equalisation at the local level in a variety 
of different modes (Ring 2001a). However, before presenting the empirical results based on 
an analysis of all fiscal equalisation laws at the local level as currently in force for the states 
of the Federal Republic of Germany,1 some preliminary remarks must be made. It must be 
borne in mind that due to the federal structure in Germany, all German states are familiar with 
a great number of additional earmarked grants, mostly in the form of incentive programmes 
for environmental or conservation-oriented purposes (e.g. for Saxony, Frank and Ring 1999). 
These programmes can be exclusively implemented at the state level; some of them are jointly 
managed by the federal and the state level, while others are combined with agri-environ-
mental programmes at the European level (Plankl 1996). A comprehensive analysis of ear-
marked grants related to ecological public functions should ideally consider all additional 
regulations alongside fiscal equalisation, where local jurisdictions can serve as applicants. 
The main purpose of this analysis, though, is to precisely elaborate the present status of eco-
logical public functions within fiscal equalisation at the local level in Germany. This is due to 
the fact that grants from fiscal equalisation are among the most important income sources for 
local jurisdictions in Germany. Furthermore, fiscal equalisation serves a number of additional 
purposes from the angle of public finance. On the one hand, fiscal grants do not necessarily 
have to be earmarked and can still be based on ecological indicators referring to the fiscal 
need for ecological public functions. On the other hand, spillover effects related to ecological 
public functions can be effectively addressed within the system of intergovernmental fiscal 
relations just as spillover effects are currently addressed with respect to socio-economic and 
cultural functions of urban agglomerations. Therefore, the following analysis of fiscal equali-
sation at the local level is designed firstly to identify the kinds of ecological functions consid-
ered (respectively neglected), and secondly to point out the types of grants and indicators cur-
rently used for ecological functions. Based on the results, recommendations can be made for 
the comprehensive consideration of ecological public functions within fiscal equalisation at 
the local level in Germany. 
2.4.1 Area-related indicators as an indirect approach 
In a very basic sense, area-related approaches constitute a first step towards acknowledging 
ecological functions (Ring 2000). This is due to the importance of area and its associated land 
uses for many ecological functions. The need to consider area as an indicator for allocating 
intergovernmental fiscal grants is especially important for large communities and for district 
councils as opposed to smaller communities that are part of the wider district (local councils) 
or district-independent cities. The larger a community or district is, and the farther away it is 
from an urban agglomeration, the higher the relevance of area-related indicators. These re-
                                                 
1  Only the city states Berlin, Bremen and Hamburg are excluded. Due to their specific situation, local and state 
public functions can hardly be separated and so no fiscal equalisation laws exist. 
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mote areas are often characterised by low population densities and, in terms of land use, by a 
higher proportion of agricultural land and forestry, as well as more valuable habitats for rare 
species. Therefore, it is not surprising that consideration of area-related indicators has long 
been championed by the German Association of District Councils (Henneke 2001). This is 
due to the cost relevance of area for financing specific local public functions. The larger the 
community or district area in combination with a lower population density, the more expen-
sive the production of certain public goods and services. Bergmann (1999) and Henneke 
(2001) mention additional costs related to both ecological and socio-economic public func-
tions such as nature conservation, agricultural affairs, waste disposal, water supply, public 
transport, education and health services. 
Therefore, the majority of fiscal equalisation laws at the local level already consider area-
related indicators in one way or another, except in Lower Saxony. In Brandenburg, Mecklen-
burg-Western Pomerania, Rhineland-Palatinate and Saxony-Anhalt, area is one of a number 
of indicators for the distribution of lump-sum transfers. Other states use area as one indicator 
to distribute lump-sum transfers for municipal investments. Most states make use of condi-
tional grants for selected public functions that become more expensive with a larger district 
area. However, these earmarked grants usually cover road construction and maintenance, pub-
lic transport and transport for schoolchildren. Although theoretical claims clearly cover eco-
logical functions, existing regulations concerning area as an indicator in the various fiscal 
equalisation laws at the local level predominantly concentrate on socio-economic functions. 
2.4.2 The direct consideration of ecological public functions  
Beyond area as a rather indirect indicator, most fiscal equalisation laws at the local level also 
directly consider ecological functions. Firstly, the total amount of finance available for distri-
bution to local government can be divided such that ecological functions are also taken into 
account. Before any indicators come into play, a certain amount of funds can be earmarked in 
advance for selected ecological purposes in addition to the monies set aside for traditional 
purposes (Ewers et al. 1997; Rose 1999). The states of Bavaria, Baden-Württemberg, Saxony 
and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania make use of this possibility (Ring 2001a).  
Secondly, additional approaches can include ecological functions as a basis for calculating 
the fiscal need in the course of determining lump-sum transfers. For example, Saarland has an 
additional approach for local jurisdictions suffering from mining damage; Hesse, Saarland 
and Rhineland-Palatinate use them for local public functions related to spas. 
Thirdly – /and this is by far the option most used – /fiscal equalisation at the local level con-
siders ecological functions by means of conditional grants (Ring 2001a). Table 2.1 gives an 
overview of supported areas and measures in the states concerned. Most of the fiscal equalisa-
tion laws explicitly specify measures related to sewage disposal, water supply and waste dis-
posal. Conditional grants for the prospecting and remediation of contaminated sites are also 
quite common. Further ecological functions can only be sporadically found in a few fiscal 
equalisation laws, mainly concerning precautionary-type measures related to nature and re-
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source protection or landscape conservation. Brandenburg places emphasis on functions re-
lated to agriculture and tourism, while Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania considers landscape 
maintenance. In the way of conditional grants, Hesse supports projects in the areas of biotope 
protection, biotope networks and water conservation schemes. North Rhine-Westphalia speci-
fies grants for the preservation of cultural landscapes and natural monuments, including the 
ecological rehabilitation and landscaping of the Emscher-Lippe area. 
To sum up, there is a widespread tendency to support end-of-the-pipe infrastructure such as 
sewage and waste disposal. With the exception of functions related to (drinking) water, re-
sources protection and nature conservation activities are rarely supported. Furthermore, most 
ecological functions implemented in fiscal equalisation laws are only represented by condi-
tional grants or the provision of loans for local government. Apart from area as an indirect 
indicator for certain ecological functions, there is no principal or additional approach based on 
an indicator generally taking into account ecological functions comparable to the considera-
tion of inhabitants for the socio-economic functions. Consequently, ecological functions pre-
dominantly provided by rural and remote areas are underrepresented in fiscal equalisation at 
the local level, and therefore the respective jurisdictions are not compensated for the external 
benefits of their expenditure. This insufficient spatial coincidence of costs and benefits may 
lead to an underprovision of the public goods and services concerned (Bergmann 1999). 
Table 2.1: Ecological functions in fiscal equalisation at the local level in Germany 
Area Supported measures German states  
Soil Prospecting and remediation of contaminated 
sites, recultivation 
BY, BW, HE, NW, TH 
Water Water protection HE 
 Water supply BY, BW, HE, MV, RP, SL, SN, TH 
 Sewage disposal BY, BB, BW, HE, MV, NW, RP, SL, 
SN, TH 
Nature conservation Nature protection and landscape conservation BB, HE, MV, NW 
Recreation Spas BW, NW, RP 
 Recreation and tourism BB, MV, RP, SH 
Waste disposal Waste disposal plants BY, HE, MV, RP, SL, TH 
Energy Energy saving measures HE 
BW, Baden-Württemberg; BY, Bavaria; BB, Brandenburg; HE, Hesse; MV, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania; 
NW, North Rhine-Westphalia; RP, Rhineland-Palatinate; SL, Saarland; SN, Saxony; SH, Schleswig-Holstein; 
TH, Thuringia. 
Source: Ring 2001a. 
 
2.4.3 Fiscal options for further considering ecological functions 
One way of counteracting the underprovision of ecological goods and services would be to 
systematically integrate ecological functions into the various fiscal equalisation laws at the 
local level. Concerning the types of ecological functions, precautionary and intergenerational 
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ecological functions must be stressed, such as nature conservation and landscape preservation 
as well as soil and water protection. With regard to the types of grants, a distinction has to be 
drawn between lump-sum and conditional grants. 
There are two options for considering ecological indicators in the course of determining 
lump-sum grants in Germany. In addition to existing inhabitant-based principal approaches, 
the calculation of the general fiscal need of a local jurisdiction may also be based on appro-
priate ecological indicators. Complementary additional approaches might be adapted to take 
into account specific ecological needs. Some authors favour extending the additional ap-
proaches, since they are explicitly meant to unfold a certain steering function (Bergmann 
1999). 
However, only the category of direct costs accruing for ecological public functions pro-
vides a basis for extending both principal and additional approaches. Although a lack of fi-
nancial resources for conservation-oriented tasks is often stated, there are few empirical stud-
ies that actually try to determine budgetary deficits related to these tasks. This is even more 
true for the corresponding costs of local jurisdictions (an exemption is Karl (1995)). Thus, 
there is a need for empirical studies investigating the direct costs borne by local governments 
due to the provision of ecological goods and services. Implementation deficits due to the lack 
of resources in terms of personnel or monies available should also be considered. Founded on 
these studies, appropriate abiotic or biotic indicators need to be identified that might consti-
tute a link between the ecological functions and the respective costs required for their provi-
sion (Ring 2000). 
The category of conditional grants is especially well suited to internalise spillover effects 
(Oates 1972; Fischer 1988). Local governments bear financial burdens for providing ecologi-
cal goods and services that at least partially benefit other jurisdictions. This burden can accrue 
in the form of direct costs, e.g. for conserving protected sites of (inter)national importance. It 
may also show up in the form of opportunity costs, for a protected area status may restrict 
other (economic) development options. Ideally, the grantor finances the share of the recipi-
ent’s expenditure that externally benefits other jurisdictions. However, due to the well-known 
difficulties of accurately determining spillover effects, appropriate procedures have to be de-
veloped to approximately decide the local and external benefits of relevant expenditures. The 
local benefit for providing certain ecological goods and services should ultimately be re-
flected in the matching contribution of the local government to receive a conditional grant. 
Furthermore, the category of conditional grants may be used to adjust local behaviour to 
the objectives of centralised governments. Conditional grants can thus be introduced as an 
incentive for local governments to spend more money on conservation-oriented tasks. Al-
though this option has already been realised in some of the fiscal equalisation laws, this kind 
of steering effect need not necessarily be exerted by fiscal grants within the system of fiscal 
equalisation at the local level. There are a number of earmarked grants as part of conserva-
tion-oriented incentive programmes in the German states that can also be used for this pur-
pose. 
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2.5 Conclusion 
Sustainable development requires the acknowledgement and financing of ecological, eco-
nomic and social public functions at all levels of government. Whereas economic and social 
public functions have a rather long tradition in the intergovernmental fiscal relations of fed-
eral systems, ecological public functions have only appeared comparatively recently on the 
political agenda. An important step towards implementing sustainable development thus con-
sists in strengthening ecological functions. Well-established economic, financial and social 
institutions such as the fiscal transfer systems in federal states presently face the challenge of 
co-evolving with the implementation of environmental sustainability at various governmental 
levels. Finally, ecological aspects will have to be regarded as a matter of course in all relevant 
domains of intergovernmental fiscal relations. 
Although this article presented a national case study, the general message can be trans-
ferred to other federal systems. The binding force of the European legal framework with its 
common environmental policy and the adoption of the principle of sustainability clearly give 
a direction for the greening of intergovernmental fiscal relations in all Member States. Fur-
thermore, many other federal systems around the world have committed themselves to com-
ply with international environmental treaties and to implement the concept of sustainability. 
Sophisticated legal frameworks now exist in numerous states assigning ecological functions 
to different governmental levels. However, the kinds of recommendations to be made for con-
sidering ecological public functions at various levels of government strongly depend on the 
type of federal system investigated (e.g. co-operative versus competitive federalism), the gen-
eral role and functions of different jurisdictions within these systems, and the specific envi-
ronmental legislation in force. 
Research at the interface of implementing the sustainability concept, conservation and en-
vironmental policies, and the economic theory of federalism is still more or less in its infancy. 
Few studies exist so far that investigate intergovernmental fiscal relations for their potential to 
adequately consider ecological aspects in terms of public functions and appropriate financing. 
The German case study has shown that although ecological functions are partly considered 
within the system of fiscal equalisation at the local level, there is still a long way to go before 
intergovernmental fiscal relations systematically address ecological functions. The empirical 
results seem to somewhat mirror the general historical development of environmental poli-
cies. In the early phases of environmental policy, a narrow focus on the point of emissions 
favoured technological, end-of-the-pipe solutions to acute and mostly local environmental 
problems. In later and more mature phases of environmental policy, the importance of precau-
tionary, long-term and co-evolutionary approaches was highlighted, calling for integrative 
concepts (Ring 1997). 
Both aspects have to be carefully considered in the course of analysing intergovernmental 
fiscal relations. Environmental federalism would then be achieved regarding both the ecologi-
cal functions and the financial resources needed to secure the provision of ecological services. 
In this way, a basic prerequisite for sustainable development – taking into consideration eco-
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logical, economic and social aspects – /would be fulfilled for fiscal instruments, thereby help-
ing to translate sustainability into reality. 
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3 Ökologische Aufgaben und ihre Berücksichtigung im 
kommunalen Finanzausgleich 
Ecological public functions and their consideration in 
fiscal equalisation at the local level 
This chapter was published as “Ring, I. (2001). Ökologische Aufgaben und ihre Berücksichti-
gung im kommunalen Finanzausgleich. In: Spehl, H., Held, M. (Eds.), Vom Wert der Vielfalt. 
Zeitschrift für angewandte Umweltforschung, Sonderheft 13: 236–249”. 
It was presented as a lecture at the conference “Vom Wert der Vielfalt – Diversität in Öko-
nomie und Ökologie” (On the value of diversity – diversity in economics and ecology), orga-
nised by the Vereinigung für Ökologische Ökonomie and the Evangelische Akademie Tutzing 
(30 April–2 May 2001, Tutzing, Germany).  
Abstract 
Regionale Nachhaltigkeit bedingt die Wahrnehmung und Finanzierung ökologischer, ökono-
mischer und sozialer öffentlicher Aufgaben durch kommunale Gebietskörperschaften. Wäh-
rend die Bedeutung sozioökonomischer Aufgaben im föderalen System der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland seit langem anerkannt ist, werden ökologische Aufgaben bislang nur teilweise 
berücksichtigt. Auf der Basis einer empirischen Analyse der kommunalen Finanzausgleichs-
gesetze der 13 Flächenländer präsentiert Irene Ring den Stand der Berücksichtigung ökologi-
scher Aufgaben und entwickelt Vorschläge für deren systematische Integration. 
3.1 Einführung 
Nachhaltige Entwicklung erfordert die Berücksichtigung von Umweltbelangen auf allen poli-
tischen Entscheidungsebenen. Aus einem ökonomischen Blickwinkel betrachtet, findet man 
die geeignete Zuweisung von öffentlichen Aufgaben zu unterschiedlichen föderalen Entschei-
dungsebenen als Gegenstand der ökonomischen Theorie des Föderalismus. Aus diesem Grund 
stehen die Operationalisierung des Leitbildes der Nachhaltigkeit, die erfolgreiche Umsetzung 
umweltpolitischer Ziele und die ökonomische Theorie des Föderalismus in einem engen Zu-
sammenhang.  
Für eine nachhaltige Regionalentwicklung ist die Art und Intensität der Landnutzung von 
herausragender Bedeutung, die wiederum davon abhängig ist, inwieweit Ressourcen-, Natur-, 
Landschafts- und Umweltschutz im regionalen Kontext verwirklicht sind. Aufgrund des in 
Deutschland verfassungsrechtlich garantierten Selbstverwaltungsrechtes von Gemeinden und 
Gemeindeverbänden sowie der damit verbundenen Planungshoheit bezüglich der Flächennut-
zung wird eine nachhaltige Landnutzung maßgeblich auf kommunaler Ebene bestimmt. Eine 
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wesentliche Frage besteht also darin, wie ökologisch notwendige und wünschenswerte Land-
nutzungspraktiken als Beitrag kommunaler Gebietskörperschaften zu einer nachhaltigen Re-
gionalentwicklung gefördert werden können – und ob es adäquate fiskalische Instrumente 
gibt, die eine nachhaltige Landnutzung unterstützen können. In diesem Zusammenhang wird 
seit einiger Zeit der kommunale Finanzausgleich verstärkt diskutiert (SRU 1996; Ewers et al. 
1997; Rose 1999). Der folgende Beitrag widmet sich diesem fiskalischen Instrument, indem 
das Konzept nachhaltiger Entwicklung als normative Leitidee für die Ausgestaltung der Fi-
nanzbeziehungen im föderativen Staat herangezogen wird. 
3.2 Die kommunale Ebene und ihre Einnahmequellen 
Die kommunale Ebene – dazu gehören kreisfreie Städte, Landkreise und Bezirksverbände 
sowie kreisangehörige Gemeinden – zeichnet sich in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland durch 
eine relativ hohe Autonomie aus, die durch das verfassungsrechtlich garantierte kommunale 
Selbstverwaltungsrecht begründet ist. Den Kommunen kommt je nach Rechtsgebiet eine ge-
wisse Eigenständigkeit in der Umsetzung von Landes- und Bundesrecht zu. Im Bereich der 
Bauleit- und Flächennutzungsplanung besitzen sie die Planungshoheit, was für Fragen der 
Landnutzung von besonderer Relevanz ist. Zur Durchführung ihrer in eigener Verantwortung 
zu regelnden Angelegenheiten der örtlichen Gemeinschaft sowie zur Erledigung der ihnen 
von zentraler Ebene übertragenen Aufgaben benötigen kommunale Gebietskörperschaften 
besondere fiskalische Instrumente (Zimmermann 1999; Birke 2000). Hierzu zählen eigene 
Einkommensquellen wie die kommunalen Steuern, Abgaben und Gebühren. Darüber hinaus 
wird ein beträchtlicher Teil der kommunalen Einnahmen über die Landeszuweisungen bereit-
gestellt, da die bundesdeutsche Finanzverfassung von einer (zwar modifizierten) Zweistufig-
keit ausgeht und die Bundesländer für eine ausreichende Finanzausstattung der Gemeinden 
und Gemeindeverbände Sorge tragen müssen (vgl. Art. 106, VII und IX, Art. 107 II i.V.m. 
Art. 28 II GG sowie Lenk 2001, S. 53f.). Näheres regeln die kommunalen Finanzausgleichs-
gesetze der Bundesländer. Der Anteil der Landeszuweisungen am kommunalen Budget in den 
alten Bundesländern beträgt ungefähr 30 %. Die Haushalte der Kommunen in den neuen 
Bundesländern hängen sogar mit rund 50 % von den Mitteln aus dem kommunalen Finanz-
ausgleich ab. Erst mit diesen Mitteln ist es den Kommunen möglich, ihre unterschiedlichen 
öffentlichen Aufgaben zu erfüllen. Abbildung 3.1 vermittelt einen Überblick über die Her-
kunft, den Freiheitsgrad und die Verwendung der Mittel aus dem kommunalen Finanzaus-
gleich für die alten Bundesländer. 
In einer Reihe deutscher Bundesländer wird der überwiegende Anteil der vertikalen Trans-
fers in Form von allgemeinen Zuweisungen an kommunale Gebietskörperschaften gegeben, 
die zur freien Verwendung zur Verfügung stehen. Die Schlüsselzuweisungen als zentraler 
Bestandteil des kommunalen Finanzausgleiches bestimmen sich neben der Finanzkraft der 
jeweiligen Gebietskörperschaft durch ihren Finanzbedarf. Die Finanzkraft ergibt sich durch 
die Berücksichtigung der gemeindlichen Steuereinnahmen, d.h. des Einkommenssteueranteils, 
der Gewerbesteuer unter Berücksichtigung der Gewerbesteuerumlage und der Grundsteuer. 
 3   Ökologische Aufgaben im kommunalen Finanzausgleich 91 
 
Der Finanzbedarf wird in der Regel über einen Gesamtansatz bestimmt, der sich aus der 
Summe von Hauptansatz und Neben- bzw. Leistungsansätzen ergibt.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nach den Finanzausgleichsgesetzen der alten Länder 1997. 
Quelle: Karrenberg und Münstermann (2000, S. 55) 
Abbildung 3.1: Struktur des kommunalen Finanzausgleichs (alte Bundesländer). 
Figure 3.1: Structure of fiscal equalisation at the local level (old German Länder). 
Der Hauptansatz basiert auf dem Indikator Einwohnerzahl der betroffenen Gebietskörper-
schaft. In der überwiegenden Zahl der Bundesländer wird die Einwohnerzahl noch zusätzlich 
gewichtet, zum Teil progressiv mit steigender Einwohnerzahl. Dementsprechend ergibt sich, 
dass mit zunehmender Einwohnerzahl einer Gebietskörperschaft die Höhe der Schlüsselzu-
weisungen mitunter progressiv steigt. Dieser Zusammenhang, der sich auf Brecht (1932) und 
Popitz (1932) zurückführen lässt1, wird heute in Theorie und Praxis kontrovers diskutiert. In 
                                                 
1  Brecht (1932, S. 6) hat das „Gesetz von der progressiven Parallelität von öffentlichen Ausgaben und Ein-
wohnerzahl“ formuliert. Popitz (1932, S. 130) argumentierte, dass Stadtbewohner eine höhere Nachfrage nach 
öffentlichen Gütern besitzen als die ländliche Bevölkerung. 
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der Folge haben die Bundesländer Rheinland-Pfalz und Schleswig-Holstein die Einwohner-
gewichtung bereits abgeschafft.  
Ergänzend zum einwohnerbasierten Hauptansatz existieren in den kommunalen Finanz-
ausgleichsgesetzen der Bundesländer Nebenansätze zur Verteilung der Schlüsselzuweisungen, 
die z.B. die Anzahl der Schüler, Soziallasten oder zentralörtliche Funktionen der jeweiligen 
Gebietskörperschaften berücksichtigen. Während der Hauptansatz den allgemeinen und 
durchschnittlichen Finanzbedarf einer Kommune zu berücksichtigen hat, sollten die Nebenan-
sätze gemeindespezifische, regionale und überregionale finanzielle Sonderlasten erfassen. 
Neben den allgemeinen Zuweisungen gibt es noch die speziellen, zweckgebundenen Zu-
weisungen an die Kommunen. Sie speisen sich aus der Finanzausgleichsmasse, werden aber 
darüber hinaus durch weitere Bundes- und Landesmittel ergänzt. Mit den Zweckzuweisungen 
werden in der Regel Lenkungsabsichten verfolgt und die Ausgaben der Kommunen an den 
landespolitischen Zielen orientiert. Die Mittelzuweisung erfolgt mitunter nur auf Antragstel-
lung, für ihre Bewilligung wird häufig eine Eigenbeteiligung der Kommune an den zu finan-
zierenden Projekten vorausgesetzt. 
3.3 Bedeutung und Rechtsverbindlichkeit ökologischer Aufgaben 
Für die vorliegende Untersuchung werden die öffentlichen Aufgaben einer Gebietskörper-
schaft entsprechend dem Leitbild einer nachhaltigen Entwicklung in soziale, ökonomische 
und ökologische Aufgaben unterteilt. Aus der Sicht der ökonomischen Theorie des Födera-
lismus gilt es, die zweckmäßige Zuordnung öffentlicher Aufgaben auf verschiedene föderale 
Ebenen vorzunehmen, wobei in der Regel eine Differenzierung von Einnahmen- und Ausga-
benmaßnahmen nach allokativen, distributiven und stabilisierenden Funktionen stattfindet 
(vgl. stellvertretend Musgrave 1959, Kapitel 1). Sowohl für die distributiven Funktionen (z.B. 
Einkommensverteilung), die hier vereinfachend mit den sozialen Aufgaben gleichgesetzt 
werden, als auch für die makroökonomischen Stabilisierungsfunktionen gilt, dass hierfür in 
der Regel zentrale Gebietskörperschaften verantwortlich sein sollten. Bezüglich der Allokati-
onsfunktion gilt das Prinzip der fiskalischen Dezentralisierung. Die Bereitstellung von zahl-
reichen öffentlichen Gütern und Dienstleistungen lässt sich – bei Abwesenheit von Skalen- 
und externen Effekten – am effizientesten gestalten, wenn Produktion und Konsum der nied-
rigst möglichen Gebietskörperschaft zugewiesen werden (Musgrave 1959; Oates 1972). Im 
Folgenden wird zu hinterfragen sein, inwieweit im Rahmen der allokativen Funktion ökologi-
sche öffentliche Aufgaben im kommunalen Finanzausgleich berücksichtigt werden. Dazu 
werden die allokativen Aufgaben in ökologische und nicht-ökologische Aufgaben unterteilt2. 
Wie lassen sich ökologische öffentliche Aufgaben definieren? In erster Näherung sind dar-
unter Aufgaben des Natur- und Umweltschutzes zu verstehen. Die Notwendigkeit staatlichen 
Handelns bei der Bereitstellung von Natur- und Umweltschutz ist erforderlich, da viele dieser 
                                                 
2  Für die vorliegende Analyse genügt die Unterscheidung von ökologischen und nicht-ökologischen Aufgaben, 
wobei letztere sowohl soziale als auch ökonomische Aufgaben umfassen. 
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Leistungen durch das Kriterium der Nichtausschließbarkeit gekennzeichnet und den öffentli-
chen Gütern zuzurechnen sind. Öffentliche Aufgaben des Natur- und Umweltschutzes bezie-
hen sich einerseits auf den Schutz und die nachhaltige Nutzung von natürlichen Ressourcen, 
von Lebewesen, Ökosystemen und Landschaften. Nach den §§ 1 und 2 des Bundesnatur-
schutzgesetzes sind mit Naturschutz und Landschaftspflege die Lebensgrundlagen des Men-
schen, auch als Vorraussetzung für seine Erholung in Natur und Landschaft, nachhaltig zu 
sichern. Insofern werden im weiteren Verlauf der Untersuchung öffentliche Aufgaben im Zu-
sammenhang mit den Bereichen Boden, Wasser, Naturschutz und Landschaftspflege, aber 
auch der Erholung betrachtet. Andererseits beziehen sich entsprechende öffentliche Aufgaben 
auf die Regulierung von Umweltbelastungen, d.h. von negativen Auswirkungen menschlicher 
Aktivitäten auf die sie umgebende Umwelt in Form von beispielsweise Emissionen, Abfällen, 
Altlasten oder Landschaftszerstörung. In konkreter Form ließen sich hier die Abwasser- und 
Abfallentsorgung, aber auch die Altlastensanierung und Landschaftsrekultivierung nennen.  
Um diesem weiten Verständnis öffentlicher Aufgaben im Rahmen von Naturschutz- und 
Umweltpolitik gerecht zu werden, aber auch in Anlehnung an die drei Dimensionen der 
Nachhaltigkeit, wird der Begriff „ökologisch“ im Zusammenhang mit den genannten öffentli-
chen Aufgaben verwendet. Manche dieser Aufgaben, wie z.B. die Erholung oder Landschafts-
rekultivierung infolge von Bergschäden, lassen sich nicht eindeutig den ökologischen Aufga-
ben zuordnen, denn sie besitzen gleichermaßen eine soziale bzw. ökonomische Komponente. 
Andere Aufgaben wiederum haben bereits eine lange Tradition im Katalog kommunaler öf-
fentlicher Aufgaben, da sie wie die Abwasserentsorgung vor allem aus dem Blickwinkel 
kommunaler Daseinsvorsorge bzw. stadthygienischer Erwägungen von Bedeutung sind. Bei 
einer vollständigen Aufzählung ökologischer Aufgaben dürfen diese Aufgaben dennoch nicht 
fehlen, da sie sich auch durch ökologisch relevante Komponenten auszeichnen. Ökologische 
Aufgaben gilt es auf allen administrativen Ebenen in föderalen Staatengebilden zu berück-
sichtigen und angemessen zu finanzieren. Diese Forderung baut im Wesentlichen auf zwei 
Argumenten auf:  
Das erste Argument basiert auf der Entwicklung von Naturschutz- und Umweltpolitik und 
den entsprechenden rechtsverbindlichen Regelungen. Seit den 1970er Jahren ist ein umfang-
reiches Gesetzeswerk geschaffen worden, das den verschiedenen administrativen Ebenen in 
der Bundesrepublik Deutschland zahlreiche ökologische Aufgaben zugewiesen hat. In Ab-
hängigkeit von Ausgestaltung und Wechselbeziehungen zwischen europa-, bundes- und lan-
desweiten, regionalen und kommunalen ökologischen öffentlichen Aufgaben entstehen ent-
sprechende Ausgaben. Im Gegensatz zu den wesentlich länger bestehenden und etablierten 
öffentlichen Aufgaben im sozioökonomischen Bereich, die mit vergleichsweise höheren fi-
nanziellen Ressourcen zur Bereitstellung der betreffenden Güter und Leistungen ausgestattet 
sind, wird für den Naturschutz- und Umweltbereich vielfach eine Unterfinanzierung beklagt 
(vgl. z.B. Kaule 1991, S. 353ff.; Henle 1995; Steffens 1997; Hessischer Landtag 1997)3. Da 
                                                 
3  Auch die Vollzugsdefizite in der Umweltpolitik können zum Teil der Unterfinanzierung dieses Aufgabenfel-
des geschuldet sein. 
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der kommunale Finanzausgleich u.a. der Sicherung der finanziellen Ressourcen zur Erledi-
gung kommunaler öffentlicher Aufgaben dient, ist dieser im Hinblick auf die systematische 
Integration ökologischer Aufgaben und Indikatoren zu untersuchen. 
Das zweite Argument steht in Verbindung mit der Mitgliedschaft der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland in der Europäischen Union und damit der rechtlichen Verbindlichkeit der euro-
päischen Verträge, Richtlinien und Verordnungen. Seit dem Amsterdamer Vertrag von 1997 
ist das Leitbild der nachhaltigen Entwicklung Bestandteil des europäischen Vertragswerkes.4 
Gemäß der Präambel des Vertrages von Amsterdam soll der wirtschaftliche und soziale Fort-
schritt der europäischen Völker „unter Berücksichtigung des Grundsatzes der nachhaltigen 
Entwicklung“ verfolgt werden. Darüber hinaus wird nachhaltige Entwicklung im neuen Arti-
kel 2 des EU-Vertrages auf die gleiche Ebene mit den Zielen der Förderung des wirtschaftli-
chen und sozialen Fortschritts sowie eines hohen Beschäftigungsniveaus gestellt (Frenz und 
Unnerstall 1999, S. 173f.). Das Leitbild einer nachhaltigen Entwicklung hat sich somit zu 
einem führenden Konzept für Politikformulierung und -gestaltung in den Mitgliedstaaten der 
Europäischen Union entwickelt, das in Verbindung mit dem Subsidiaritätsprinzip auf allen 
relevanten administrativen Ebenen umzusetzen ist. 
3.4 Ökologische Aufgaben in den kommunalen Finanzausgleichsgesetzen 
Ökologische öffentliche Aufgaben werden in den kommunalen Finanzausgleichsgesetzen der 
Bundesländer5 bereits in den verschiedensten Formen berücksichtigt6. Sie finden Erwähnung 
im Rahmen von Nebenansätzen, pauschalen Zuweisungen, besonderen Bedarfszuweisungen, 
Zweckzuweisungen, Darlehen, Zinshilfen und Zuschüssen, um nur eine Auswahl zu nennen. 
Teilweise finden Vorwegentnahmen aus der Gesamtschlüsselmasse statt, teilweise werden 
Zuweisungen benannt, deren Finanzierung außerhalb der Verbundmasse geregelt wird. Mit-
unter gibt es auch Schlüssel- oder Zweckzuweisungen für ökologische Aufgaben, obwohl dies 
                                                 
4  Dies betrifft sowohl den Vertrag über die Europäische Union (EUV) als auch den Vertrag zur Gründung der 
Europäischen Gemeinschaft (EGV). 
5  Die Stadtstaaten Berlin, Bremen und Hamburg werden von der Analyse ausgenommen. Aufgrund ihrer Son-
derstellung sind hier Landes- und kommunale Aufgaben schwer zu trennen; kommunale Finanzausgleichsgeset-
ze existieren nicht. 
6  Die nun folgenden Aussagen basieren, soweit nicht durch andere Quellen belegt, auf einer Analyse der 
kommunalen Finanzausgleichsgesetze der deutschen Bundesländer: Baden-Württemberg: FAG i.d.F. v. 
1.1.2000. GBl. 2000, S. 14. - Bayern: FAG i.d.F.d.Bek. v. 23.2.2000. GVBl. 2000, S. 70, zul. geänd. d. G. v. 
22.12.2000. GVBl. 2000, S. 940. - Brandenburg: GFG 2000 v. 15.2.2000. GVBl. 2000, S. 2. - Hessen: FAG 
i.d.F. v. 18.3.1997. GVBl. 1997, S. 58, zul. geänd. d. G. v. 19.12.2000. GVBl. 2000, S. 553. - Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern: FAG i.d.Bek. v. 12.1.2000. GVOBl. 2000, S. 2, geänd. d. G. v. 18.12.2000. GVOBl. 2000, S. 559. 
- Niedersachsen: NFAG i.d.F.d.Bek. v. 26.5.1999. GVBl. 1999, S. 116, geänd. d. G. v. 22.6.2000. GVBl. 2000, 
S. 138. - Nordrhein-Westfalen: GFG 2001 v. 3.4.2001. GV NRW 2001, S. 172. - Rheinland-Pfalz: LFAG v. 
30.11.1999. GVBl. 1999, S. 415. - Saarland: KFAG v. 12.7.1983. Abl. 1983, S. 462, zul. geänd. d. G. v. 
7.6.2000. Abl. 2000, S. 1021. - Sachsen: FAG v. 19.12.2000. SächsGVBl. 2001, S. 2. - Sachsen-Anhalt: FAG v. 
1.7.1999. GVBl. 1999, S. 204. - Schleswig-Holstein: FAG i.d.F. v. 4.2.1999. GVOBl. 1999, S. 47, zul. geänd. 
d. G. v. 28.12.2000. GVOBl. 2000, S. 632. - Thüringen: ThürFAG i.d.F.d.Bek. v. 9.2.1998. GVBl. 1998, S. 15, 
zul. geänd. d. G. v. 19.12.2000. GVBl. 2000, S. 381. 
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aus den Finanzausgleichsgesetzen nicht wörtlich zu entnehmen ist. So gewährt Baden-
Württemberg Zuweisungen für die Altlastensanierung, Wasserversorgung und Abwasserent-
sorgung im Rahmen der Kommunalen Investitionspauschale und des Kommunalen Investiti-
onsfonds (Finanzministerium Baden-Württemberg 2000, S. 18). Des Weiteren ist zu berück-
sichtigen, dass es in allen Bundesländern, zum Teil auch auf Bundes- und EU-Ebene, zweck-
gebundene Zuwendungen für ökologische Aufgaben außerhalb der Regelungen in den kom-
munalen Finanzausgleichsgesetzen gibt, die im Rahmen einer Vielzahl von umwelt- und na-
turschutzbezogenen Förderrichtlinien geregelt sind. Für eine vollständige Analyse der Zuwei-
sungen für ökologische Aufgaben wären neben den Finanzausgleichsgesetzen auch alle weite-
ren Regelungen einzubeziehen, in deren Rahmen kommunale Gebietskörperschaften antrags-
berechtigt sind. Obwohl dies nicht Ziel der vorliegenden Analyse ist, gilt es, diese Aspekte im 
Auge zu behalten, wenn im Folgenden der Stand der Berücksichtung ökologischer Aufgaben 
in den kommunalen Finanzausgleichsgesetzen der Flächenländer präsentiert wird. Trotz der 
erwähnten Einschränkungen macht es Sinn, die Finanzausgleichsgesetze einer gründlichen 
Analyse zu unterziehen. Die Zuweisungen aus dem kommunalen Finanzausgleich stellen eine 
wesentliche kommunale Einnahmequelle dar. Dies betrifft sowohl die allgemeinen Zuweisun-
gen ohne Verwendungsauflage, die in vielen Bundesländern den Hauptanteil ausmachen, als 
auch die speziellen, zweckgebundenen Zuweisungen. Insofern zielt die Analyse der kommu-
nalen Finanzausgleichsgesetze hinsichtlich der Berücksichtigung ökologischer Aufgaben 
zwar einerseits auf die konkreten ökologischen Aufgabenfelder, die im Rahmen der Finanz-
ausgleichsgesetze gefördert werden. Andererseits ist auf die gewählten Formen der Zuwei-
sungen einschließlich der dazugehörigen Indikatoren zu achten und inwieweit diese ökologi-
sche Aspekte einschließen. 
3.4.1 Der Indikator Fläche als indirekter Ansatz 
Flächenbezogene Ansätze können als ein erster, indirekter Schritt der Anerkennung ökologi-
scher Aufgaben in den Finanzausgleichsgesetzen betrachtet werden. Dies liegt in der Bedeu-
tung von Fläche und flächenintensiven Landnutzungen für zahlreiche ökologische Aufgaben 
begründet. Hierunter fallen Aufgaben des Ressourcenschutzes wie z.B. die Ausweisung von 
Trinkwasser-, Natur- oder Landschaftsschutzgebieten, aber ebenso Aufgaben des Umwelt-
schutzes wie etwa die Abwasserentsorgung7.  
Die Berücksichtigung eines Flächenindikators für die Allokation von Zuweisungen ist be-
sonders für großflächige Gemeinden und Landkreise relevant. Je flächenintensiver eine Ge-
meinde oder ein Landkreis und je weiter die Entfernung von verdichteten Räumen oder Städ-
ten, desto höher ist die Bedeutung flächenbezogener Indikatoren. Dies betrifft vor allem die 
ländlichen und naturnäheren Räume mit geringer Einwohnerdichte, die sich hinsichtlich ihrer 
Landnutzung durch einen größeren Anteil land- und forstwirtschaftlicher Nutz- sowie natur-
schutzfachlich wertvoller Flächen auszeichnen. 
                                                 
7  Für eine ausführliche Analyse der zunehmenden Kosten der Abwasserentsorgung mit abnehmender Sied-
lungsdichte vgl. Seitz (2000).  
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Aus den gegebenen Zusammenhängen heraus überrascht es nicht, dass die Berücksichti-
gung flächenbezogener Indikatoren seit langem vom Deutschen Landkreistag gefordert wird 
(Henneke 2001)8. Dies liegt in der Kostenwirksamkeit des Faktors Fläche für die Finanzie-
rung bestimmter kommunaler Aufgaben begründet. Je flächenintensiver eine Gemeinde oder 
ein Landkreis in Verbindung mit einer geringen Einwohnerdichte ist, desto teurer gestaltet 
sich die Bereitstellung bestimmter öffentlicher Güter und Leistungen. So sind zusätzliche 
Kosten in Verbindung mit ökologischen, sozialen und ökonomischen öffentlichen Aufgaben 
zu erwarten wie z.B. dem Naturschutz, der Wasserversorgung, der Abwasser- und Abfallent-
sorgung, dem Landwirtschaftswesen, dem öffentlichen Nahverkehr sowie dem Schul- und 
Gesundheitswesen (Henneke 2001; Bergmann 1999; Bizer et al. 1998, S. 51).  
Deshalb berücksichtigt auch die Mehrzahl der Finanzausgleichsgesetze der deutschen 
Bundesländer flächenbezogene Indikatoren, lediglich Niedersachsen bildet hier eine Ausnah-
me. In Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Rheinland-Pfalz und Sachsen-Anhalt wird 
der Indikator Fläche zur Berechnung der Bedarfsmesszahl der Gebietskörperschaft herange-
zogen, die sich unmittelbar auf die Höhe der zu beziehenden Schlüsselzuweisungen auswirkt 
(Henneke 2001)9. In manchen Fällen findet der Flächenindikator Eingang in die Berechnung 
von Zuweisungen, die der pauschalen Förderung investiver Maßnahmen dienen10. Die meis-
ten Bundesländer wählen – zum Teil zusätzlich, meist aber ausschließlich – den Weg, dieje-
nigen Aufgabenfelder direkt zu benennen, die mit zunehmender Fläche teurer werden. Dies 
geschieht in der Regel durch die anteilige Berücksichtigung des Flächenindikators bei der 
Bestimmung von Zweckzuweisungen, die sich auf Aufgabenfelder wie beispielsweise Stra-
ßenbau und -instandhaltung, öffentlicher Nahverkehr, Schülerbeförderung oder Abwasserent-
sorgung beziehen. Obgleich aus theoretischer Sicht auch ökologische Aufgaben mit zuneh-
mender Fläche zu einer Kostenerhöhung führen können, dominieren bei der praktischen Aus-
gestaltung der Zweckzuweisungen die sozialen und ökonomischen Aufgabenfelder das Bild. 
3.4.2 Die direkte Berücksichtigung ökologischer Aufgaben 
Neben dem indirekten Indikator Fläche werden ökologische öffentliche Aufgaben in den Fi-
nanzausgleichsgesetzen auch in direkter Form benannt, dabei bedienen sich die Bundesländer 
unterschiedlicher Wege. Lediglich Sachsen-Anhalt und Niedersachsen bilden hier eine Aus-
                                                 
8  Hier erfahren flächenorientierte Ansätze eine besondere Wertschätzung in der jährlichen Analyse des kom-
munalen Finanzausgleiches unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Landkreise.  
9  In der Regel wird der Indikator Fläche im Nebenansatz zur Berechnung der Bedarfsmesszahl herangezogen. 
Sachsen-Anhalt berücksichtigt ihn als einziges Bundesland im Hauptansatz, wobei hier seit 1999 beabsichtigt ist, 
den Flächenfaktor bis 2002 zurückzuführen. 
10  So in Nordrhein-Westfalen: § 17 (2) Gemeindefinanzierungsgesetz (GFG) nennt pauschale Zuweisungen für 
kommunale Investitionsmaßnahmen, die zu 5/6 nach der Einwohnerzahl und zu 1/6 nach der Gebietsfläche ver-
teilt werden. Die pauschale Förderung investiver Maßnahmen im Abwasserbereich nach § 17 (4) GFG gewichtet 
die Gebietsfläche sogar mit 2/3, während die Einwohnerzahl mit 1/3 in die Verteilung eingeht.  
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nahme: Diese beiden Bundesländer benennen in ihren Finanzausgleichsgesetzen überhaupt 
keine ökologischen Aufgaben in direkter Form11.  
Was die Formen der Berücksichtigung ökologischer Aufgaben angeht, reservieren einige 
Bundesländer Mittel im Rahmen von Vorwegentnahmen aus der Finanzausgleichsmasse. So 
entnimmt Bayern vorab Mittel für Verstärkungsbeträge für Zuwendungen zum Bau von Ab-
fallentsorgungsanlagen (Bayerisches Finanzausgleichsgesetz Art. 1 (2) und Art. 10c). In Ba-
den-Württemberg werden der Finanzausgleichsmasse 50 % des Erstattungsbetrages für die 
Erkundung oder Sanierung von Bodenbelastungen entnommen, falls die Kosten von den unte-
ren Bodenschutzbehörden zu tragen sind (Finanzausgleichsgesetz Baden-Württemberg § 2 
Nr. 9 sowie § 10 (4) Bodenschutzgesetz Baden-Württemberg). In Sachsen bestehen Vorweg-
entnahmen für besondere Bedarfszuweisungen, die auch zur Unterstützung von Haushalts-
konsolidierungen bei Zweckverbänden der Wasserver- und Abwasserentsorgung verwendet 
werden können (Sächsisches Finanzausgleichsgesetz § 3 (1) Nr. 1.b) und § 22 Nr. 7). In 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern fließen über eine Vorwegentnahme 20 Millionen DM in einen 
Kommunalen Aufbaufonds. Aus diesem können Zinshilfen und Darlehen, in Ausnahmefällen 
auch Zuschüsse für den Bau von Abfallentsorgungsanlagen, den Ausbau der Wasserversor-
gung und Abwasserbeseitigung oder die Förderung von Naherholungs-, Landschafts- und Kul-
turpflegemaßnahmen gewährt werden (Finanzausgleichsgesetz Mecklenburg-Vorpommern § 6 
(1) Nr. 8 und § 16). 
Die Berücksichtigung ökologischer Aufgaben im Rahmen von Nebenansätzen erfolgt le-
diglich in Ausnahmefällen. So gibt es im Saarland einen Ergänzungsansatz für Bergschäden. 
Hessen, Rheinland-Pfalz und das Saarland nutzen Ergänzungsansätze in Verbindung mit Kur- 
und Erholungsorten.  
Die weitaus zahlreichsten direkten Nennungen erfahren ökologische Aufgaben im Rahmen 
der Zweckzuweisungen. Mit Ausnahme der bereits erwähnten Bundesländer Niedersachsen 
und Sachsen-Anhalt sind diese in den Finanzausgleichsgesetzen aller Flächenländer zu fin-
den. Tabelle 3.1 gibt einen Überblick über die Förderbereiche, die geförderten Maßnahmen 
und die jeweiligen Bundesländer, in deren Finanzausgleichsgesetzen entsprechende Maßnah-
men genannt werden. 
Die Abwasserentsorgung wird mit Abstand am häufigsten genannt (10 Länder), was nicht 
wundert, gehört sie doch auf kommunaler Ebene zu den zentralen und aufwendigsten öffentli-
chen Aufgabenbereichen (vgl. Seitz 2000). Danach folgt mit geringem Abstand der Bereich 
der Wasserversorgung (8 Länder). Auch die Förderung von Abfallentsorgungsanlagen (6 Län-
der) sowie die Erkundung und Sanierung von Altlasten (5 Länder) werden noch relativ häufig 
im Rahmen der Zweckzuweisungen genannt.  
                                                 
11  Allerdings erwähnt Niedersachsen in seinem Finanzausgleichsgesetz als einziges Bundesland generell keine 
konkreten Aufgabenbereiche. Insofern gibt das niedersächsische Finanzausgleichsgesetz keine Anhaltspunkte für 
eine ausreichende oder mangelnde Berücksichtigung ökologischer Aufgaben. Sachsen-Anhalt nennt dagegen 
zahlreiche Zuweisungen für konkrete nicht-ökologische Aufgaben, so dass hier das Fehlen ökologischer Aufga-
ben besonders auffällt. 
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Tabelle 3.1: Zweckzuweisungen für ökologische Aufgaben im Rahmen der kommunalen  
Finanzausgleichsgesetze. 
Table 3.1: Specific-purpose transfers for ecological public functions in fiscal equalisation 
laws at the local level. 
Förderbereiche  Geförderte Maßnahmen Bundesländer  
Boden Erkundung und Sanierung von Altlasten, 
Rekultivierung 
BY, BW, HE, NW, TH 
Wasser Gewässerschutz HE 
 Wasserversorgung BY, BB, HE, MV, RP, SL, SN, TH 
 Abwasserentsorgung BY, BB, BW, HE, MV, NW, RP, SL, 
SN, TH 
Naturschutz und Landschaftspflege BB, HE, MV, NW 
Kur- und Erholungsorte BW, NW, RP 
Naturschutz,  
Landschaftspflege  
und Erholung 
Naherholungs- und Fremdenverkehrs-
maßnahmen 
BB, MV, RP, SH 
Abfall Abfallentsorgungsanlagen BY, HE, MV, RP, SL, TH 
Energie Energiesparmaßnahmen HE 
BW, Baden-Württemberg; BY, Bayern; BB, Brandenburg; HE, Hessen; MV, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern;  
NW, Nordrhein-Westfalen; RP, Rheinland-Pfalz; SL, Saarland; SH, Schleswig-Holstein; SN, Sachsen;  
TH, Thüringen. 
 
In sehr viel geringerem Maße werden Zweckzuweisungen für Maßnahmen des Natur- und 
Ressourcenschutzes gewährt. Hier sind die Bundesländer Hessen und Nordrhein-Westfalen 
hervorhebenswert. So unterstützt Hessen Projekte der Biotopsicherung und -vernetzung, Ge-
wässerschutzmaßnahmen und den naturnahen Ausbau von Fließgewässern. Nordrhein-West-
falen gewährt Zweckzuweisungen für die Bodendenkmalspflege, den Erwerb und die Nutz-
barmachung von Brachflächen sowie für die ökologische Gestaltung des Emscher-Lippe-
Raums. 
In Zusammenhang mit Maßnahmen des Natur- und Ressourcenschutzes, der Erholung so-
wie einiger anderer ökologischer Aufgaben muss an dieser Stelle auch noch Schleswig-
Holstein erwähnt werden. Hier werden für zahlreiche ökologische Aufgaben Darlehen verge-
ben12. Die Vergabe von Darlehen für ökologische Aufgaben steht dabei aber in einem gewis-
sen Gegensatz zur Vergabe von realen Zuweisungen für zahlreiche nicht-ökologische Auf-
gaben.  
Einen Sonderfall stellt die Förderung von Erholung dar. Fasst man die verschiedenen For-
men der Gewährung von Zuweisungen für diesen Bereich zusammen, die von Nebenansätzen 
über pauschale Zuweisungen zu Zweckzuweisungen und Darlehen reichen, so nennen immer-
hin 8 Länder diesen Aufgabenbereich in ihren Finanzausgleichsgesetzen. Dies lässt sich inso-
                                                 
12  Im Rahmen des Kommunalen Investitionsfonds nach § 19 Finanzausgleichsgesetz Schleswig-Holstein.  
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fern erklären, als der Bereich Erholung eine Schnittstelle zwischen den ökologischen und  
sozioökonomischen Aufgaben darstellt, da die entsprechenden Maßnahmen unmittelbar dem 
Menschen selbst zu gute kommen. 
3.5 Voraussetzungen zur systematischen Integration ökologischer 
Aufgaben 
3.5.1 Erweiterungsbedarf nach Aufgabenbereichen 
Insgesamt werden also nur in Hessen und Nordrhein-Westfalen ökologische Aufgaben im 
umfassenderen Sinn berücksichtigt, d.h. bezogen auf vorsorgende Ressourcenschutz- und 
nachsorgende Umweltschutzmaßnahmen. Ansonsten besteht die Tendenz, in den Finanzaus-
gleichsgesetzen nachsorgende Maßnahmen bzw. „End-of-pipe“-Infrastruktur wie die Abwas-
ser- und Abfallentsorgung sowie die Sanierung von Altlasten zu nennen. Mit Ausnahme des 
Bereiches Erholung und der (Trink-)Wasserversorgung als infrastruktureller Aufgabe werden 
Ressourcen- und Naturschutz nur selten erwähnt (vgl. Abbildung 3.2).  
 
Status quo Erweiterungsbedarf 
Wasserver- und Abwasserentsorgung 
Abfallentsorgung 
Altlastensanierung 
 
 
Dominanz nachsorgender und 
infrastruktureller Aufgaben 
Naturschutz und Landschaftspflege 
Gewässerschutz 
Bodenschutz 
 
 
Verstärkung vorsorgender und  
intergenerativer Aufgaben 
Abbildung 3.2: Öffentliche Aufgaben des Natur- und Umweltschutzes im kommunalen  
Finanzausgleich. 
Figure 3.2: Public functions of nature conservation and environmental protection in fiscal 
equalisation at the local level. 
Dieses Ergebnis steht in enger Verbindung mit der historischen Entwicklung kommunaler 
öffentlicher Leistungen. So gehören die Wasserversorgung sowie die Abwasser- und Abfall-
entsorgung mit ihren infrastrukturellen Einrichtungen seit langem zu den Kernbereichen der 
kommunalen Daseinsvorsorge, die ihrem Wesen nach der kommunalen Selbstverwaltung un-
terstehen. Diese Aufgabenbereiche zeichnen sich dadurch aus, dass sie mit den (Grund-)Be-
dürfnissen der Einwohner einer Gebietskörperschaft verknüpft sind (Gewährleistung einer 
Grundversorgung sowie Notwendigkeit hygienischer Mindeststandards). Aufgrund ihrer un-
mittelbaren Umweltrelevanz werden sie jedoch entsprechend der weiter oben entwickelten 
Systematik auch den ökologischen Aufgaben zugeordnet. Die Finanzierung dieser Aufgaben 
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erfolgt grundsätzlich über Gebühren und Beiträge, die für die Inanspruchnahme der entspre-
chenden öffentlichen Leistungen zu zahlen sind, der kommunale Finanzausgleich dient in der 
Regel lediglich dem Abfangen von Spitzenlasten und Sonderbedarfen. Deshalb werden diese 
Bereiche bei der Diskussion um die Ökologisierung des kommunalen Finanzausgleiches eine 
vergleichsweise geringe Rolle spielen. 
Dagegen gehören Naturschutz und Landschaftspflege sowie der Gewässer- und Boden-
schutz im Sinne des abiotischen und biotischen Naturschutzes zu denjenigen ökologischen 
öffentlichen Aufgaben, wie sie zur Gewährleistung einer bestimmten Natur- und Umweltqua-
lität auch unabhängig von menschlichen Bedürfnissen bestehen. Eine direkte Finanzierung 
über Gebühren und Beiträge entfällt weitgehend aufgrund des Fehlens nutzerbezogener öf-
fentlicher Leistungen. Dies hängt entscheidend mit der Nichtanwendbarkeit des Ausschluss-
prinzips bei der Bereitstellung entsprechender Leistungen zusammen. Zusätzlich befinden 
sich ausgedehnte, naturschutzfachlich wertvolle Gebiete häufig in Regionen, die durch gerin-
ge Einwohnerdichten und wirtschaftliche Strukturschwäche gekennzeichnet sind. Damit be-
wegen sich sowohl die eigenen Einnahmen der betroffenen Gebietskörperschaft als auch die 
Zuweisungen über den kommunalen Finanzausgleich auf vergleichsweise niedrigem Niveau. 
Folglich sind die Einbeziehung des Naturschutzes sowie entsprechender Indikatoren in den 
kommunalen Finanzausgleich notwendig, um dem finanzwissenschaftlichen Grundsatz der 
Konnexität Rechnung zu tragen. Danach sollten mit der Zuweisung öffentlicher Aufgaben 
zugleich auch die zur Erfüllung erforderlichen Ausgaben zur Verfügung gestellt werden. 
Eine weitere Begründung für die notwendige Integration des Aufgabenbereiches Natur-
schutz basiert auf dem Prinzip der fiskalischen Äquivalenz (Olson 1969). Danach sollte eine 
Übereinstimmung zwischen denjenigen hergestellt werden, die einen Nutzen aus der Bereit-
stellung eines öffentlichen Gutes ziehen und jenen, die für die Bereitstellung dieses Gutes 
zahlen. So werden auf überkommunaler Ebene je nach naturräumlichen Gegebenheiten (z.B. 
Seltenheit vorkommender Tier- und Pflanzenarten) bestimmte Flächen als Vorrang- oder 
Schutzgebiete (zum Teil mit internationalem Rang) ausgewiesen, was auch gegen die Präfe-
renzen der Einwohner der betroffenen Kommunen stattfinden kann. Die positiven räumlichen 
externen Effekte („spillover“) können weit über die kommunale Ebene hinausreichen13, wo-
gegen diverse Kosten und Belastungen durch Nutzungseinschränkungen überwiegend auf 
kommunaler Ebene verbleiben. Olson (1969) hat für diese Problematik bereits einen Lösungs-
ansatz vorgeschlagen, obgleich er für andere öffentliche Güter wie z.B. Erziehung und Aus-
bildung entwickelt wurde. Solange sich bei Abwesenheit von Skaleneffekten die Bereitstel-
lung bestimmter öffentlicher Güter und Leistungen auf kommunaler Ebene empfiehlt und das 
ist in Zusammenhang mit vielen Aspekten der Landnutzung der Fall, sollten räumliche Exter-
nalitäten durch Zuweisungen im Rahmen der Finanzausgleichsbeziehungen von einer zentra-
len an eine dezentrale Gebietskörperschaft internalisiert werden. 
                                                 
13  So etwa bei Biosphärenreservaten, FFH-Gebieten oder internationalen Vogelschutzgebieten. 
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3.5.2 Erweiterungsbedarf nach Zuweisungsarten 
Betrachtet man zusammenfassend die Formen der Berücksichtigung ökologischer Aufgaben 
in den kommunalen Finanzausgleichsgesetzen, so dominieren in der Mehrzahl der Bundes-
länder eindeutig die Zweckzuweisungen. Zweckzuweisungen stellen nach vorherrschender 
finanzwissenschaftlicher Sicht die geeignete Form der Zuweisung zur Internalisierung von 
Spillover-Effekten dar (Fischer 1988, S. 65f.). Damit wäre diese Zuweisungsart geboten, um 
die Spillover-Effekte des abiotischen und biotischen Naturschutzes im Rahmen des kommu-
nalen Finanzausgleiches zu berücksichtigen. Da die Gemeinde im Fall von räumlichen positi-
ven externen Effekten auch einen eigenen Nutzen an der entsprechenden Leistung hat, der in 
der Gemeinde verbleibt, wäre dieser gemeindeinterne Nutzen im Rahmen einer Eigenbeteili-
gung der Gemeinde zu berücksichtigen.  
Übergeordnete Gebietskörperschaften können darüber hinaus ganz allgemein die Len-
kungsabsicht verfolgen, kommunale Gebietskörperschaften dazu zu bewegen, mehr Mittel für 
den abiotischen und biotischen Naturschutzes zu verausgaben. Hierfür wären im Rahmen des 
kommunalen Finanzausgleiches entweder allgemeine Investitionszuweisungen mit Verwen-
dungsnachweis für einen entsprechend zu bestimmenden Bereich denkbar (z.B. den abioti-
schen und biotischen Naturschutz) oder aber zweckgebundene Zuweisungen, die für spezifi-
sche Vorhaben innerhalb dieses Bereiches zur Verfügung gestellt werden. Bei diesen Zuwei-
sungsarten ist aber zu berücksichtigen, dass eine Nichtnennung im Rahmen der Finanzaus-
gleichsgesetze noch nicht bedeutet, dass es für bestimmte Aufgaben keine Zuwendungen gibt. 
Zweckgebundene Zuwendungen für ökologische Aufgaben werden in den Ländern ausnahms-
los auch über zahlreiche Förderrichtlinien geregelt. Insofern ist für den Bereich der zweckge-
bundenen Zuwendungen aufgrund der vorliegenden Analyse kein abschließendes Urteil mög-
lich.  
Anders ist die Lage bei den allgemeinen Zuweisungen einzuschätzen. Mit Ausnahme des 
Indikators Fläche14, dem Aufgabenbereich Erholung sowie in einem Einzelfall, dem Bereich 
Bergschäden, findet man keine ökologischen Aufgaben in den Nebenansätzen der Finanzaus-
gleichsgesetze, geschweige denn eine Berücksichtigung im Hauptansatz zur Berechnung der 
Schlüsselzuweisungen. Damit gibt es keinen Haupt- oder Nebenansatz, der auf einem Indika-
tor basiert, der ganz allgemein ökologische Aufgaben abbildet, wie es vergleichsweise mit der 
Berücksichtigung von Einwohnerzahlen für sozioökonomische Aufgaben der Fall ist. Ein-
wohnerzahlen können zwar in gewissem Umfang als Indikator für nutzerbezogene Umwelt-
schutzaufgaben herangezogen werden, wie z.B. für die Trinkwasserversorgung sowie die 
Abwasser- und Abfallentsorgung, sie versagen jedoch unweigerlich bei Aufgaben, die mit 
dem abiotischen und biotischen Naturschutz in Verbindung stehen15. Sie gehen aufgrund des 
Fehlens entsprechender Indikatoren weder in den allgemeinen Finanzbedarf kommunaler Ge-
                                                 
14  Dieser repräsentiert jedoch nur indirekt und partiell ökologische Aufgaben. 
15  In diesem Fall geht es um diejenigen naturschutzbezogenen öffentlichen Aufgaben, die auf kommunaler 
Ebene zu erledigen sind bzw. erledigt werden können und deren Nutzen in der kommunalen Gebietskörperschaft 
verbleibt. 
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bietskörperschaften ein, noch werden über die Nebenansätze spezifische Sonderlasten erfasst. 
Insofern sind diese Aufgaben in den gegenwärtigen Finanzausgleichsgesetzen der Bundeslän-
der unterrepräsentiert. Dadurch kann es zu einer Unterversorgung der entsprechenden öffent-
lichen Güter und Leistungen kommen.  
Ergänzend zu den bestehenden einwohnerbasierten Ansätzen sollte deshalb die Berech-
nung des kommunalen Finanzbedarfs auch auf naturschutzbezogenen Indikatoren beruhen. 
Hier wäre zu trennen zwischen einem Indikator, der den allgemeinen Finanzbedarf repräsen-
tieren kann sowie Indikatoren, die gemeindespezifische, regionale und überregionale finan-
zielle Sonderlasten über die Nebenansätze berücksichtigen und gewisse Lenkungsfunktionen 
ausüben. In Analogie zum allgemein verwendeten Indikator der Einwohnerzahl für sozioöko-
nomische Aufgaben sollten naturschutzbezogene Indikatoren ebenfalls relativ einfach zu 
handhaben und statistisch möglichst verfügbar sein (Bauer et al. 1996; Rose 1999)16. Eine 
noch zu leistende und nicht zu unterschätzende Forschungsaufgabe besteht schließlich in der 
Rechtfertigung des Zusammenhanges zwischen naturschutzbezogenen Indikatoren und der 
Kostenwirksamkeit bzw. Belastungsintensität der entsprechenden öffentlichen Aufgaben auf 
kommunaler Ebene. 
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Zusammenfassung 
Regionale Nachhaltigkeit bedingt die Wahrnehmung und Finanzierung ökologischer, ökono-
mischer und sozialer öffentlicher Aufgaben durch kommunale Gebietskörperschaften. Wäh-
rend die Bedeutung sozioökonomischer Aufgaben im föderalen System der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland seit langem anerkannt ist, werden ökologische Aufgaben bislang nur teilweise 
berücksichtigt. Eine empirische Analyse der kommunalen Finanzausgleichsgesetze der 13 
Flächenländer zeigt, dass nachsorgende und infrastrukturelle ökologische Aufgaben im Rah-
men von Zweckzuweisungen bereits stark vertreten sind. Dagegen fehlen vorsorgeorientierte 
und intergenerative Aufgaben wie der Natur- und Ressourcenschutz weitgehend. Insofern 
ergibt sich ein Erweiterungsbedarf der kommunalen Finanzausgleichsgesetze im Hinblick auf 
den abiotischen und biotischen Naturschutz sowie entsprechende Indikatoren, die im Rahmen 
geeigneter Zuweisungsarten zu berücksichtigen wären. 
                                                 
16  Bauer et al. (1996) und Rose (1999) haben bereits eine Reihe abiotischer, biotischer und flächenbezogener 
Indikatoren vorgeschlagen, die in diesem Sinne auf ihre Verwendbarkeit zu prüfen wären.  
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Summary 
Regional sustainability requires the acknowledgement and financing of ecological, economic 
and social public functions by local jurisdictions. Whereas fiscal federalism in Germany pre-
dominantly assigns economic and social functions to the local governmental level, ecological 
functions are only partially considered. An empirical analysis of the “Kommunale Finanzaus-
gleichsgesetze” (fiscal equalisation laws) of the German states shows that end-of-the-pipe and 
infrastructural ecological functions are already strongly integrated by way of conditional 
grants. However, precautionary and intergenerational functions like nature and resource con-
servation are widely missing. Therefore, a comprehensive implementation of sustainable de-
velopment calls for the integration of conservation issues and appropriate indicators in the 
system of intergovernmental fiscal relations. 
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4 Compensating municipalities for protected areas. Fiscal 
transfers for biodiversity conservation in Saxony, Germany  
This chapter was published as “Ring, I. (2008). Compensating municipalities for protected areas. 
Fiscal transfers for biodiversity conservation in Saxony, Germany. GAIA 17/S1: 143–151”. The 
article was part of the special issue “Protected areas and biodiversity conservation”, edited by 
Susanne Stoll-Kleemann and Hubert Job. This special issue was published on the occasion of the 
9th meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity (19–
30 May 2008, Bonn, Germany). 
An earlier version of the paper was presented at a guest lecture in the Seminar Series of the Cen-
tre for Social and Economic Research on the Global Environment (CSERGE) at the University of 
East Anglia (13 November 2006, Norwich, UK). Updated versions were presented at the 7th Interna-
tional Conference of the European Society of Ecological Economics (Integrating Natural and Social 
Sciences for Sustainability, 5–8 June 2007, Leipzig, Germany) and the expert meeting “Natura 
2000: Aktuelle rechtliche und fachliche Probleme der Errichtung des europäischen Schutzgebiets-
netzes in Deutschland”, organised by the Department of Environmental and Planning Law, UFZ 
(22–23 November 2007, Leipzig, Germany). Furthermore, the results were presented upon invita-
tion at the State Office for Environment and Geology, Saxony (3 July 2008, Freiberg, Germany).  
Abstract 
Local conservation efforts and land-use restrictions due to protected areas are often related to 
benefits at higher governmental levels. This gives rise to spatial externalities that – if not ade-
quately compensated – may lead to an underprovision of public goods and services. This arti-
cle proposes two models that would expand the existing intergovernmental fiscal transfer sys-
tem from the state to the local level in Saxony, Germany, to include designated protected are-
as; the models are based on actual administrative, social, and economic data from 2002. Con-
servation units (CUs) are identified in each municipality by overlaying Geographical Informa-
tion System (GIS) layers of the various categories of protected areas over a total of 537 mu-
nicipal borders in Saxony. The first model considers CUs within the calculation of general 
lump-sum transfers by “translating” CUs into the generic indicator of inhabitants. In the sec-
ond model, a specified amount of the overall transfer sum is devoted to conservation accord-
ing to the share of CUs a municipality holds in relation to its total area. Both approaches lead 
to higher transfers, especially to rural communities (though to varying degrees), thereby ac-
knowledging the latter’s ecological services to society. 
Keywords:  
Biodiversity conservation, environmental federalism, fiscal transfers, Germany, local costs, 
protected areas, Saxony, spillover effects 
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4.1 Introduction 
The concept of ecological tax reform was developed during the 1990s. The early focus on 
energy taxes was later enlarged to include fiscal policy more broadly. The debate on ecologi-
cal fiscal reform, however, continues to be focused on environmental pollution, or – in eco-
nomic terms – internalising negative externalities by way of taxes, charges, and fees, and thus, 
on greening public income. Much less has been written on internalising positive externalities, 
which means greening the public expenditure side. Developing fiscal transfers to compensate 
societal actors for the ecological goods and services they provide remains a neglected aspect 
of the debate. Although the German Advisory Council on the Environment has long suggested 
the integration of nature conservation into communal fiscal transfer systems (SRU 1996), 
there have been no systematic steps in this direction so far. One major argument in favour of 
ecological fiscal transfers relates to the spatial division of labour concerning public sector 
functions. Whereas the socio-economic public sector functions of urban agglomerations (such 
as schools, hospitals, and theatres) have long been a part of fiscal transfer schemes, functions 
related to ecological goods and services in rural and peripheral regions still await inclusion 
(Ewers et al. 1997; Ring 2002). Protected areas, for example, involve land-use restrictions 
that may force municipalities to forego development opportunities that would generate com-
munal income (Figure 4.1). If protected areas were successfully included in fiscal transfers to 
the local level, however, their acceptance could be increased.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1: This highway bordering the protected landscape Leipziger Auewald exemplifies 
the conflict between nature protection and other forms of land use, such as trans-
port infrastructure. 
Perner and Thöne (2005) suggested ways of incorporating nature conservation into communal 
fiscal transfers, based mainly on indicators from spatial planning and the support of direct 
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conservation measures. Köllner et al. (2002) developed a model based on biodiversity indica-
tors and cantonal benchmarking for fiscal transfers to the local level in Switzerland. 
This article aims to advance the debate, firstly, by describing the current state of and future 
prospects for ecological fiscal transfers in Germany, based on an analysis of the 13 fiscal 
transfer laws in the German Länder (federal states). Secondly, the intergovernmental fiscal 
transfer system from state to local level in Saxony, Germany, is presented and at the same 
time expanded to include a conservation indicator based on designated protected areas. 
Saxony was selected with a view to data availability, since the expanded transfer scheme is 
based on Saxon administrative, social, and economic data from 2002. Two alternative models 
and sets of simulation results are presented. They demonstrate for the first time in a spatially 
explicit way the changes in communal income that would occur if protected areas were con-
sidered in a state’s fiscal transfer system. 
4.2 Ecological fiscal transfers in Germany: Status quo and perspectives 
Local conservation efforts as well as local land-use restrictions due to protected areas are of-
ten related to benefits at higher governmental levels. In particular, biodiversity conservation 
gives rise to global benefits, yet its associated costs are unequally distributed with regard to 
regions and economic sectors (Urfei 2002; Ring 2004; Hampicke 2005). In studies of envi-
ronmental federalism, it is undisputed that the non-use values associated with natural re-
sources in particular justify the centralisation of responsibilities (Revesz 2000; Oates 2001; 
List et al. 2002). In Germany, protected areas are designated by the Länder and at regional 
governmental levels, at times with and at times without the consent of local actors. Hence, 
land users and municipal authorities often perceive protected areas as an obstacle to develop-
ment (Bauer et al. 1996), and opposition towards large protected areas can be considerable 
(Stoll-Kleemann 2001; Job 2008). Due to the local management and opportunity costs of pro-
viding public goods and services, spatial externalities or spillovers exist that – if not ade-
quately compensated – lead to their underprovision (Bergmann 1999; Ring 2008a). A number 
of reforms are needed to reconcile the local costs and global public benefits of biodiversity 
conservation (Perrings and Gadgil 2003; MEA 2005). In Germany and in Europe generally, 
various agri-environmental programmes exist to compensate private land users for benefits 
foregone. For local public actors – the municipalities – only few options exist for obtaining 
compensation. In Saxony, one programme offers support for direct conservation measures, 
although the opportunity costs of protected areas imposed by spatial planning are not taken 
into account. Moreover, municipalities hope to generate income from designating commercial 
and housing development areas; this remains a major driver of land consumption. 
Theoretically, fiscal federalism and the principle of fiscal equivalence provide major ar-
guments for matching decision-making responsibilities with the costs and benefits of provid-
ing public goods and services (Buchanan 1950). Where spatial externalities exist between 
jurisdictions at different governmental levels, intergovernmental fiscal transfers are proposed 
as a suitable instrument to internalise them (Olson Jr. 1969). Fiscal transfers are an important 
source of local income in Germany: almost 30 percent in West Germany and more than 50 
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percent of average local income in eastern Germany stem from communal fiscal equalisation 
(Karrenberg and Münstermann 2006). 
In the German Länder, general lump-sum transfers constitute the majority of transfers to 
the local level. They may be used in any way the recipient wishes, thereby acknowledging the 
high degree of autonomy given to the local level of government by the German Constitution. 
Their allocation is based on the fiscal need of a local jurisdiction in relation to its fiscal capac-
ity (its own revenues based on local taxes). Fiscal need is determined by a “principal” ap-
proach that takes into account the general and average fiscal need. The main indicator used is 
the number of inhabitants, often accompanied by weighting factors linked to population size. 
In some states, “additional” approaches exist to take account of specific community burdens. 
The Free State of Saxony has an additional approach based on the number of schoolchildren; 
other states take account of recreational functions or the area of a municipality. The inhabi-
tant-based indicator used for the bulk of fiscal transfers, however, generally favours urban 
areas as opposed to rural areas, due to the lower population densities of the latter. 
Area-based indicators are a first step towards taking account of ecological public functions 
in fiscal transfers (Ring 2002). Henneke (2006) refers to the additional costs incurred by a 
large community or district area for public sector functions such as nature conservation, agri-
cultural affairs, waste disposal, water supply, or sewage discharge. The German Association 
of District Councils (Deutscher Landkreistag) frequently requires enhanced area-related indi-
cators in fiscal transfers. So far, only the thinly populated states of Brandenburg, Mecklen-
burg-Western Pomerania and Saxony-Anhalt use area as an indicator for general lump-sum 
transfers, along with Rhineland-Palatinate, a state with higher average population density. 
North Rhine-Westphalia, Baden-Württemberg, and Hesse acknowledge ecological fiscal 
needs independently of a municipality’s fiscal capacity. These states provide unconditional 
fiscal transfers relating to public sector functions in nature conservation, recreation, and envi-
ronmental protection. 
Table 4.1 shows fiscal transfers earmarked for ecological purposes in German fiscal 
equalisation laws in 2006. This is the most common method of including ecological functions 
in communal fiscal transfers. Infrastructure-related measures and end-of-pipe measures domi-
nate the picture, confirming the results of a previous analysis conducted in 2001 (Ring 2002). 
Apart from drinking water provision, resource protection, as well as nature and biodiversity 
conservation are rarely supported. 
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Table 4.1: Earmarked ecological fiscal transfers in German fiscal equalisation laws of the 
German Länder (2006). 
Area Measures supported Länder (Federal states) 
Soil Soil conservation BW, ST 
 Prospecting and remediation of contaminated sites, 
recultivation 
BY, BW, HE, ST, TH 
Water Water protection HE, SH, RP 
 Water supply BY, BW, HE, MV, RP, SL, SN, TH 
 Sewage disposal BY, BB, BW, HE, MV, RP, SL, 
SN, TH 
Nature protection  Nature conservation and landscape management HE, MV, ST 
Recreation Spas, recreation, and tourism MV, RP, SH 
Waste Waste disposal plants BY, HE, MV, RP, SL, TH 
Energy Energy saving measures HE 
BW, Baden-Württemberg; BY, Bavaria; BB, Brandenburg; HE, Hesse; MV, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania; 
RP, Rhineland-Palatinate; SH, Schleswig-Holstein; SL, Saarland; SN, Saxony; ST, Saxony-Anhalt;  
TH, Thuringia. 
 
To sum up, there is a lack of conservation-oriented public sector functions in fiscal transfers, 
particularly relating to the opportunity costs of protected areas. In terms of types of fiscal 
transfer, there is a lack of lump-sum or unconditional transfers based on conservation indica-
tors. Such transfers would give the municipality more leeway in the use of monies received. 
Therefore, two alternative models are presented, each using a conservation indicator for dis-
tributing 1. lump-sum transfers and 2. unconditional ecological fiscal transfers. 
4.3 Modelling fiscal transfers for protected areas in Saxony  
4.3.1 The Saxon communal fiscal transfer system 
The Free State of Saxony has three administrative levels: the state level, an intermediate level 
of administrative districts1, and the local governmental level. The latter consists of cities that 
are district-independent, districts, and communities belonging to a district. In the following 
models, only the seven district-independent cities and 530 communities are considered (537 
municipalities in total) representing Saxony’s decentralised jurisdictions that make up the 
total state area. For the distribution of general lump-sum transfers, fiscal needs are determined 
by weighted inhabitants according to size classes of municipalities (principal approach) and 
weighted schoolchildren according to school types (additional approach). The two approaches 
form the “overall approach” which is then multiplied by a “base amount” to identify the fiscal 
need of a municipality. Different iterative calculation processes are used to determine the base 
amounts for district-independent cities and communities respectively. In 2002 these original 
                                                 
1  Regierungsbezirke Chemnitz, Dresden, and Leipzig. 
110 II   Intergovernmental fiscal transfers 
base amounts were 1,150.62 euros for cities and 520.81 euros for communities. Fiscal capac-
ity is determined by a municipality’s own local revenues, consisting of local land and busi-
ness taxes plus local shares of income and value-added taxes (Lenk 2005). Municipalities do 
not receive any lump-sum transfers if their fiscal capacity exceeds their fiscal need, which 
was the case for just four Saxon municipalities in 2002. All the others received lump-sum 
transfers, partly equalising the gap between their fiscal need and fiscal capacity. 
In addition to lump-sum transfers, the Saxon fiscal transfer system provides for further un-
conditional transfers to take account of fiscal needs independently of the municipality’s fiscal 
capacity; it dedicates specified amounts for transfers to compensate for burdens linked to 
roads, cultural amenities, and snowfall, and includes earmarked transfers. Before presenting 
the models below, a suitable indicator is developed for including protected areas in the Saxon 
fiscal transfer system. 
4.3.2 Conservation units as an indicator 
Conservation units (CUs) are used as an indicator for taking account of designated protected 
areas in the Saxon fiscal transfer scheme. Conservation units are standardised areas within the 
boundaries of a municipality that belong to one of the following categories of protected areas 
according to Saxon nature conservation law: national park, special area of conservation 
(SAC) according to the EU Habitats Directive2, special protection area (SPA) according to 
the EU Birds Directive3, nature reserve, biosphere reserve, nature park, and landscape reserve. 
These categories are defined by German nature conservation law. Data on protected area 
boundaries are available from conservation authorities. Hence, CUs represent a simple yet 
comparable indicator capable of being included in the communal fiscal transfer systems of the 
German states in various ways, thus reflecting German federalism. For the standardisation of 
protected areas, a conservation weight is introduced, taking account of the conservation value 
of the management category in question (Table 4.2). From an economic perspective, the con-
servation weight also takes into account – in other words rewards – spillover benefits associ-
ated with categories of international and European significance, such as national parks, bio-
sphere reserves, and the European Natura 2000 network. Land-use restrictions associated with 
the various management categories are also considered.4 For example, national parks are of 
very high conservation value; they represent a management category of international signifi-
cance and are associated with the strictest land-use restrictions in German nature conservation 
law. For this reason, one hectare of national park corresponds to one CU, setting the reference 
value for the other categories. In contrast, landscape reserves are usually of regional impor-
                                                 
2  EU Directive 92/43/EEC on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora. 
3  EU Directive 79/409/EEC on the conservation of wild birds. 
4  The conservation weights applied here were estimated with the assistance of Klaus Henle, Head of Depart-
ment of Conservation Biology at the Helmholtz Centre for Environmental Research – UFZ. In practice, conser-
vation authorities may decide on weights according to the conservation value of different protected areas. A 
scientific justification may also include an analysis of land-use restrictions and associated opportunity costs as 
well as an economic valuation of spillover benefits. 
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tance with relatively low land-use restrictions. Thus, one hectare of landscape reserve is as-
sumed to correspond to 0.3 CU.5 
Table 4.2: Estimated conservation weights for different categories of protected areas. 
Management category Conservation weight 
National park  1 
Special area of conservation (SAC), EU Habitats Directive  0.9 
Special protection area (SPA), EU Birds Directive  0.9 
Nature reserve  0.7 
Biosphere reserve  0.6 
Nature park 0.4 
Landscape reserve 0.3 
 
The CUs of each municipality are identified by overlaying GIS6 layers of the various catego-
ries of protected areas over a total of 537 municipal borders in Saxony, while avoiding double 
counts.7 Figure 4.2 shows all protected areas in Saxony as of early 2004 superimposed on its 
municipal borders as of January 1, 2002.8 41 percent or approximately 758,000 hectares of 
Saxony’s total area are designated under nature conservation law (Table 4.3). Due to the con-
servation weights applied, this corresponds to approximately 365,000 hectares CU. Compared 
to Chemnitz and Leipzig, the administrative district of Dresden has a higher percentage of 
CUs due to having large protected areas, including Saxony’s single national park and bio-
sphere reserve. 
To simplify matters, the models presented include CUs only as a quantitative indicator. As 
a second step, both the quantity and the quality of protected areas should be considered in 
order to prevent municipalities striving to accumulate low quality protected areas. 
 
 
 
                                                 
5  If all protected areas were to be considered in the same way, all the conservation weights would be equal to 
one. The sum of a municipality’s CUs would then be the sum of all designated protected areas within its terri-
tory. 
6  Geographical information system. 
7  An area designated as a nature reserve, which also lies in a biosphere reserve, is to be counted once using the 
area and conservation weight of the highest category associated with it. 
8  GIS data for all types of protected area in Saxony became publicly available only in 2004. 
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Figure 4.2: Protected areas overlaid over municipal borders in Saxony. 
Table 4.3: Inhabitants, protected areas and conservation units (CUs) in Saxony. 
Administrative 
district 
Inhabitants Total area 
(ha) 
Protected 
area (ha) 
Protected 
area (%) 
CUs 
(ha) 
CUs 
(%) 
CUs per 
inhabitant 
Chemnitz 1,621,284 613,007 270,770 44.2 118,289 19.3 0.07 
Dresden 1,712,562 796,944 322,094 40.4 168,080 21.1 0.10 
Leipzig 1,091,735 440,669 165,439 37.5 78,989 17.9 0.07 
Saxony 4,425,581 1,850,620 758,303 41.0 365,359 19.7 0.08 
 
4.3.3 Model 1: Including conservation units in general lump-sum transfers 
In the first model, protected areas are taken into account by creating a further additional ap-
proach – the “conservation approach” – in the distribution of lump-sum transfers, thereby 
increasing fiscal need while acknowledging local fiscal capacity. For this purpose, CUs need 
to be converted into the generic indicator of inhabitants. This procedure mirrors the existing 
consideration of area in fiscal transfer systems in other German Länder9. In the model calcu-
                                                 
9  For example Brandenburg: additional approach with ten inhabitants per square kilometre area for districts; 
Saxony-Anhalt: principal approach with 15 inhabitants per square kilometre area for districts; Rhineland-
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lation presented, we assume that a political decision is taken to make one hectare CU equal to 
one inhabitant (average population density in Saxony in 2002: 2.36 inhabitants per hectare). 
Thus, the “overall approach” of a municipality is given by the sum of weighted inhabitants 
and schoolchildren plus its CUs. In this way, the fiscal need of a municipality is increased 
according to the CUs within its municipal boundaries. 
Ideally, the equivalence between CUs and inhabitants should be justified empirically by es-
timating the opportunity costs of protected areas and the municipality’s direct conservation 
management costs, in order to approximate the “actual” fiscal need. It is very difficult (if not 
impossible), however, to develop an indicator and an appropriate weighting procedure that 
“correctly” reflects the fiscal need of a municipality. A similar problem is encountered when 
using weighted inhabitants to approximate municipal fiscal needs, a (controversial) argument 
developed in the literature on public finances in the 1930s (Brecht 1932). Rhineland-
Palatinate and Schleswig-Holstein have already abolished the weighting of inhabitants, in 
contrast to the prevailing practices of other German states. 
In the present model, the base amounts calculated for district-independent cities (1,144.21 
euros) and for communities (478.04 euros) are lower than those obtained in the original fiscal 
transfer system in 2002 (see above). Hence, municipalities with no or few CUs receive fewer 
lump-sum transfers, while others make gains according to their CUs. Due to the differing base 
amounts, one weighted inhabitant or schoolchild, as well as one hectare CU, more than dou-
bles the fiscal need of a district-independent city compared to the smaller communities. From 
an economic point of view this is justified by the higher opportunity costs of protected areas 
in large cities. 
Figure 4.3 illustrates the percentage changes in general lump-sum transfers due to CUs for 
each Saxon municipality, compared to lump-sum transfers originally received in 2002. On the 
winners’ side, most municipalities increase their lump-sum transfers by up to 25 percent, but 
there are some municipalities that more than double them. The ten municipalities ranking 
highest are located within one of the large protected areas in Saxony’s peripheral regions. 
Half of them lie in the biosphere reserve Oberlausitzer Heide- und Teichlandschaft, while the 
others are part of the nature parks Dübener Heide and Erzgebirge-Vogtland, as well as the 
national park Sächsische Schweiz. The absolute increase in lump-sum transfers of these ten 
municipalities ranges between 700,000 and 1.5 million euros. By contrast, the vast majority of 
municipalities in Saxony lose only up to 25 percent of their lump-sum transfers (Table 4.4). 
                                                                                                                                                        
Palatinate: additional approach with two inhabitants per square kilometre area above state average. In protected 
area statistics at local and state levels, the unit hectare (one hectare equals 0.01 square kilometre) is more com-
mon and henceforth used to incorporate CUs into fiscal transfers. 
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Figure 4.3: Model 1: Percentage change in general lump-sum transfers when the Saxon fiscal 
transfer system 2002 was expanded to include designated protected areas. In this 
model, conservation units (CUs) are used in addition to inhabitants and school-
children to calculate the fiscal need of a municipality, assuming one hectare CU is 
equal to one inhabitant. 
Table 4.4: Model 1: Distribution of winning and losing municipalities across Saxony if the 
Saxon fiscal transfer system 2002 included designated protected areas. 
Percentage change in general lump-sum transfers 
Administrative 
district < –50 
–50 up to  
< –25 
–25 up to 
< 0 
0 up to 
< 25 
25 up to 
< 50 
50 up to 
< 100 ≥ 100 
Number of 
municipalities
Chemnitz 1 1 113 64 21 13 1 214 
Dresden 0 0 99 65 21 16 19 220 
Leipzig 1 0 61 18 15 4 4 103 
Saxony 2 1 273 147 57 33 24 537 
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4.3.4 Model 2: Devoting a specified amount to ecological fiscal transfers 
The second way of including CUs in communal fiscal transfers is designed in analogy to the 
ICMS Ecológico in Brazil (see Box 4.1). This fiscal instrument has been implemented by sev-
eral Brazilian states since the early 1990s (Grieg-Gran 2000; May et al. 2002; Ring 2008b). 
Ecological fiscal transfers are determined by multiplying the ecological index of a municipal-
ity by a specified amount of money devoted to conservation. For a given quantity of overall 
CUs in the state, each municipality’s ecological index is controlled by its Municipal Conser-
vation Factor (MCF), representing the share of municipal CUs in relation to its total area. In 
this way, the relative land-use restrictions associated with protected areas are compensated, 
and a higher CU to municipal area ratio will lead to an increased absolute amount of ecologi-
cal fiscal transfers. Thus, a municipality with a MCF of 90 percent receives more ecological 
fiscal transfers than one with a MCF of only 30 or 50 percent. 
Applied to the situation in Saxony, a specified amount is devoted to unconditional fiscal 
transfers based on CUs, in analogy to Saxon fiscal transfers for the compensation of burdens 
associated with road maintenance (about 90 million euros each year), provision of cultural 
services (about 30 million euros), and the removal of excess snow (SMF 2007). For the pur-
pose of illustration, we assume that 90 million euros are devoted to conservation services, 
similar to the amount used annually for roads. This is about 2.7 percent of the 3,283 billion 
euros available for communal fiscal transfers in 2002. By comparison, Brazilian states devote 
0.5 to seven percent to CU-based fiscal transfers (Ring 2008b). 
Figure 4.4 and Table 4.5 present the percentage changes in fiscal transfers to Saxon mu-
nicipalities for the second model. Results are given in net changes in fiscal transfers, consist-
ing of additional ecological fiscal transfers due to CUs and reduced lump-sum transfers. 
Box 4.1: International experiences with fiscal transfers for protected areas 
Both Brazil and, more recently, Portugal have implemented ecological fiscal transfers, compensat-
ing municipalities for land-use restrictions imposed by protected areas. The ICMS Ecológico has 
been adopted by 12 out of 27 Brazilian states; others are preparing relevant legislation (Ring 
2008b). 
Conservation units (CUs) are the ecological indicator used by all states. They are defined accord-
ing to the National System of Conservation Units, and relate to the categories of protected areas 
for biodiversity conservation in Brazil. Paraná was the first state in 1992 to introduce ecological 
indicators for the redistribution of state value-added tax income to municipalities: 2.5 percent of 
the amount to be distributed to the local level is allocated according to CUs; another 2.5 percent 
considers water protection areas within a municipality’s territory (May et al. 2002). 
As of January 1, 2007, Portugal has a new national community financing law that includes eco-
logical fiscal transfers. The new fiscal transfer scheme explicitly rewards municipalities for desig-
nated Natura 2000 sites and other protected areas within their territories (de Melo and Prates 
2007). 
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Figure 4.4: Model 2: Percentage change in fiscal transfers when 90 million euros were de-
voted to conservation in the Saxon fiscal transfer system in 2002. The map indi-
cates net changes in fiscal transfers consisting of additional ecological fiscal trans-
fers, based on conservation units (CUs) in relation to the total municipal area, and 
reduced lump-sum transfers. 
Table 4.5: Model 2: Distribution of winning and losing municipalities across Saxony if the 
Saxon fiscal transfer system devoted 90 million euros to conservation. 
Percentage change in net fiscal transfers 
Administrative 
district < –50 
–50 up to  
< –25 
–25 up to 
< 0 
0 up to 
< 25 
25 up to 
< 50 
50 up to 
< 100 ≥ 100 
Number of 
municipalities
Chemnitz 0 1 93 75 27 13 5 214 
Dresden 0 0 84 82 28 18 8 220 
Leipzig 0 1 58 32 8 2 2 103 
Saxony 0 2 235 189 63 33 15 537 
 
The monies devoted in advance to CUs are no longer available for lump-sum transfers, re-
flecting a budget-neutral fiscal reform. Similar to the first model, most municipalities either 
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gain or lose up to 25 percent of their fiscal transfers. However, in the present simulation, with 
90 million euros devoted to conservation, 39 municipalities move from the losing to the win-
ning side, while fewer municipalities double their income from fiscal transfers. 
4.4 Which option to choose? 
In principle, both models are suitable for including protected areas in intergovernmental fiscal 
transfers to the local level. The indicator “conservation units” offers further possibilities for 
greening communal fiscal transfers. A specified amount per hectare CU could be allocated to 
municipalities, in the way Portugal amended its communal financing law in 2007 (see 
Box 4.1). In the end, the choice among these options is a political decision, as is the choice of 
conservation weights and funds reserved for conservation purposes. Although there are theo-
retical and scientific arguments to support the different options, political reasoning as well as 
community lobbying strongly influence the specific design of a state fiscal transfer scheme. 
This is exemplified in current practices of including area or recreational functions in German 
communal fiscal transfer laws (Ring 2002). 
There is a basic difference, however, between the two models presented. In the first model, 
municipalities only benefit if they receive lump-sum transfers. If their fiscal capacity still ex-
ceeds fiscal need despite including CUs in the fiscal transfer system, it is assumed that the 
financial status is healthy enough to cope with conservation-related direct and opportunity 
costs. By contrast, the second model always provides for municipal income for CUs irrespec-
tive of fiscal capacity. So the two models differ in the question of whether protected areas and 
associated fiscal needs should be valued in relation to or irrespective of fiscal capacity. Many 
national parks regions benefit economically from higher tourism income. Taking account of 
CUs in the distribution of general lump-sum transfers would better account for municipal in-
come (local taxes) generated through attractive tourism destinations. At the same time, less 
attractive areas of high conservation value would be able to increase their income based on 
CUs, allowing the latter to provide basic municipal services for the remaining inhabitants. 
At any rate, existing experiences with ecological fiscal transfers in Brazil have shown that 
their implementation should be accompanied by a sound information policy. Otherwise, mu-
nicipalities may simply not know that protected areas generate municipal income for them 
(Grieg-Gran 2000). Nevertheless, local preferences differ, and there may be municipalities 
that – despite ecological fiscal transfers – are not interested in biodiversity conservation (May 
et al. 2002), while others are intrinsically motivated in conservation policies irrespective of 
economic incentives. 
Two important developments should be mentioned with regard to Saxony: First, a new 
administrative reform is under way that involves retaining only the three district-independent 
cities of Leipzig, Dresden, and Chemnitz (Sächsische Staatsregierung 2007). When the plans 
are realised in mid-2008, general lump-sum transfers for the cities of Görlitz, Hoyerswerda, 
Plauen, and Zwickau will be much lower. The change of status will be hard for these cities, 
irrespective of the consideration of protected areas. A transition phase has already been 
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planned to assist them in adapting to fewer lump-sum transfers. Second, the models presented 
include Saxony’s protected areas as of early 2004. Since then, a significant number of SPA 
sites according to the EU Birds Directive have been reported to the EU Commission, consti-
tuting about 13.5 percent of the Saxon state area, compared to approximately four percent 
incorporated in the models. Including these new reserves would mean increased transfers for a 
number of municipalities due to the high conservation weight associated with this category. 
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source Economists (23–26 June 2005, Bremen, Germany).  
Abstract 
Local conservation efforts are often related to benefits at higher governmental levels. On the 
one hand, these efforts are strongly connected to local land-use decisions. On the other hand, 
activities such as sustainable water management or biodiversity conservation are associated 
with regional, national or even global public goods. Therefore, spatial externalities or spill-
overs exist, which – if not adequately compensated for – lead to an underprovision of the pub-
lic goods and services concerned. This article investigates intergovernmental fiscal transfers as 
an innovative instrument for compensating local jurisdictions for the ecological goods and ser-
vices they provide across local boundaries. From a public finance perspective, fiscal transfers 
are a suitable instrument for internalising spatial externalities. However, most federal states use 
this instrument predominantly for social and economic public sector functions rather than for 
ecological ones. This article investigates the case of the ecological “ICMS” that was first intro-
duced by a few states in Brazil during the 1990s. Part of the revenue from this value-added tax 
is redistributed to the local level on the basis of ecological indicators. In this way, the state 
level uses fiscal transfers to compensate municipalities for the existence of protected areas and 
other ecological services provided within their territories. The Brazilian experience illustrates 
that such fiscal transfers can represent both a compensation for land-use restrictions and an 
incentive to value and engage in more conservation activities at the local level. 
Keywords: 
Fiscal transfers, environmental federalism, conservation benefits, spillover effects, local eco-
logical services, Brazil 
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5.1 Introduction 
Sustainable land use requires a variety of conservation efforts and services, not least at the 
local level. There is a close link between the environmental quality of a landscape, its land-
use pattern and the type of management performed by public jurisdictions and private land 
users. However, local communities can often obtain greater benefits from activities that con-
tribute to the loss of biodiversity and ecosystem services. Providing incentives for conserva-
tion efforts in the form of benefits for local people has proven to be very difficult (Millennium 
Ecosystem Assessment 2005a, p. 92ff). There are few incentives for local actors to engage in 
conservation activities, especially when ecological benefits cross local boundaries (Perrings 
and Gadgil 2003). In Europe, compensation payments for ecological services provided by 
private land users are being introduced more and more widely, mainly in the context of co-
funded EU agri-environmental programmes. What is largely lacking in European member 
states, however, are economic instruments that explicitly address local public actors in their 
role as providers of ecosystem services over the long term. Local governments usually seek to 
achieve socio-economic development by attracting both industries and residents as tax payers. 
Municipalities are rarely able to generate income from the provision of ecological services; on 
the contrary, they are often restricted in their sovereignty, e.g. regarding land-use planning. 
This is the case with a number of services, such as water protection or nature reserves. Deci-
sions on the designation of the protected areas concerned are often taken by institutions above 
the local level, whereas the concrete consequences in terms of restrictions in land use are 
borne by local actors, often without any (or adequate) compensation. 
This article describes an innovative instrument that is able to address this basic problem. 
Intergovernmental fiscal transfers are analysed with regard to their potential within federal 
systems for compensating for ecological services provided by local governments. From a pub-
lic finance perspective, it is the ‘value added’ of local ecological services, i.e. the benefits that 
cross the boundaries of local jurisdictions, which are of special interest. The first part of this 
article gives a brief introduction to public finance principles as they relate to ecological goods 
and services.1 The main part presents a case study from Brazil, focusing on the status quo and 
the incentive effects of integrating ecological public sector functions into intergovernmental 
fiscal transfers. Since the 1990s, several states in Brazil have introduced fiscal transfers that 
explicitly compensate municipalities for certain ecological services, such as watershed protec-
tion and conservation areas (Bernardes 1999; Grieg-Gran 2000; Loureiro 2002; May et al. 
2002). The various ways of introducing ecological indicators into the Brazilian system of in-
tergovernmental fiscal transfers, as well as the experiences gained so far, are analysed and 
important criteria for success elaborated. Finally, the prospects for transferring this instrument 
to other federal systems are explored.  
                                                 
1  For a more detailed interpretation of public finance principles with respect to ecological public sector func-
tions and their relevance to European countries, see Ring (2002). 
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5.2 Compensating for the value added of local ecological services 
5.2.1 Principles of fiscal federalism 
Fiscal federalism is a sub-field of public finances that explores the roles of the different levels 
of government and their interrelationships through fiscal instruments. Its major task is one of 
effectively and efficiently allocating public sector functions, expenditures and revenues to the 
central, state and local governmental levels in federal systems. As Oates (1999, p. 1120) puts 
it, “... we need to understand which functions and instruments are best centralised and which 
are best placed in the sphere of decentralised levels of government”. Regarding the allocation 
function of the public sector, the principle of fiscal decentralisation has been advanced (Mus-
grave 1959; Oates 1972). Most public goods and services are provided more efficiently when 
production and consumption are limited to the lowest governmental level possible. This 
makes it possible to respond more appropriately to the regionally differing preferences of the 
population (Tiebout 1956). 
The decentralisation rule for allocating public goods and services applies in the absence of 
economies of scale. Given economies of scale, the provision of the public goods and services 
concerned should be moved to the cost-efficient centralised level (Postlep and Döring 1996). 
Due to the characteristics of non-rivalry and non-excludability of many public goods, spatial 
externalities or spillovers may exist between jurisdictions. In this case, the principle of fiscal 
equivalence comes into play, which advocates achieving a match between those who decide 
about a collective good, those who pay for it and those who receive its benefits (Buchanan 
1950; Olson 1969). Social welfare is increased through the differentiation of public services 
in accordance with costs and preferences at the appropriate governmental level. The realisa-
tion of fiscal equivalence may require competencies to be shifted to a more centralised level 
of government. Regional cooperation, e.g. by way of negotiations between the relevant par-
ties, can also lead to an efficient Coasian type of resolution of jurisdictional spillovers (Berg-
mann 1999; Oates 2001). A third option has been mentioned by Olson (1969). Provided dis-
economies of large-scale operations require local provision, spillovers can be internalised 
through fiscal transfers from more centralised levels to the local level. In this way, the local 
government is compensated for the external benefits of its expenditures. We focus on this 
potential of fiscal transfers to internalise spillover benefits to other jurisdictions. In the next 
section, we discuss how the principles of fiscal federalism apply to ecological goods and ser-
vices. 
5.2.2 Environmental federalism and spatial externalities 
What are the consequences of the decentralisation rule and the principle of fiscal equivalence 
for environmental issues? The decentralisation rule implies that the provision of ecological 
goods and services should be assigned to lower levels of government where appropriate. 
However, the execution of this rule calls for a differentiated approach. Appropriate solutions 
have to be sought according to the specific characteristics of the various natural resources and 
environmental compartments. This is reflected in ongoing discussions regarding the compe-
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tencies of the national or even supranational governmental level versus the state or local level 
in environmental standard setting (Döring 1997; Oates 1998, 1999).  
Public goods that tend to be underprovided at decentralised levels are basic and applied re-
search, including that concerning the development of environmental policy instruments, but 
also the dissemination of information on harmful environmental impacts or the development 
of pollution control techniques. These issues need to be assigned to a more centralised level of 
government (Oates 2001). Global change problems such as climate change or biodiversity 
loss also point to the need for a fundamental role of central levels of government (Ring 2004). 
Highly mobile environmental compartments and associated pollutants that easily cross admin-
istrative boundaries create far-reaching spatial externalities. The emissions of carbon dioxide 
and other air pollutants associated with climate change and the depletion of the ozone layer 
require more centralised, if not global, emission policies (Hansjürgens 1996). 
In contrast, environmental policy associated with less mobile environmental compartments 
and spatially restricted problems is better suited for assignment to decentralised levels of gov-
ernment (Ring 2002). This is due to the lower probability of causing spatial externalities. 
Tasks relating to land use and soil conservation, as well as public functions associated with 
inland waters, can usually be solved within national boundaries. Despite the general suitabil-
ity of many land-use issues for being assigned to lower governmental levels, spatial external-
ities may require different, more appropriate solutions. 
Regarding water resources, such solutions may be necessary in relation to public policies 
for pollution control related to transboundary spillovers. In the context of water pollution in 
the US, for example, Sigman (2005) estimates the environmental costs generated downstream 
due to free riding states when rivers cross state boundaries. Whereas transboundary water 
pollution is associated with negative spillovers, priority areas for water protection can involve 
positive spillovers. In contrast to certain local costs, be it in terms of land-use restrictions or 
measures for keeping up and improving the quality of the respective reserves, the benefits 
from some of these activities cross local boundaries. For example, water protection zones are 
often located in rural areas, mostly providing drinking water far beyond local demand. Urban 
agglomerations and capital cities with high population densities and industrial activities rely 
especially heavily on water resources lying outside their own municipal boundaries. In the 
case of water resources, an important task consists in properly valuing these resources and 
their functions which should then, as far as possible, be reflected in water prices. In the Euro-
pean Union, the Water Framework Directive now obliges member states both to develop 
management regimes across state and national boundaries according to the spatial dimensions 
of river basins and to find solutions to fully reflect resource costs in water prices (Hansjürgens 
and Messner 2002; Unnerstall 2006). However, for various reasons, resource costs are not yet 
fully reflected in prices; indeed, with regard to certain tasks related to long-term resource pro-
tection, this may not even be a feasible solution. 
The conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity is another example of the widespread 
existence of spatial externalities (Perrings and Gadgil 2003; Ring 2004). The loss of biodiver-
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sity and the threat to services provided by ecosystems for human well-being are among the 
serious global change problems, demanding in many cases centralised standard setting and 
policies. This is reflected in numerous international conventions regarding biological diversity 
and species protection. In the European Union, the Habitats and Birds Directives set strict 
standards to be implemented by member states at national and state levels (Similä et al. 2006). 
Despite centralised standards, decentralised activities related to local land use – seen cumula-
tively – have a tremendous influence on the state of biodiversity worldwide. Compared to 
water resources, ensuring that the value of ecological services is reflected in market prices is 
even more difficult, if not impossible, for many areas of biodiversity conservation (Gowdy 
1997; Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005b). This is especially true for benefits related 
to non-use values, such as existence and option values that may accrue to people everywhere. 
For example, Horton et al. (2003) attempted to estimate the non-use values for a programme 
of protected areas in the Brazilian Amazon by eliciting individual preferences in Italy and the 
UK. Although the contingent valuation study exemplified the difficulties and uncertainties of 
such a global approach, it clearly indicated that the majority of households in Italy and the 
UK were willing to pay to support large-scale tropical forest preservation efforts. Hence, 
large-scale positive spillovers exist at least for certain public goods of global relevance. The 
practical consequences of spatial externalities related to species protection are illustrated by 
an empirical study by List et al. (2002). In their study of federal and state spending under the 
Endangered Species Act in the US, they identified the phenomenon of free riding on the part 
of the states. States tend to spend less (relative to the federal government) on those species 
that demand a large habitat area and whose preservation causes conflicts with economic de-
velopment. Perrings and Gadgil (2003) address a number of reforms necessary to reconcile 
both local and global public benefits of biodiversity conservation. One of them is adjusting 
incentives to allow local communities to be rewarded and paid for their conservation efforts 
(Ring 2002; Unnerstall 2004; Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005b). 
In the following case study, the focus for solving such discrepancies will be on fiscal trans-
fers. Spillovers associated with the provision of public goods and services at the local level 
can be internalised through intergovernmental fiscal transfers from more centralised levels to 
the local level. These transfers may compensate municipalities for the external benefits of 
their conservation expenditure, as well as for their opportunity costs related to land-use re-
strictions to be borne. This is especially necessary in relation to social benefits that accrue in 
the long term, where public actors are bearing the costs arising in the present. In this way, the 
‘value added’ of local ecological goods and services is acknowledged socially, which at the 
same time can provide an incentive for local actors to engage in more conservation activities. 
5.3 Fiscal transfers for local ecological services in Brazil 
Brazil has 27 states, each with an elected government which has revenue-raising powers. The 
ICMS tax (Imposto sobre Circulação de Mercadorias e Serviços) represents the largest source 
of state revenue in Brazil, constituting approximately 90 % of overall state tax revenues 
(Loureiro 2002). It is also an important source of revenue for local governments. The ICMS is 
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a tax on goods and services, similar to the value-added taxes in other countries. It is collected 
on commercial transactions and exchanges of goods and services, such as energy, transporta-
tion and communication (May et al. 2002). The Federal Constitution of Brazil as adopted in 
1988 decrees that 25 % of the revenues raised by this tax are to be allocated by the state to the 
local level of government. Constitutional law further stipulates that 75 % of the total amount 
passed on to the municipalities is to be distributed in accordance with the share of the state 
ICMS that has been collected within that municipality. The state governments determine the 
indicators to be used for allocating the remaining 25 %. Typical indicators are based on popu-
lation, geographical area and primary production (Grieg-Gran 2000). Since the 1990s, the 
states began to introduce ecological indicators. 
Paraná was the first state to introduce the ICMS Ecológico (ICMS-E) (May et al. 2002), 
meaning the ICMS along with an allocation of tax revenues based on environmental indica-
tors.2 In 1990 and 1991, the relevant laws and implementing regulations were adopted that 
allowed for consideration of ecological indicators in the ICMS (Loureiro 2002). Drawing on 
the experience of Paraná, which started using ecological indicators in 1992, the states of Mi-
nas Gerais (1996), São Paulo (1996), Rondônia (1997), Mato Grosso do Sul (2002), Tocantins 
and Pernambuco (2003) started operating a similar system a few years later (Grieg-Gran 
2000; Loureiro 2002; May et al. 2002; CPRH 2003). The state of Rio Grande do Sul passed 
an ICMS-E Law in 1993, followed by implementing laws and regulations in 1997 and final 
adoption in 1999 (Freitas 1999). ICMS-E legislation also exists in the states of Amapá (1996), 
Mato Grosso (2001) and, very recently, Rio de Janeiro (2007). Other Brazilian states, namely 
Santa Catarina, Espírito Santo and Goiás, drafted ICMS-E legislation; Amazonas, Bahia and 
Ceará submitted ICMS-E legislation to their respective state legislatures (Bernardes 1999; 
Freitas 1999; Leite 2001; Loureiro 2002; MMA 2002; Arantes 2006). Discussions are being 
conducted in the latter states, but so far ecological ICMS legislation has been met with oppo-
sition, mostly due to fiscal competition between municipalities for scarce revenues. 
5.3.1 Paraná: valuing watershed protection areas and conservation units 
Following the implementation of more strict environmental legislation in the early 1980s, a 
number of municipalities in Paraná that had protected areas on their territory exerted pressure 
on the state legislature and government agencies (Loureiro 1998). The land-use restrictions 
associated with large conservation and watershed protection areas were preventing the mu-
nicipalities from developing productive activities and thereby generating value added. The 
municipality of Piraquara is a typical example of this situation: 90 % of municipal territory 
consists of designated protected areas for conserving a major watershed to supply the Curitiba 
                                                 
2 The ICMS Ecológico is also known as the “ecological value-added tax”. This holds both for scientific litera-
ture and common language use in Brazil. From a public finance perspective, however, this term is misleading. 
An ecological tax would be a tax whose assessment base is related to ecological indicators. The ICMS 
Ecológico, by contrast, uses ecological indicators for the allocation of its revenues. Therefore, economically 
speaking, the term ecological fiscal transfer is more appropriate and will be used henceforth in this article. 
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metropolitan region (1.5 million inhabitants) with drinking water, and the remaining 10 % 
occupies protected areas for biodiversity conservation (May et al. 2002). 
The ICMS Ecológico was introduced in response to these concerns, as an instrument to 
compensate municipalities with large protected areas for the land-use restrictions they faced, 
while providing incentives for conservation (Loureiro 2002). In the case of Paraná, state deci-
sion-makers considered the long-term costs of water treatment needed due to uncontrolled 
development around water sources. They also were worried about the serious deterioration of 
the state’s land cover with respect to biodiversity protection (Loureiro, cited in Echavarría 
2000). Following the adoption of the Ecological ICMS Law in 1991, 5 % of the total amount 
distributed to the local level has been based on ecological indicators since 1992. Half of this 
(2.5 %) is distributed to municipalities that have watershed protection areas on their territories 
which partly or completely provide services for public drinking water systems in neighbour-
ing municipalities. The other half is for those municipalities that have “conservation units” 
(Loureiro 2002). Conservation units (CUs) are conservation areas that consist of completely 
protected and restricted sustainable use areas that can be publicly managed (federal, state or 
municipal level), privately owned or managed by public-private partnerships. The ICMS-E 
revenue accrues to the municipality and not to the owner of the land. Therefore, the incentive 
effect primarily addresses local public authorities. However, as we will see later, there is also 
an incentive effect to encourage public-private partnerships in terms of more environmentally 
sound land uses. The protected areas may be used indirectly (biological reserves, ecological 
stations and parks) or directly (indigenous areas, extractive reserves and sustainably managed 
forests). In either case, they have to be registered and legally defined in order to be considered 
for ICMS-E allocation (Grieg-Gran 2000). In Paraná, the ICMS-E programme is administered 
by the Paraná State Environmental Institute (Instituto Ambiental do Paraná, IAP). 
5.3.2 Synopsis of existing approaches 
The states of Paraná, Minas Gerais, Rondônia and São Paulo have now been operating the 
ICMS-E for several years. Mato Grosso do Sul, Pernambuco and Tocantins introduced the 
new system only recently. Each state is free to decide upon the indicators for distributing 
25 % of the ICMS to the local level, and therefore, different operating systems are in place. 
This is important to bear in mind when comparing various effects among the states. The indi-
cator “conservation units” has been introduced by all states with ICMS-E legislation. Al-
though the states use slightly different methods to calculate the ecological index of a munici-
pality, the basic procedure is the following: 
The revenues allocated are based on the ecological index EIi of municipality i multiplied 
by the total amount of ICMS-E revenues dedicated to conservation units. The ecological in-
dex EIi is calculated by dividing the municipal conservation factor MCFi by the state conser-
vation factor SCF. For each municipality i (i = 1,…, z) the ecological index EIi can be written as 
SCF
MCF
EI ii = . (1) 
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EIi is the ecological index of municipality i, MCFi the municipal conservation factor of  
municipality i, SCF the state conservation factor, and z the total number of municipalities in 
the state. 
The municipal conservation factor MCFi is based on the total area set aside for protection 
in terms of conservation units CU in relation to the total area of the municipality: 
i
i
i MArea
CUArea
MCF = . (2) 
Area CUi is the total area of conservation units in municipality i and Area Mi the total area of 
municipality i. 
The CUs of a municipality are calculated according to Eq. (3) where the protected areas are 
weighted according to the different categories of management. Table 5.1 shows the conserva-
tion weights CWn for different types of protected areas in Paraná. 
If n denotes the different categories of management, 
∑ ×=
n
nni CWareaprotectedCUArea . (3) 
CWn is the conservation weight for management category n. 
The state conservation factor SCF is given by the sum of all municipal conservation factors 
in the state: 
∑
=
=
z
i
iMCFSCF
1
. (4) 
Table 5.1: Conservation weights CWn for different management categories n  
of protected areas in Paraná. 
Management category Conservation weight 
Ecological research station 1.0 
Biological reserve 1.0 
Park 0.9 
Private natural heritage reserve 0.8 
National, state or municipal forest 0.7 
Indigenous area 0.5 
Environmental protection area I 0.1 
Area of relevant ecological interest 0.1 
Special, local areas of tourist interest 0.1 
Buffer zones 0.1 
Source: Adapted from Grieg-Gran (2000). 
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Paraná was also the first state to evaluate the quality of protected areas and to include this in 
the calculation of the ecological index (Grieg-Gran 2000; Loureiro 2002; May et al. 2002). 
The additional quality index of each protected area is assessed by regional officers of the state 
environmental agency on the basis of variables such as physical quality, biological quality 
(fauna and flora), quality of water resources (within the CU and in its surroundings), physical 
representativeness, and quality of planning, implementation and maintenance.3 Minas Gerais 
(2005) planned for a quality factor early on, but only introduced the respective regulation in 
2005. Although more states with ICMS-E legislation call for a quality index, in most cases 
they are only partially implemented, if at all. 
Table 5.2: ICMS allocation for ecological indicators in the states operating the ICMS Ecológico. 
State ICMS-E 
legislation 
adopted 
Ecological share 
of total ICMS 
(%) 
Allocation to 
indicators  
(%) 
Ecological indicators 
Paraná 1991 5 2.5 Watershed protection areas 
   2.5 Conservation units 
São Paulo 1993 0.5 0.5 Conservation units 
Minas Gerais 1995 1 0.5 Conservation units 
   0.5 Solid waste disposal and sanita-
tion systems 
Rondônia 1996 5 5 Conservation units 
Amapá 1996 1.4 1.4 Conservation units 
Rio Grande do Sul 1998 7 7 Conservation units 
Mato Grosso 2001 7 5 Conservation units 
   2 Waste disposal and sanitation 
systems 
Mato Grosso do Sul 2001 5 5 Conservation units 
Pernambuco 2001 6 1 Conservation units 
   5 Waste management 
Tocantinsa 2002 13 3.5 Conservation units 
   3.5 Solid waste disposal and sanita-
tion systems; water protection 
   2 Slash and burn control 
   2 Local environmental policy 
   2 Soil protection 
Rio de Janeirob 2007 2.5 1.1 Conservation units 
   0.8 Water resources 
   0.6 Solid waste management 
Sources: Bernardes (1999), Grieg-Gran (2000), Loureiro (2002), CPRH (2003), SEPLAN (2003), Rio de Janeiro 
(2007), and Domingues (personal communication). 
a Final implementation state in 2007. 
b Final implementation state in 2011. 
                                                 
3 A more detailed description is provided by Loureiro (2002, p. 79ff.) and May et al. (2002, p. 195). 
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Table 5.2 illustrates the types and shares of all ecological indicators adopted so far for ICMS-
E allocation by the respective states. With regard to the waste management indicator in Minas 
Gerais, funds are allocated to those municipalities operating solid and liquid waste manage-
ment systems duly licensed by the State Environmental Policy Council (Bernardes 1999). 
Differences can be noted in the way the states introduced ecological indicators into the 
ICMS allocation system. In Rondônia, the allocation of ICMS based on value added (75 %), 
population (0.5 %), area (0.5 %) and agricultural production (5 %) did not change (Freitas 
1999). It was the “equal share” indicator being reduced from 19 % to 14 % that allowed for 
the introduction of the ecological indicator, which was allocated a share of 5 % (Grieg-Gran 
2000). 
Whereas Rondônia changed its allocation system within one year (between 1996 and 
1997), Minas Gerais introduced its new allocation system step-wise, starting to apply new 
indicators in 1996 and achieving full operation of the new system in 1998. In Minas Gerais, 
the introduction of the ICMS-E was part of a substantial change of the whole ICMS allocation 
system, popularly known as the “Robin Hood Law” (Bernardes 1999). The allocation based 
on value added was gradually reduced from about 94 % (1995) to 80 % (1998) to allow for 
the consideration of other indicators. Apart from the introduction of ecological indicators, 
eight further indicators were implemented: geographical area (1 %), population (2.71 %), 
50 municipalities with the biggest population (2 %), education (2 %), area cultivated (1 %), 
cultural heritage (1 %), health expenditure (2 %) and the municipalities’ own revenue genera-
tion (2 %). Here, the reform of the ICMS system covered not only ecological aspects, it also 
included the redistribution of resources for social reasons, aimed at making poorer munici-
palities better off. For this reason, it is much more difficult to illustrate clearly the effects of 
the introduction of ecological indicators in Minas Gerais compared to Rondônia (Grieg-Gran 
2000).  
The state of Tocantins also decided to introduce the ICMS-E in a gradual manner. Having 
started in 2003 with an overall percentage of 3.5 % for ecological indicators, Tocantins is to 
allocate a total of 13 % in 2007 for conservation units and indigenous areas, local environ-
mental policy, slash and burn control, water and soil protection, as well as waste and sewage 
disposal (SEPLAN 2003). 
A similar step-wise implementation is foreseen in the state of Rio de Janeiro, which passed 
its law on the ecological ICMS in October 2007 (Rio de Janeiro 2007). Starting with just 1 % 
in 2009, in its final implementation stage in the year 2011 a total of 2.5 % will be allocated to 
municipalities according to conservation units, the quality of water resources and solid waste 
management (see Table 5.2). 
Before investigating the specific effects of the ICMS-E, a brief overview is presented re-
garding the existence and respective categories of protected areas for the states of Paraná, 
Rondônia and Minas Gerais. Table 5.3 shows the jurisdiction of protected areas in these states 
in 1997, differentiated according to federal, state and municipal levels. All states have in 
common a very low percentage of protected areas under municipal jurisdiction. In Paraná, 
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more than 95 % of areas are protected under a jurisdiction higher than the municipal level; in 
Minas Gerais and Rondônia the figure is more than 99 %.  
Rondônia represents a very special situation. This state has an extraordinarily high per-
centage of protected areas (36 %), with more than 50 % of all its municipalities containing 
protected areas (total number of municipalities in 1998: 52). Rondônia began to be settled 
through officially induced colonisation by people of European ancestry only in the late 20th 
century, starting in the early 1970s. A substantial part of this state consists of Indian reserves, 
extractive reserves, federal parks and other reserves, most of which are threatened by illegal 
logging, mining and other economic activities. In contrast, Paraná and Minas Gerais are in the 
Atlantic Forest, where settlement has taken place ever since colonisation in the 16th century, 
leading to substantial deforestation. Only 1 % of the original Atlantic Forest is left, of which 
75 % is severely endangered. Protected areas in Minas Gerais account for 2 % of its total state 
area, with only about 16 % of its municipalities including protected areas as part of their mu-
nicipal area (total number of municipalities in 1998: 853) (Grieg-Gran 2000). Paraná’s pro-
tected areas also account for about 2 % of the total state area (total number of municipalities 
in 1999: 400). 
Table 5.3: Jurisdiction of protected areas in Paraná, Rondônia and Minas Gerais (1997). 
 Federal State Municipal Total 
Paraná     
Area protected (ha) 502,471 1,013,421 69,699 1,585,590 
Percentage of total protected area 32 64 4 100 
Protected areas as % of total state area    2 
Minas Gerais     
Area protected (ha) 830,269 331,078 2,772 1,164,119 
Percentage of total protected area 71 28 0.24 100 
Protected areas as % of total state area    2 
Rondônia     
Area protected (ha) 6,637,462 2,406,018 1,150 9,044,630 
Percentage of total protected area 73 27 0.01 100 
Protected areas as % of total state area    36 
Source: Grieg-Gran (2000, p. 7). 
 
5.3.3 Participation in the programme 
In the states in which ICMS-E legislation exists, ecological fiscal transfers are automatically 
distributed to all municipalities that qualify, i.e. that hold officially registered conservation 
units within their territories. Therefore, an important prerequisite for the success of the pro-
gramme is a good information policy. Municipalities need to know about the programme and 
they also need to expect benefits from participation for actually making an effort to create 
new conservation units or to use the ICMS-E revenues for additional conservation benefits. In 
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Minas Gerais, for example, the decentralised structure of the State Forest Institute, which is 
responsible for monitoring all information related to ICMS-E transfers based on conservation 
units, turned out to be extremely helpful in terms of publicising the new law. With its 150 
local and 14 regional offices, it acted as an important source of information for municipalities 
with an interest in participation (Bernardes 1999). 
May et al. (2002) indicate that since the programme’s inception, Minas Gerais showed a 
100 % increase in the number of municipalities benefiting from ICMS-E revenues. Currently, 
about 30 % of all municipalities in Minas Gerais participate in the programme. In Paraná, the 
ICMS-E programme began with the participation of 112 municipalities in 1992. In the year 
2000, 221 municipalities benefited from the ICMS-E, either for conservation units or water-
shed protection or for having both types of protected areas. Over 50 % of all municipalities in 
Paraná are now participating in the programme. With regard to the biodiversity part of the 
ICMS-E programme, the number of participating municipalities grew from 63 in 1992 to 176 
in the year 2000, representing an increase of 179 % (Loureiro 2002). This means that since its 
inception in Paraná, 113 municipalities qualified for the programme for the first time, due to 
the designation of new conservation units. 
The ICMS-E has greatly improved relations between protected areas and the surrounding 
inhabitants (Bernardes 1999). Instead of perceiving protected areas as an obstacle to devel-
opment, they are starting to see them as an opportunity to generate revenue. More municipali-
ties are now aware of the existence of protected areas within their territory and are beginning 
to change their attitude towards them. They are more open to creating new reserves and, de-
pending on the design of ecological indicators, also care about the quality of these areas. Dur-
ing the first year of operating the ICMS-E in Minas Gerais, only federal and state protected 
areas were considered; protected areas at municipal level were excluded because they lacked 
formal registration. The following year saw the official registration of existing municipal pro-
tected areas, and these were then included in the ICMS-E programme (Grieg-Gran 2000). 
5.3.4 Increase in protected areas  
Young (2005) stresses the effectiveness of the ICMS-E in encouraging the creation of new 
protected areas. Existing empirical studies concentrate on the states of Paraná and Minas 
Gerais, which were among the first states to introduce this economic instrument. Here, a clear 
incentive effect can be seen in the way new protected areas have been created, predominantly 
at local and state level. In relation to public protected areas in particular, the ICMS-E has be-
come an important stimulus for the creation of new conservation units and for improved envi-
ronmental management and quality of these areas. 
In Paraná, the total area measured in conservation units grew by over 1,000,000 ha in the 
year 2000, representing an overall increase of 165 % during the 9 years since the pro-
gramme’s inception in 1992 (May et al. 2002). Table 5.4 shows that municipalities developed 
a strong interest in designating new public protected areas at the local level. The introduction 
of quality evaluation for conservation units had a positive effect on the interest of municipali-
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ties in improving their management (Grieg-Gran 2000, p. 21). Some municipalities and their 
mayors also started supporting private land users in managing conservation units, including 
provision of staff, equipment and vehicles for managing the areas. 
In Minas Gerais, conservation units grew by slightly over 1,000,000 ha in 5 years, repre-
senting a 62 % increase (see Table 5.5, May et al. 2002). As for public protected areas, the 
designation of new protected areas was carried out exclusively at the state and municipal level 
of government. In Minas Gerais, however, the ICMS-E is not the only reason for the increase 
in protected areas: part of the initial growth was due to the efforts by local governments to 
register existing units that had not been regulated previously by the state. 
Table 5.4: Public and private protected areas in Paraná before and after the ICMS-E. 
Protected areas Until 1991  
(ha) 
Created after 1991 
(ha) 
Total by 2000 
(ha) 
Increase 
(%) 
Public     
 Federal 289,582 50,846 340,428 18 
 State 39,859 13,804 53,663 35 
 Municipal 1,429 2,740 4,169 192 
Private/mixed     
 APA 306,693 905,631 1,212,324 295 
 RPPN 0 26,124 26,124  
 Other 0 53,607 53,607  
Total 637,563 1,052,752 1,690,315 165 
Source: Adapted from May et al. (2002). APAs (Environmental Protection Areas) can be designated at federal, 
state or municipal level. RPPNs (Private Natural Patrimony Reserves) can be designated at federal or state level.  
Table 5.5: Public and private protected areas in Minas Gerais before and after the ICMS-E. 
Protected areas Until 1995  
(ha) 
Created after 1995 
(ha) 
Total by 2000 
(ha) 
Increase 
(%) 
Public     
 Federal 268,147 0 268,147 0 
 State 295,151 196,436 491,587 67 
 Municipal 3,851 9,076 12,927 236 
Private/mixed     
 APA 1,023,566 785,894 1,809,460 77 
 RPPN 20,261 13,808 34,069 68 
Total 1,610,976 1,005,214 2,616,190 62 
Source: Adapted from May et al. (2002). APAs (Environmental Protection Areas) can be designated at federal, 
state or municipal level. RPPNs (Private Natural Patrimony Reserves) can be designated at federal or state level. 
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In Paraná and Minas Gerais, intra-state allocations favour municipalities with large areas 
dedicated to ‘indirect use’ conservation units, which are designated at state and federal levels. 
Relatively high conservation weights are assigned to parks, reserves and forests (cf. Table 
5.1), and a significant increase in protected areas can be noted for these management catego-
ries, at both state and municipal governmental levels (May et al. 2002). Nevertheless, a sub-
stantial volume of financial resources has been allocated to municipalities with Environmental 
Protection Areas (Área de Proteção Ambiental, APAs). APAs alone account for 86 % 
(Paraná) and 78 % (Minas Gerais) of the incremental increase in total new conservation units 
in these states, the vast majority being dedicated to state and municipal APAs. APAs are eas-
ily created, and a relatively low level of control is practised within them. They may cover 
large areas within a municipality with restricted zoning, in spite of far less rigorous enforce-
ment than other conservation units, which is reflected by rather low conservation weights. 
Following the introduction of the ICMS-E, new state legislation in Paraná and Minas 
Gerais has enabled the generation of a wider range of conservation units, including areas es-
tablished under municipal jurisdiction as well as the Private Natural Patrimony Reserves (Re-
serva Particular do Patrimônio Natural, RPPN). RPPNs are owned and administered by a 
wide range of institutions, including NGOs, industry or private landowners. These private 
reserves are established and run by their owners. Owners are fully responsible for mainte-
nance and management, yet they may benefit indirectly from the revenues municipalities re-
ceive based on the ICMS-E. 
Originally, RPPNs represented a category of protected areas that was to be designated and 
handled at the national level by IBAMA (Instituto Brasileiro do Meio Ambiente e dos Recur-
sos Naturais Renováveis), involving a very slow and difficult process. Paraná and Minas 
Gerais established state legislation in the 1990s, allowing a less bureaucratic way of designat-
ing and handling the private reserves at state level. Together with the financial incentive effect 
of the ICMS-E, this step contributed to a significant increase in the number and size of 
RPPNs. By the year 2000, some 26,124 ha were designated in Paraná and 34,069 ha in Minas 
Gerais. Both states are promoting RPPNs as part of an integrated public-private partnership in 
buffer zones surrounding public protected areas (Bernardes 1999). Particularly in Paraná, 
state environmental agencies play a very active role in promoting private reserves, and the 
state now holds the largest number and area of RPPNs (183 reserves with 36,928 ha) protect-
ing the remaining Atlantic Forest, one of the global hotspots of biodiversity (Mesquita 2004). 
The positive experience with these reserves was triggered by the ecological fiscal transfers 
that motivated local governments to assist landowners in measures to protect and maintain the 
environmental quality of their areas, as well as helping them to prepare the necessary registra-
tion documentation (Bernardes 1999). A number of local governments have now begun to 
share additional revenues from RPPNs with landowners, whether in cash or in kind. This is 
done through agreements with the state association of RPPNs, since there is no leeway in the 
state laws for direct payment of municipal budgetary resources to private landowners for en-
vironmental services. May et al. (2002) mention in the case of Paraná that mainly large farm-
ers were prioritised for RPPN creation, due to the size of their property and the volume of 
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resources generated from it. Although small farmers may also be interested in RPPN creation, 
their land is not usually eligible due to its small size and the high transaction costs associated 
with it. 
Bernardes (1999) presents figures for protected areas in Minas Gerais up to June 1999 that 
further break down the categories of APA and RPPN according to their governmental levels 
(Table 5.6).4 These figures clearly show how strong an incentive effect the ICMS-E exercised 
on the initiative at state and local levels to create new protected areas. The largest absolute 
increase (552,976 ha) in protected areas up to June 1999 was due to new conservation units at 
state level. However, the largest relative increase of 1,619 % took place at municipal level, 
where 120,294 ha of protected areas existed in June 1999 compared to only 6,997 ha before 
the introduction of the ICMS-E. 
Table 5.6: Protected areas in Minas Gerais before and after the ICMS-E, according to  
governmental levels. 
Protected areas Up to 1995 
(ha) 
Created after 1995
(ha) 
Total by June 1999 
(ha) 
Increase 
(%) 
Federal 909,467 5,710 915,177 0.6 
State 695,610 552,976 1,248,586 79.5 
Municipal 6,997 113,297 120,294 1,619.2 
Total 1,612,074 671,983 2,284,057 41.7 
Source: Adapted from Bernardes (1999). In this table, public and private/mixed protected areas, such as APAs 
and RPPNs, are already included in the figures presented according to their governmental level of designation. 
 
5.3.5 Changing municipal revenues 
The total amounts passed through to municipalities are appreciable. In the state of São Paulo, 
the sums distributed from the ICMS-E amounted to 70,241 million Brazilian Real (R$) be-
tween 1994 and 1996, averaging over R$ 23.4 million annually. It is estimated that participat-
ing municipalities in São Paulo received about R$ 2.45 per hectare of protected area per 
month (Bernardes 1999). Azzoni and Isai (1994) provide an estimate of the opportunity costs 
associated with protected areas for the state of São Paulo. They relate the value of production 
lost (in terms of state GDP) to state and county losses in terms of fiscal transfers and revenues 
from the value-added tax. They show for two extreme scenarios that – based on existing pro-
tected areas – the cost of environmental protection is likely to be between 0.05 % and 0.03 % 
of the state’s GDP, depending on the location of the protected areas. 
                                                 
4  Bernardes (1999) and May et al. (2002) differ slightly in their base figure of protected areas in Minas Gerais 
up to 1995. Since the difference of less than 1 % is minimal, this is not considered any further here.  
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In Paraná, the amounts averaged over R$ 50 million annually between 1994 and 20005 
(May et al. 2002). Individual municipalities, such as Piraquara in Paraná, saw their revenues 
increase considerably. Ninety percent of Piraquara’s municipal territory is designated as a 
protected area for water conservation, while the remaining 10 % consists of protected areas 
for biodiversity conservation. This municipality increased its earnings by 84 % in 1995 
(Loureiro, cited in Echavarría 2000). 
May et al. (2002) investigated municipal revenues in the Paraná floodplain, the so-called 
“Varjão”. Located in the northwestern part of the state, it lies within the Paraná, Parana-
panema and Piquiri watersheds. Here, the ICMS-E constitutes a high percentage of overall 
municipal revenues and became a solution to the financial problems of the municipalities. The 
impacts of ICMS-E resources are especially significant, for example, in the municipality of 
São Jorge do Patrocínio, which has 52 % of its total area in conservation units (May et al. 
2002, p. 185). In 1998, ICMS-E transfers represented 17.6 % of the overall municipal budget 
and in 2000, ICMS-E revenue amounted to 71 % of total ICMS transfers for that year. Con-
servation began to become an important part of the municipal agenda – for neighbouring mu-
nicipalities as well. It led to the creation of Brazil’s first municipal consortium for biodiver-
sity protection in 1995 and, two years later, of the Ilha Grande National Park. Differences in 
ICMS-E pass-throughs are mainly due to the proportion of Park area within the total area of 
the municipality. The local population is aware of the financial importance of the ICMS-E for 
revenue generation, and the behaviour of the community towards the environment has 
changed. ICMS-E resources nowadays are used for numerous environmental activities, such 
as well drilling to provide drinking water, cleaning and landscaping of the urban area, rubbish 
collection, landfills, environmental education and the enforcement of land-use controls in 
parks and APAs. They are also used for other activities, such as the acquisition of tractors or 
the construction of industrial facilities. “All these benefits, provided by ICMS-E revenues, are 
disclosed to the community to make the public aware of the link between environmental pro-
tection and day-to-day-problems” (May et al. 2002, p. 185). 
Grieg-Gran (2000) investigated the detailed financial effects of the ICMS-E for the states 
of Rondônia and Minas Gerais. Due to the relatively low number of municipalities in 
Rondônia, a full picture for the whole state is available. Here, the 5 % ecological share of total 
ICMS was introduced between 1996 and 1998 in combination with the equivalent reduction 
in the equal shares indicator. As a consequence, municipalities must have at least a 25 % 
share of protected area within their territory to outweigh the reduction in the equal shares in-
dicator. Municipalities with more than a 25 % share of protected area can benefit significantly 
from the new type of transfers. In Rondônia, roughly 60 % of municipalities with protected 
areas benefited from the introduction of the ICMS-E: 7 municipalities with more than 50 % 
protected area, three municipalities with 40–50 %, six municipalities with 30–40 % protected 
area, and one municipality with 25–30 %. The remaining 40 % of municipalities experienced 
a negative impact due to the reduction in weighting accorded to the equal shares indicator. 
                                                 
5  In June 2001: Brazilian Real R$ 1.00 = US$ 0.41. 
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In Minas Gerais, the values allocated through the ICMS-E reached about R$ 15 million 
annually between 1998 and 2000 (May et al. 2002). In 1998, 86 municipalities with protected 
areas benefited from the increase in their consolidated index for ICMS allocation thanks to the 
ecological indicator (Grieg-Gran 2000). Thirty-eight municipalities with protected areas ex-
perienced a reduction in their overall index. This reduction in revenues resulted not so much 
from having too few protected areas, but rather from other factors. In part, it was due to the 
reduction in weighting accorded to value added; and in part it was to do with the introduction 
of other new indicators, such as health and education. In the case of Minas Gerais, it is impor-
tant to distinguish between the effects of the ecological indicator and those of the others. For 
some municipalities, however, the introduction of the ecological indicator turned out to be 
extremely important. In 1998, the ecological index accounted for more than 20 % of the con-
solidated index in some 20 municipalities. The municipality of Marliéria, for example, has 
55 % of its territory within the Rio Doce State Park, the largest contiguous area of Atlantic 
Forest in Minas Gerais. Here, the ecological index accounts for 70 % of the overall index for 
ICMS allocation (Grieg-Gran 2000), and in the first year after the ICMS-E was introduced, 
revenues from it accounted for around 68 % of total municipal ICMS revenues, increasing 
from R$ 36,648 in 1995 to R$ 811,335 in 1996 (Bernardes 1999). 
One generic feature of the ICMS Ecológico in particular deserves to be highlighted: the 
amount of money available for distribution for ecological purposes in any one year depends 
on the state revenues of value-added tax in this year. Thus, municipalities are competing for 
the same pool of money. Given certain finite tax revenues, the creation of additional conser-
vation units will inescapably lead to a gradual decrease in payments for environmental ser-
vices per unit. Municipalities compete to provide more ecosystem services at lower and lower 
costs. Therefore, it is important to design the ICMS Ecológico not just around the quantity of 
conservation units, but also around their quality. In Paraná, the growing quality of conserva-
tion units over the years has demonstrated just how much of an incentive effect the criterion 
of quality is capable of generating (Loureiro 2002). If municipalities are aware of this feature, 
it may also motivate them to consider carefully the opportunity costs of different land uses. 
Grieg-Gran (2000) presents calculations for Rondônia and Minas Gerais in order to iden-
tify the potential benefits that municipalities can expect to accrue when they set aside a further 
1,000 ha of protected area.6 For municipalities with very low average levels of value added 
and primary production, the conservation option would turn out to be highly beneficial. In the 
case of Rondônia, 28 municipalities would benefit from creating protected areas. Of these, 
only 12 already have protected areas, 16 have none and could be financially better off with 
protected areas. Comparative calculations for Minas Gerais are more complicated due to 
complex changes in overall ICMS-E allocations. Still, there are municipalities with low levels 
of value added where the creation of protected areas would be extremely financially attrac-
tive. São Sebastião do Rio Preto, which has no conservation units, would have to generate at 
                                                 
6  Grieg-Gran (2000) assumes that the municipality concerned is the only one in the whole state to designate an 
extra 1,000 ha of its territory as a protected area. 
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least 226 times the average value added per hectare in the municipality for it to be more bene-
ficial in terms of ICMS revenues than the creation of 1,000 ha of protected area (Grieg-Gran 
2000, p. 24). 
5.4 The ecological ICMS: general reflections and transfer potential 
5.4.1 The way forward in Brazil 
Although the basic features of the ICMS-E are rather uniform across the various Brazilian 
states, the method of implementing it, its operation in practice and the reactions on the part of 
the municipalities can vary greatly. In-depth empirical studies show that ICMS-E allocations 
appear to have substantial impacts on conservation decisions in some areas, while in others 
only a limited impact can be observed (May et al. 2002). Municipalities with a high share of 
protected areas in particular can benefit substantially from the ecological fiscal transfers, and 
therefore appreciate the ecological services they provide across local boundaries. Many mu-
nicipal governments – and depending on their information policy the public as well – are now 
aware of the natural assets they preserve and maintain. However, the type of indicator chosen 
also determines the incentive effect. The examples of Paraná and Minas Gerais show that not 
only the quantity but also the quality of the respective areas should be taken into considera-
tion. In Paraná, there has not only been an increase in the number and surface area of conser-
vation units, there have also been noted improvements in the quality of conservation units 
(Loureiro 2002). A quality-based evaluation awaits implementation in other states, and this 
represents a major challenge due to the regular controls of the registered areas conducted by 
decentralised environmental institutions. One prevalent point of critique relates to the way the 
ICMS-E revenues are currently allocated to municipalities. So far, they are given as lump-
sum transfers, to be used in any way the recipient wishes. Some authors argue that earmarking 
for environmental purposes should be considered (Grieg-Gran 2000; May et al. 2002). How-
ever, from a general public finance perspective, there are also a number of arguments in fa-
vour of lump-sum transfers, such as guaranteeing maximum financial autonomy to local ju-
risdictions. 
Despite the pros and cons of how precisely to design the ICMS-E, this innovative instru-
ment is in the ascendent in Brazil. One of the great advantages of the ICMS-E is that it is not 
an instrument that requires new institutions or a new bureaucracy. By simply introducing an 
ecological indicator into the existing fiscal transfer mechanism, it builds on existing institu-
tions and administrative procedures, thereby entailing very low transaction costs. The ICMS 
Ecológico is strongly promoted by the Federal Environmental Ministry and many initiatives 
have been undertaken by a variety of actors to advance its implementation in those states that 
do not have it so far, such as Goías, Espírito Santo and Bahía (Arantes 2006; Veiga Neto 
2006, personal communication). A major challenge for Brazil will be to promote efforts for 
the design and implementation of economic incentives that are geared directly towards indi-
vidual land users. The ICMS-E clearly has its focus on municipalities and on compensation 
for the land-use restrictions imposed on local public governments. However, a substantial 
proportion of the opportunity costs generated by protected areas accrues at the level of the 
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individual land user. Therefore, further programmes need to be developed that focus on the 
individual land user, among them payments for environmental services, agricultural certifica-
tion schemes, agri-environmental and forestry programmes, and so forth. 
5.4.2 Transfer potential to other federal systems 
Local governments rarely have substantial scope for influencing decisions made on the desig-
nation and maintenance of large-scale areas set aside for protective purposes. The “forced” 
provision of ecological goods and services in the form of protected areas, where there is no 
compensation for positive spillovers, is neither effective nor efficient. From an economic 
point of view, it is perfectly rational for local governments to be uninterested in – or even to 
be against – water and nature protection areas if the associated costs are to be borne locally, 
e.g. in terms of land-use restrictions, whereas many benefits cross local boundaries. Munici-
palities do not usually support the existence of protected areas within their territory, apart 
from a few exceptions where intrinsic motivation or a substantial potential for nature tourism 
comes into play. For most other local actors, protected areas reduce options for generating 
local income by attracting more inhabitants or promoting economic development. Even 
though protected areas might exist, a lack of enforcement, control or even simply information 
can easily lead to the deterioration of the quality of these areas. Therefore, one prerequisite for 
long-term sustainable land use consists in the integration of protected areas with positive 
spillovers into intergovernmental fiscal transfers to the local level. The internalisation of posi-
tive spatial externalities brings local interests in line with supra-local interests, thereby creat-
ing incentives for appropriate local public behaviour and contributing to economic efficiency. 
One of the major problems associated with centralised provision of ecosystem services is 
that knowledge about the opportunity costs of protected areas is greater at the local level. The 
ICMS Ecológico addresses this problem by combining centralised incentives with decentral-
ised decisions. As with markets, it does not require any centralised source of information. 
Although this article presented a national case study from Brazil, the general message can be 
transferred to other federal systems. It goes without saying that the recommendations to be 
made depend on the type of federal system being looked at, the general role and functions of 
different jurisdictions within these systems, and the specific constitutional and environmental 
legislation in force. In Brazil, the present focus is on compensating municipalities, i.e. public 
institutions, based on environmental performance indicators. Due to the specific legal frame-
work and societal conditions prevailing there (including the prevention of corruption), there 
are almost no instruments that directly support private land users in their substantial role as 
conservation actors (Loureiro 2005, personal communication). 
If we take the European Union and its many federally organised member states as a promi-
nent example for comparison, the choice of instruments for compensating for local spillover 
benefits reflects the opposite strategy. Here, the focus is almost exclusively on the private 
land user, be it in agriculture, forestry or aquaculture. There are, for example, many different 
agri-environmental programmes in existence that are continuously being monitored and im-
proved with the aim of increasing ecological effectiveness (e.g. Court of Auditors 2000; Bal-
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dock et al. 2002). Ultimately, both sides – private land users and the municipality as the pub-
lic representative of local communities – have to be considered in their specific role for long-
term sustainable land use (Ring 2004). However, in a few European countries there is a need 
for increased use of fiscal transfers to the local level for conservation purposes. 
Köllner et al. (2002), for example, present a recent case study for integrating biodiversity 
into intergovernmental fiscal transfers in Switzerland. Portugal has recently set up a fiscal 
transfer scheme that explicitly rewards municipalities for having designated Natura 2000 sites 
and other protected areas within their territories (de Melo and Prates 2007). In Germany, this 
topic has already been discussed among the research community, federal conservation agen-
cies and expert councils. In its reports over the last 10 years the German Advisory Council on 
the Environment has called for the integration of ecological indicators into intergovernmental 
fiscal transfers to the local level (SRU 1996; Ewers et al. 1997). A number of detailed studies 
and suggestions regarding implementation are available (e.g. Bergmann 1999; Rose 1999; 
Ring 2001; Perner and Thöne 2005), although the crucial step towards creating actual policy 
on this has not yet been taken. The Brazilian case showed that various mechanisms already 
exist for acknowledging ecological goods and services in intergovernmental fiscal transfers to 
the local level. In Germany, only very few states have implemented ecological aspects in their 
fiscal system, mostly concentrating on end-of-the-pipe and infrastructure-related public eco-
logical functions (Ring 2002). The special relevance of protected areas has not yet been rec-
ognised. As a result, the majority of German municipalities still perceive them as an obstacle 
to development (Bauer et al. 1996, p. 334; Stoll-Kleemann 2001). Both theoretical analysis of 
the principles behind the economic theory of federalism related to spillovers from protected 
areas and the respective empirical investigations of the Brazilian federal system have shown 
that there still is a great need for adequately rewarding ecological services provided by the 
local level. 
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6 Biodiversity. Emerging issues for linking natural and social 
sciences 
This chapter was published as “Jentsch, A., Wittmer, H., Jax, K., Ring, I., Henle, K. (2003). 
Biodiversity. Emerging issues for linking natural and social sciences. GAIA 12(2): 121–128”. 
This is an interdisciplinary paper written by UFZ scholars working in the Department of 
Conservation Biology and the Department of Economics. It was prepared and published in the 
context of setting up a new biodiversity research plan within the Helmholtz Association’s 
research programme on “Sustainable Use of Landscapes” (2003–2008), aiming at integrative 
biodiversity research that is both scientifically sound and policy-relevant. 
Abstract 
More than a decade after the signing of the Convention on Biological Diversity, biodiversity 
loss is still occurring at unprecedented rates. There is a strong consensus that human activities 
are among the major drivers of biodiversity loss and that integrated approaches between natu-
ral and social scientists are needed. This paper develops the rationale for an integrative biodi-
versity research to produce socially relevant knowledge. It illustrates the challenges and po-
tentials for integrative research using the examples of key drivers of biodiversity change: dis-
turbances, invasions, and fragmentation as well as biodiversity conservation as a societal 
process. It concludes by highlighting conceptual changes necessary for integrative biodiver-
sity research. 
Keywords: 
Biodiversity conservation, ecology, global change, interdisciplinary methodology, socio-
economics 
6.1 Introduction 
Ten years after “Rio”, the research community has to ask itself whether its efforts – the re-
search questions it is concerned with, the approaches it applies, the way it organizes, co-
ordinates, and communicates its research – are suited to meet the growing challenge of biodi-
versity loss. It has convincingly been argued, including in notable contributions to this jour-
nal, that an interdisciplinary approach is needed to tackle environmental degradation. Indeed, 
research programs on biodiversity increasingly involve natural and social sciences disciplines, 
and funding organizations place high emphasis on interdisciplinary design in their programs. 
In spite of many efforts, linking social and natural sciences for integrative biodiversity re-
search remains a major challenge. In this paper, we discuss new dimensions of this challenge. 
Our awareness results from the preparation of a biodiversity research plan within the new 
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research program of the Helmholtz Association on “Sustainable Use of Landscapes”. We ar-
gue that methods and tools to link natural and social sciences have to be adjusted to the spe-
cific issue under consideration in order to make biodiversity research both scientifically sound 
and policy-relevant. 
6.2 Global change and loss of biodiversity 
The current species-extinction period is mainly caused by human impact, and estimated to 
happen at a rate 1,000 times greater than the natural rate of extinction (Primack 1993). Re-
cently, various Global-Change scenarios have been developed that address the effects on bio-
diversity caused by atmospheric warming, altered precipitation patterns, land-use changes, 
increased fragmentation, urban expansion, or other human activities (Sala et al. 2000). Ongo-
ing discussions have been further alerted by the last report of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC 2001) stating an accelerated speed of change. The ability of living 
biota to adapt to such rapid environmental changes is questionable (Jentsch and Beierkuhnlein 
2003; Kaule et al. 1999) (Figure 6.1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1: Spatio-temporal scales of biotic mechanisms to cope with changing environmental 
conditions: migration, plasticity, dispersal, and evolutionary development (a) ver-
sus the spatio-temporal scale of global change phenomena (b). As soon as species 
cannot cope with the speed or the spatial extent of environmental change, they are 
likely to go extinct (based on Beierkuhnlein 2003). Note the log/log scale. 
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The “crisis of biodiversity” discussed during the last two decades originated at first from a 
diffuse fear of losing species (Wilson 1985; Western 1992). In contrast to earlier mostly aca-
demic discussions on the relations between diversity and stability (Goodman 1975), the cur-
rent debate on biological diversity was explicitly introduced by conservation biologists be-
cause of their concerns about the loss of biodiversity. We have understood that species diver-
sity plays a vital role for the persistence of ecosystem processes and services in the face of 
severe land use pressure and changing environmental conditions (Hooper and Vitousek 1997). 
Meanwhile, the socio-economic value of ecosystem services is widely acknowledged (Co-
stanza et al. 1997). Biodiversity, especially functional biodiversity, is increasingly recognized 
as decisive for maintaining these services (Hooper and Vitousek 1997). Still, it remains a fun-
damental challenge to assign economic and ethical attributes to particular species, communi-
ties or to ecological functions such as slope stabilisation or nutrient retention, in order to pro-
pose conservation measures where the obtained benefits exceed the costs for action. Likewise, 
it is necessary to better understand incentive structures in society that increasingly threat bio-
diversity and to develop mitigation options. Concepts for their implementation and for con-
flict reconciliation are required (Saunders et al. 1995). 
Within the natural sciences, research approaches now extend from assessing regional spe-
cies richness and characterizing the global patterns of biodiversity to analyzing functional 
implications of diversity, for, for example, biomass production, clean water, disease preven-
tion, pharmaceutical use, or dynamic landscape equilibrium (Ernst et al. 2000; Loreau et al. 
2002). Both the Convention on Biological Diversity1 and current research programs such as 
the 6th framework program of the European Union explicitly call for linking natural and social 
sciences as essential focus when addressing the “drivers” for biodiversity dynamics and spe-
cies loss. However, these postulates have rarely been implemented in a satisfactory manner. 
6.3 Integrating natural and social sciences 
Since its invention in 1986 in the preparation of the famous Forum on Biodiversity in Wash-
ington D.C. (Wilson 1988), “biodiversity” has been both a political and a scientific concept. 
This characteristic has experienced another strong boost through the development and ongo-
ing implementation of the Convention on Biological Diversity. The primary causes of biodi-
versity loss are rooted in societal processes that lead to global change and the remedies to halt 
it depend on human values and on social and economic structures. The dynamics of these 
structures and the decision processes resulting from them have to be taken into perspective if 
biodiversity research is really to contribute to the protection and sustainable use of biodiver-
sity (Brechin et al. 2002). At the same time, much ecological research is required to provide 
the basis for informed decision processes in this field. Disciplinary biodiversity research cur-
rently covers many aspects (compare boxes 6.1–6.4 for methodologies).  
                                                 
1  http://www.cbd.int/convention/convention.shtml 
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 Box 6.1: Biodiversity assessment 
Biodiversity as defined in the Convention on Biological Diversity is not restricted to species diver-
sity but encompasses the whole diversity of life, ranging from genes to ecosystems and biomes. 
These levels display complex spatial and temporal patterns and functional interactions. Therefore, 
biodiversity assessment needs to go beyond mere species-richness inventories. It has to account for 
spatial patterns, temporal rhythms, and anthropogenic processes impacting upon them. Global bio-
diversity patterns have recently been analyzed (Barthlott and Winiger 1998) and depicted, stimu-
lating the discussion about biodiversity hot spots and global conservation priorities (Myers et al. 
2000), an issue that has not yet been satisfactorily resolved and urgently requires the merging of 
biological and socio-economic/cultural research. 
 
These aspects, that is, methods and knowledge from the natural and the social sciences, must 
be connected and integrated (Diversitas Scientific Committee 2002; WBGU 1996). The chal-
lenge is an applied, socially relevant biodiversity research to serve sustainable development. 
As argued in the introduction, the research approaches in the natural and social sciences 
have to be linked in ways that are specific to the particular biodiversity-conservation chal-
lenge under consideration. To illustrate this point, we discuss in this section four challenges of 
biodiversity research and management addressed in the upcoming Helmholtz research pro-
gram on “Sustainable Use of Landscapes”. We will pay specific attention to combinations of 
approaches that facilitate using research results in planning processes. 
6.3.1 Disturbance, stability, and management options 
Crucial drivers shaping the evolution of biodiversity are natural and anthropogenic distur-
bances such as floods, fire, bioturbation, or logging (Connell 1978; White and Jentsch 2001). 
Disturbances are ubiquitous, inherent, and unavoidable, causing both stability and change of 
ecological functions and distribution patterns (Turner et al. 1998; Jentsch et al. 2002). They 
can have huge ecological effects and economic costs, and their impact is difficult to mitigate 
(Figure 6.2). However, alteration of disturbance regimes can also be a threat to the mainte-
nance of biotic diversity and may result in changes of the abundances of many species and of 
the composition of communities (Tilman 1996; Beierkuhnlein 1998). We lack simulation 
models on the implications of human activities on disturbance regimes at various spatial and 
temporal scales. We also lack an understanding of the vulnerability of ecosystems to distur-
bance and knowledge on the sensitive threshholds and preconditions at which disturbances 
become catastrophes. 
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  Box 6.2: Experimental research 
Biodiversity matters essentially to the performance of ecosystem functioning (Loreau et al. 2002). 
It contributes to productivity, can insure against environmental disasters, and provides numerous 
ecological services to mankind and human health (Heal 2000; Chivian 2001). Therefore, causal 
ecological analysis and experimental biodiversity research increasingly address functional interac-
tions between species richness and ecological processes. Large-scale, sometimes continent-wide 
experimental settings have been developed to test the effect of species richness on, for example, 
biomass production in temperate grasslands (Hector et al. 1999) or productivity in agricultural en-
vironments. In the face of global change, results from first experimental manipulations predict 
high biodiversity to enhance ecosystem responses to elevated carbon dioxide and nitrogen deposi-
tion (Reich et al. 2001). Some important insights into ecological functions of biodiversity and driv-
ing factors for the decline of endangered species have been gained through the recent use of ex-
perimental designs on the landscape level (for example Caughley and Gunn 1996). 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2: Annual flooding is a typical part of the disturbance regime of riparian ecosystems 
and maintains a high spatial and temporal niche diversity. However, the hazardous 
floods of Elbe and Mulde in Germany in August 2002 have shown, that extreme 
flooding events may have catastrophic effects and cause high economic costs. 
Managing floodplains for natural dynamics, biodiversity and human needs is a 
major challenge. 
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 Box 6.3: Ecological modeling 
Ecological modeling can be used as a unifying tool for integrating scientific results from various 
experimental and observational analyses as well as scenarios of changing environmental or socio-
economic conditions (Drechsler and Burgman 2004). During the 1980s, grid-based2 and individ-
ual-based3 simulation models were established as new powerful tools to analyze ecological events 
in a spatially explicit framework (DeAngelis and Gross 1992; Grimm 1999). Existing grid-based 
models showed that spatio-temporal correlations imposed by, for example, disturbances are a key 
to understanding system dynamics, their vulnerability or resilience (stability). There is growing 
evidence that such correlations are the unifying currency to understand not only spatiotemporal 
dynamics of ecological systems, but also general mechanisms of the interaction between natural 
and anthropogenic drivers for biodiversity loss and species-specific functions and traits (Wiegand 
et al. 1999; Vos et al. 2001). Based on this knowledge, management strategies can be tested in or-
der to find guidelines for biodiversity conservation, ecosystem restoration, and spatial planning 
(for example Henle et al. 1999). Recently developed ecological-economic models are promising 
techniques for further integration of social and natural sciences. 
 
Even more than traditional approaches of biodiversity-conservation management, such as the 
establishment of protected areas or compensation schemes, management options including a 
promotion of disturbances require an integrated approach. Such strategies may include allow-
ing events to take place that people have been trying to suppress for centuries such as fire and 
flooding. The efforts in terms of awareness creation and citizen deliberation necessary to 
achieve a consensus on such strategies are obviously higher than those needed for established 
conservation measures. Therefore, there is a need to assess different options and simulate 
their costs and benefits and the equity implications for different groups. 
A promising tool that allows researchers to bring together knowledge from the natural and 
the social sciences and provides decision makers with a means to attach values to the implica-
tions of research results is Integrated Assessment (Horsch et al. 2001). It combines two tools 
for integration: ecological-economic modeling, and multicriteria decision analysis. Ecologi-
cal-economic modeling is a pioneering approach for economic assessments of different eco-
logical management options (for example Frank and Ring 1999; Johst et al. 2002). The mod-
eling approach can establish the relationship between economic parameters of disturbance-
management alternatives and the ecological effects. The possibility to use such integrated 
models to simulate different scenarios is a distinctive advantage of the approach.  
                                                 
2  Grid-based models subdivide an area into grid cells and model its fate by applying rules of change to each 
grid cell. 
3  In individual-based models the dynamics of a system are modeled by tracing the fate of individual objects 
(such as individuals of a population). 
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 Box 6.4: Social sciences and biodiversity policies 
From an economic perspective, an important task consists in determining monetary values of bio-
diversity that are not reflected in current market prices. These include (1) non-consumptive use 
values, such as the benefits species richness provides to tourism, (2) indirect use values for ecosys-
tem stability or functions such as the provision of clean water, (3) option values such as future use 
in pharmaceuticals, (4) existence, and (5) bequest values (Costanza et al. 1997; Heal 2000; Per-
rings 1995; Fromm 2000; Dasgupta 2001). A debate has evolved that elaborates under which con-
ditions economic valuation of biodiversity is sensible (Hampicke 1999; Nunes and van den Bergh 
2001; Seidl and Gowdy 1999). Limiting factors include the nonsubstitutability of the natural re-
source, the fact that the societal preferences for the natural good to be valued cannot be repre-
sented by individual preferences, and institutional structures significantly influencing the results of 
the monetarisation.  
A concept that has gained increasing importance is governance research, which has the objective 
to understand how decisions are made and what furthers their successful implementation 
(Kissling-Näf and Kern 2002). The analysis of governance structures focuses on the division of re-
sponsibilities between governmental levels as well as between public institutions, civil society and 
the private sector. With regard to the interaction between the different sectors, there is an extensive 
literature on participatory approaches and co-management of protected areas (compare for exam-
ple Wells and Brandon 1992) and on relevant theoretical approaches from the social sciences con-
cerning stakeholder involvement in applied biodiversity research (Wittmer and Birner 2001). A re-
lated branch of literature applies the potential of deliberative democracy for enhancing the social 
debate on biodiversity (compare for example O’Riordan and Stoll-Kleemann 2002). Research on 
global biodiversity governance further includes the investigation of incentive structures and policy 
instruments (Barbier 2000; OECD 1999). As biodiversity conservation typically causes costs at the 
local level while producing a global public good, special attention is paid to developing well-
defined mechanisms for compensating local communities and land users (Ring 2002). 
Psychology, sociology and cultural anthropology provide the methods for investigating individual 
and social perceptions of biodiversity (Escobar 1998). Biodiversity-related knowledge is increas-
ingly being analyzed within the literature on local or indigenous knowledge and interfaces of dif-
ferent knowledge systems (Fairhead and Leach 1995; Long and Long 1992). 
 
However, to decide on management strategies economic and ecological outcomes of the sce-
narios under consideration still need to be weighed against each other and against further cri-
teria policy makers or other stakeholders consider relevant and that cannot be aggregated by 
means of a common denominator such as money. Multi-criteria decision analysis is an appro-
priate tool to solve this problem since it can rank alternatives using criteria with different 
units (Drechsler and Burgman 2004). Within Integrated Assessment stakeholders and policy 
makers define the management options to derive scenarios and attach the values to the differ-
ent outcomes. Thus not only can results from different scientific disciplines be aggregated but 
also societal values are directly taken into account. 
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6.3.2 Invasion and precautionary principle 
Biological invasions impose a major threat to biodiversity (for example Sala et al. 2000), have 
a great impact on ecosystem functions, and may cause substantial economic costs, for exam-
ple in agriculture, forestry, tourism, hydraulic engineering, fisheries, and aquaculture (Mack 
et al. 2000). Basic challenges for the natural sciences are the systematic description of the 
stages of invasive processes (for example Heger 2001) and the identification of basic charac-
teristics that distinguish those species having a high potential to become invasive and damag-
ing in new environments from those who have not (Prinzing et al. 2002). Another important 
task is to understand and predict how species traits and the variables of the new habitat inter-
act, that is, why some species become invasive in some ecosystems while they have insignifi-
cant effects in others (Byers et al. 2002). 
Biological invasions are in most cases caused or exacerbated by human activities such as 
international trade, traffic or land-use changes (Figure 6.3). Comprehensive ex post calcula-
tions of the economic damage caused by invasive species have been published for selected 
countries (Pimentel et al. 2001). However, assessing the economic and ecological impact ex 
ante is necessary for decisions about control measures (Perrings et al. 2000). Biological im-
pacts of invasions must be translated into terms of economic damage potential by cost-benefit 
analyses. The challenge consists in assessing the costs for combating invasions at different 
stages of the invasive process in order to determine cost-effective management strategies. 
Preventing and managing biological invasions is also a challenge for legislation where the 
various governmental levels, from regional, national and European to the international level, 
have to be addressed. Acting in a very early stage of a potential invasion implies that precau-
tionary measures are called for without sufficient scientific evidence that an invasion is about 
to take place. Such a procedure may be contrary to national, European, and other international 
rules and regulations. Therefore, the legal sciences must search for options to implement this 
principle in national and international environmental law in the presence of conflicting regula-
tions. A key challenge currently addressed within our research program refers to the transla-
tion of the ecological and economic assessment of risks that are associated with biological 
invasions into corresponding legal instruments. To achieve this goal, together with our part-
ners, we are currently developing an analytical process in which natural and social scientists 
jointly identify risk-mitigation options. These are evaluated for efficacy, feasibility, and im-
pacts in order to recommend the most appropriate means to mitigate risks considered unac-
ceptable. Specifically, we will analyze how interactions between species traits, cultivation, 
and socio-economic drivers of landscape heterogeneity contribute to the likelihood of estab-
lishment of invasive species across several European ecosystems (risk assessment), and the 
associated ecological and economic hazards. This analytical pathway will account for uncer-
tainties due to the probabilistic nature of risk events. 
 6   Biodiversity. Emerging issues for linking natural and social sciences 155 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.3: The Giant Hogweed Rufen (Riesenbärenklau/Heracleum mantegazzianum) is an 
invasive species that typically invades along rivers or streets prone to recurrent 
disturbance. It has a very high growth rate, and outcompetes most other species. 
Combating the Giant Hogweed Rufen by mechanical means is only of limited 
success. 
6.3.3 Fragmentation, spatial policies and conflict reconciliation 
Landscape structures and biodiversity patterns are tightly linked. Landscape structures are 
increasingly modified by the accelerating land-use change (Figure 6.4) leading to the loss and 
fragmentation of habitats (Kaule et al. 1999). Fragmentation in turn is one of the major driv-
ers of the current loss in biodiversity (Groombridge 1992). These processes are primarily 
driven by policy sectors such as agriculture, forestry, transportation, tourism, industrial/infra-
structure development or fiscal policies. 
Research efforts have considerably advanced our understanding of the interrelationships 
between landscape structures, fragmentation, and the viability of species (Henle et al. 2004). 
Likewise, various planning instruments to mitigate or reverse the effects of fragmentation 
have been developed and partly tested under applied conditions. Among these instruments are 
software (for example Frank et al. 2003) as well as generic principles and rules of thumb for 
assessing and mitigating the effects of fragmentation, and for planning habitat connectivity 
and revegetation programs (for example Henle et al. 1999; Freudenberger and Brooker 2004), 
or landscape indices (Jaeger 2002). Furthermore, there has also been considerable progress 
concerning our ability to identify particularly sensitive species and habitats for setting conser-
vation priorities (Henle et al. 2004). Thus, the development of principles for designing repre-
sentative networks of conservation areas (Margules and Pressey 2000) is rapidly advancing. 
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Figure 6.4: Fragmentation of ecological units, such as the Araucaria angustifolia forests in 
southern Brazil, will cause local extinction of species as soon as they cannot 
overcome the distance between two units of their habitat by dispersal or migration 
mechanisms. Spatial planning therefore needs to carefully reconcile conflicts 
between land-use developments and biodiversity-related goals. 
In spite of the progress in understanding the ecology of fragmentation our success in mitigat-
ing, halting, or reversing the effects of fragmentation has been limited. One reason for this is 
the fact that the different disciplines within natural science as well as of natural and socio-
economic sciences have not yet been integrated sufficiently in the field of fragmentation. 
Most attempts to forecast the effects of habitat loss and fragmentation on biodiversity are 
based on a static view of the landscape or use simple scenarios without considering their dif-
ferent likeliness. Conversely, analyses of drivers of fragmentation, especially transport, infra-
structure, and agricultural policy in Europe and forestry and land-use policies in tropical 
countries rarely consider the spatial effects of these policies on landscape structures and frag-
mentation on a scale that allows linking with existing knowledge on the ecological effects of 
fragmentation. Therefore, we have only a limited understanding why the same types of driv-
ers lead to different dynamics of landscape structures in different regions. For example, why 
has the clearing of vegetation lead to a variegated landscape structure in Eastern Australia but 
to a pattern of isolated remnants with sharp edges in Western Australia (Freudenberger and 
Brooker 2004)? Likewise, our ability to predict, intentionally select among, and manage po-
tential future trajectories of landscapes and landscape structures based on the analyses of so-
cietal choices and constraints is limited except for the short-term local effects of planning 
projects. 
Understanding and mitigating the effects beyond the local level requires the integration of 
biodiversity concerns in a wide array of policy sectors. For example, strategies need to be 
devised that effectively maintain large unfragmented landscapes for the conservation of spe-
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cies with high area requirements but at the same time take into account the needs of people. 
We are currently analyzing how, within German fiscal policies, a region can be compensated 
for options in economic development it foregoes by maintaining unfragmented landscapes 
and whether, and if so how, the compensation should be linked to the relative importance of a 
region in terms of biodiversity-conservation strategies. Inter alia this requires to determine 
what decisions should be made at what level of government in order to manage fragmenta-
tion. 
It has become clear (Frank and Ring 1999; Freudenberger and Brooker 2004) that the op-
timal solutions asked for by biologists analyzing the consequences of fragmentation are rarely 
feasible within socio-economic constraints and that the chances of success are low if biolo-
gists only pass on the results of their analyses to managers hoping that they would implement 
one of their preferred options. Therefore, we have developed ecological-economic modeling 
approaches based on the premise that they have to find acceptable compromises for the bal-
ance of ecological and economic requirements (Frank and Ring 1999; Johst et al. 2002). To 
help resolve emerging goal conflicts we have integrated models that allow analyzing the vi-
ability of species in the face of habitat fragmentation into multi-criteria decision analyses 
(Drechsler and Burgman 2004). The merging of these two conceptual approaches holds strong 
promises for resolving goal conflicts when integrating biodiversity concerns into other policy 
sectors. 
GIS-based spatial modeling is a further promising tool to facilitate the co-operation across 
disciplines and with decision makers when dealing with habitat fragmentation. It integrates 
data from different disciplines in a spatial framework and thereby allows researchers to iden-
tify changing landscape patterns and their causes. By visualizing potential effects the models 
also allow decision makers to become aware of the spatial implications of different policies 
(McKelvey et al. 1993). However, besides such tools intensive communication among the 
disciplines and with stakeholders is essential to jointly identify the problems and develop so-
lutions. 
6.3.4 Biodiversity conservation and stakeholder participation 
The concept of “biodiversity conservation” differs from the traditional measures of nature 
conservation that focussed on separating nature from humans. The Ecosystem Approach, 
which was approved by the 5th Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Di-
versity (http://www.cbd.int/ecosystem/) states in its first principle that “the objectives of man-
agement of land, water and living resources are a matter of societal choice”. Research on bio-
diversity can be framed in a socially relevant way if it links conservation with the question of 
sustainable use and benefit sharing, as implied by the Convention on Biological Diversity. 
The challenge for the implementation consists in re-conceptualizing biodiversity conservation 
as a social process (Figure 6.5). As such, this challenge differs from the challenges discussed 
above – disturbance, fragmentation and invasion – that are mainly defined by natural-science 
research. 
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Figure 6.5: Biodiversity conservation as a social process: non-governmental organizations in 
Thailand collecting 50,000 signatures in order to present a community forestry 
law to congress. 
A starting point for understanding biodiversity conservation as a social process is to consider 
that biodiversity is affected by human resource use, either by the utilization of the species 
concerned or by using the area these species require. Human resource use is based on the es-
tablished governance structures, the rules, norms and traditions in a society. In most cases 
these governance structures must be modified in order to achieve biodiversity conservation. 
This, however, implies addressing essential questions related to economics, ethics, social jus-
tice, and political governance, such as: Who benefits? How and by whom are decisions made 
and what is perceived as legitimate by those affected? Who is accountable, and to what extent 
are the parties involved complying with their obligations? Brechin and co-workers (Brechin et 
al. 2002) argue for a more explicit consideration of social-justice issues in biodiversity con-
servation. This consideration could produce more legitimate results and would thereby offer 
stronger foundations for compliance as well as for fair enforcement. 
The challenge for biodiversity research consists in informing the societal actors who influ-
ence biodiversity in such a way that they feel this information is useful for them. This implies 
that biodiversity conservation will most effectively occur if the relevant actors, whether they 
are politicians or farmers, feel biodiversity conservation is an issue of interest to them. There-
fore, research needs to acquire a deeper understanding of how societal rules about resource 
use are agreed upon and modified. Taking this perspective of the affected actors often implies 
posing research questions differently. An example could be: How to achieve sustainable use 
of certain species in a manner considered legitimate by the stakeholders? Combining scien-
tific knowledge from different disciplines with local knowledge becomes necessary. 
A major challenge for ecology in order to make the research relevant to stakeholders is to 
translate scientific concepts, especially that of the ecosystem, into a language which can be 
understood by and is useful to non-scientists, including indigenous communities. The Ecosys-
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tem Concept offers a strong potential as a tool for structuring interdisciplinary research pro-
jects. This approach makes use of the fact that perceptions and conceptualizations of the eco-
system and of biodiversity are also socially determined and strongly depend on the interests of 
different stakeholders. The ambiguity of the Ecosystem Concept, sometimes perceived as a 
weakness can here be turned into a strength by allowing to compare and integrate different 
social views of nature and its (socially valued) components (Jax et al. 1998; Jax 2002). In 
return, such an approach will help to refine ecological theory and the direction of empirical 
studies, by testing the usefulness and compatibility of different ecosystem concepts. Research 
can thus be focused on those of the possible entities that matter to the perception of nature by 
people while at the same time allowing for useful predictions of ecological dynamics. 
6.4 Perspectives 
The above examples of challenges for integrative biodiversity research illustrate the necessity 
to move away from the traditional division of labour between the sciences. The traditional 
model is characterized by the view that natural science research should provide an assessment 
and understanding of biodiversity and derive strategies for biodiversity conservation in order 
to pass these on to the social sciences. Social sciences should then calculate the value of bio-
diversity, assess the costs and benefits and the social acceptability, and translate the conserva-
tion strategies into instruments to be presented to policy makers. This approach, however, 
does not take into account how and why societal decisions that negatively affect biodiversity 
are made. If biodiversity change is reconceptualized as an ecological, social and political 
process mutual exchange is required at much earlier stages.  
Integrating findings from different disciplines, scales, and dimensions beyond a mere addi-
tive approach requires special tools. Instruments with a promising potential include, among 
others, ecological-economic modeling, spatial modeling, participatory multi-criteria decision 
analysis, and Integrated Assessment. As the examples of disturbance, invasion and fragmenta-
tion have shown, the specific needs for integration differ considerably. 
The discussion of biodiversity conservation and sustainable use shows that a new perspec-
tive is necessary if biodiversity loss and conservation are seen in the context of social proc-
esses: the point of view of the actors affecting and affected by biodiversity change. This re-
quires a much closer collaboration and interaction among sciences and between science and 
society. As a result, it has the potential for deriving management options that are feasible and 
can actually be implemented in a given context. In turn, this kind of research poses new ques-
tions to theory. The experiences in integrating local and scientific knowledge and promoting 
stakeholder participation in biodiversity management contribute to achieving this reconceptu-
alisation in biodiversity research. This development will be greatly enhanced if researchers 
receive training in interdisciplinary communication (compare Box 6.5) and if incentives such 
as high profile prices, career advantages, and priority funding for groups that bridge the social 
and natural sciences in an innovative way can be provided. 
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 Box 6.5: Interdisciplinary learning cabinets 
This method has been designed by one of the authors (H. Wittmer) for the course program of the 
Interdisciplinary Graduate College on “Valuation and Management of Biodiversity” at the Univer-
sity of Göttingen, Germany. Young researchers (doctoral students) who came from different disci-
plines (ecology, economics, social sciences, and law) presented the approaches and methodologies 
of their respective disciplines to the other students. The mission was to use practical examples so 
that the fellow students could experience themselves what it means to be a researcher from the re-
spective discipline: What questions are raised, what perspectives are taken, what methods used? 
For example, the ecologist took the others on a field trip and let them identify species, calculate 
diversity indices and develop an argumentation strategy for or against renaturalizing a section of a 
river from the standpoint of biodiversity conservation. In law a court on a case of international 
fisheries law was enacted and participants had to find out whether the construction of a windmill 
was permissible with respect to nature-conservation legislation. 
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7 Naturschutz in der föderalen Aufgabenteilung: 
Zur Notwendigkeit einer Bundeskompetenz aus 
ökonomischer Perspektive  
Nature conservation competencies in federal systems –  
The economic arguments for national-level competencies 
This chapter was published as “Ring, I. (2004). Naturschutz in der föderalen Aufgabentei-
lung: Zur Notwendigkeit einer Bundeskompetenz aus ökonomischer Perspektive. Natur und 
Landschaft 79(11): 494–500”. The German journal “Natur und Landschaft”, although not 
included in journal citation indexes, is nonetheless highly significant due to being the main 
conservation journal read by decision-makers and administrators at all governmental levels.  
In October 2003, a Commission of the German Parliament (Bundestag) and the Federal 
Council (Bundesrat) was inaugurated to modernise the German federal system, i.e. the inter-
governmental relations between federal and state level (Föderalismuskommission). In the 
course of the discussions that followed, the German Federal Agency for Nature Conservation 
organised an expert workshop on “Nature conservation in the federal system” (Naturschutz im 
föderalen System, 24 March 2004, Bonn, Germany). I. Ring was invited as an expert to pre-
sent an economic perspective on the issue, giving a talk entitled: “Nature conservation in the 
federal system – federal or state public function? The economic perspective” (Naturschutz im 
föderalen System – zentrale oder dezentrale Aufgabe? Die ökonomische Perspektive). She 
was among the few selected speakers who were subsequently asked to publish her talk in 
“Natur und Landschaft” in order to make the economic perspective available to a wider read-
ership.  
7.1 Einführung 
Im Oktober 2003 haben Bundestag und Bundesrat die Kommission zur Modernisierung der 
bundesstaatlichen Ordnung, kurz: Bundesstaatskommission, eingerichtet, die Vorschläge zur 
Neuverteilung der Gesetzgebungskompetenzen zwischen Bund und Ländern erarbeiten soll. 
Zu den Zielen der Kommission gehört es, die Handlungs- und Entscheidungsfähigkeit von 
Bund und Ländern zu verbessern, die politischen Verantwortlichkeiten besser zuzuordnen 
sowie die Zweckmäßigkeit und Effizienz der Aufgabenerfüllung zu steigern. Dabei sollen die 
Verteilung der Gesetzgebungskompetenzen auf Bund und Länder, die Zuständigkeiten und 
Mitwirkungsrechte der Länder bei der Gesetzgebung des Bundes sowie die Finanzbeziehun-
gen zwischen Bund und Ländern überprüft werden. Darüber hinaus sind sowohl Aspekte der 
europäischen Integration als auch die Situation der Kommunen zu berücksichtigen. 
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Die Arbeit der Kommission baut u.a. auf den Beschlüssen der Ministerpräsidentenkonfe-
renz vom 27. März 2003 auf, die die Abschaffung der Rahmenkompetenz des Bundes gefor-
dert hatte, verbunden mit einer Stärkung der Ländergesetzgebung1. Im Verlauf der bisherigen 
Arbeit der Bundesstaatskommission haben einige der berufenen Sachverständigen in ihren 
Stellungnahmen die Abschaffung der Rahmengesetzgebung für Naturschutz, Wasserhaushalt 
und z.T. weitere Sachtitel im Umweltrecht mit einer überwiegenden Verlagerung in die Zu-
ständigkeit der Länder gefordert (Huber 2003; Schmidt-Jortzig 2003; Scholz 2003; Benz 
2003). Dem entgegen positionieren sich andere Sachverständige hinsichtlich einer Befürwor-
tung der Bundeskompetenz für das gesamte Umweltrecht (Meyer 2004) oder argumentieren 
differenziert hinsichtlich der zu berücksichtigenden externen Effekte und Skalenerträge im 
Umweltbereich (Scharpf 2004).  
Weitgehend Konsens herrscht in der Kommission hinsichtlich der Abschaffung der derzei-
tigen Kategorie der Rahmenkompetenz des Bundes (Zypries 2003). Hält dieser Konsens an, 
wird dies auch Konsequenzen für die Bereiche Naturschutz und Wasserhaushalt haben. Hier 
ergeben sich zwei Alternativen: Einerseits bietet sich die Überführung in die konkurrierende 
Gesetzgebung des Bundes an, was eine integrierte Behandlung des Naturschutz- und Umwelt-
rechts auf Bundesebene erlauben würde. So hat der Umweltausschuss des Deutschen Bundes-
tags parteiübergreifend eine Lösung gefordert, die es erlaubt, ein Umweltgesetzbuch auf Bun-
desebene zu erlassen. Für eine Stärkung des Naturschutzrechts auf Bundesebene plädieren die 
Umweltverbände (Röscheisen 2004), namhafte Rechtswissenschaftler (Koch und Mechel 
2004) sowie der Rat von Sachverständigen für Umweltfragen in seinem aktuellen Umwelt-
gutachten (SRU 2004, Tz. 224). Andererseits könnte die Bundesstaatskommission auf Grund 
ihrer bis Ende 2004 angelegten Tätigkeit zu dem Ergebnis kommen, Naturschutz- und/oder 
Wasserrecht – z.T. sogar weiter gehende Umweltkompetenzen, wie kürzlich von den Präsi-
denten der Landtage von Schleswig-Holstein, Bayern, Rheinland-Pfalz, Thüringen und Sach-
sen-Anhalt vorgeschlagen (Arens et al. 2004) – auf die Länderebene zu verlagern und damit 
empfehlen, die Bundeskompetenz auf diesen Gebieten aufzugeben.  
In der Diskussion um die Neuordnung der föderalen Aufgabenteilung werden neben politi-
schen und rechtlichen vielfach ökonomische Argumente hinsichtlich der Vor- und Nachteile 
der Zentralisierung bzw. Dezentralisierung von staatlichen Aufgaben vorgebracht. Allerdings 
finden die ökonomischen Argumente momentan nur relativ pauschal und plakativ Eingang in 
die gegenwärtige Diskussion. So beziehen sich Befürworter der Verlagerung von Kompeten-
zen auf die Länderebene häufig auf die Förderung eines föderalen Wettbewerbs; Gegner der 
Dezentralisierung von Naturschutz- und Umweltkompetenzen führen meist die Befürchtung 
eines „ruinösen“ Deregulierungswettbewerbs bzw. „Race-to-the-bottom“ an. Aus ökonomi-
scher Sicht können diese pauschalen Positionen nicht befriedigen, da sie in der Regel ohne 
eine nachvollziehbare Begründung vorgebracht werden. Ziel des vorliegenden Beitrags ist es, 
ökonomische Argumente für bzw. gegen Naturschutzkompetenzen auf Bundesebene differen-
                                                 
1  Einen Überblick und eine Einschätzung zu den aktuellen Vorschlägen und neuen Formen der Gesetzge-
bungskompetenzen aus umweltrechtlicher Perspektive geben Koch und Mechel (2004). 
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ziert und sachgerecht zu diskutieren. Auf der Grundlage der ökonomischen Theorie des Föde-
ralismus werden relevante Kriterien vorgestellt, die eher für eine Zentralisierung oder Dezent-
ralisierung von Aufgaben des Natur- und Umweltschutzes sprechen. Für die Ableitung kon-
kreter Empfehlungen hinsichtlich der Kompetenzzuweisung im Naturschutz ist schließlich die 
räumliche Verteilung seiner Nutzen und Kosten zu berücksichtigen. 
7.2 Naturschutz: Dezentrale oder zentrale Aufgabe? 
Jede konkrete Umsetzung von Naturschutzpolitik in föderalen Systemen muss die spezifi-
schen ökologischen Eigenschaften des jeweiligen Guts berücksichtigen (Ring 2002). Im Fol-
genden werden einschlägige ökonomische Kriterien für die Bereitstellung eines öffentlichen 
Guts vorgestellt, die für die Verteilung der Gesetzgebungskompetenzen im Naturschutz he-
rangezogen werden können. 
Prinzipiell sind die Raumwirksamkeit der jeweiligen Aufgaben und die Mobilität der be-
troffenen Umweltmedien oder Schutzgüter zu berücksichtigen. So sprechen großräumige öf-
fentliche Aufgaben wie die Bereitstellung von Schutzgütern von nationaler oder internationa-
ler Bedeutung für eine zentrale Aufgabenwahrnehmung. Das Gleiche gilt tendenziell für 
grenzüberschreitende Phänomene. Letztere treten bei hochgradig mobilen Umweltkomparti-
menten oder Schutzgütern auf, welche eine Abstimmung der diesbezüglichen Aufgaben auf 
nationaler, oft sogar internationaler Ebene bedürfen (Siebert 1991; Hansjürgens 1996). So 
gibt es zahlreiche Tierarten, wie etwa große Wirbeltiere und Zugvögel, deren großräumiger 
Habitatanspruch oder Wanderungsverhalten administrative Grenzen überschreiten und entwe-
der eine koordinierte dezentrale oder eine nationale, mitunter auch internationale Schutzpoli-
tik nötig machen (Abbildung 7.1). Auch die großräumige Vernetzung von Habitaten im Na-
turschutz erfordert eine zentrale Koordination, wie etwa der Aufbau des europäischen Schutz-
gebietssystems Natura 2000. 
Öffentliche Aufgaben mit kleinräumiger und regional begrenzter Wirksamkeit, wie die Be-
reitstellung lokaler öffentlicher Güter, lassen sich auf dezentraler Ebene effektiv und effizient 
gestalten (Ring 2002). Ebenso sind Aufgaben im Zusammenhang mit weniger mobilen Um-
weltkompartimenten verstärkt dezentralen Gebietskörperschaften zuzuordnen. Dies hängt mit 
der geringeren Wahrscheinlichkeit grenzüberschreitender Umweltbelastung und damit der 
Existenz räumlicher Externalitäten zusammen. Fragen der Landnutzung und Bodenbelastung, 
aber auch öffentliche Aufgaben in Verbindung mit Binnengewässern können gewöhnlich in-
nerhalb nationaler Grenzen gelöst werden. Das Gleiche gilt für viele Teilaspekte der Durch-
führung des Naturschutzes und der Landschaftspflege. In Abhängigkeit von den spezifischen 
Eigenschaften der Schutzgüter bzw. Umweltprobleme lassen sich auch Ansätze für eine wei-
ter gehende Dezentralisierung auf die Ebene der Länder oder kommunalen Gebietskörper-
schaften begründen.  
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Foto: D. Nette 
Abbildung 7.1: Bedrohte Tierarten mit großem Habitatanspruch wie der Luchs (Lynx lynx)  
benötigen national und international gesetzte Naturschutzstandards sowie eine 
länderübergreifende Koordination der Artenschutzaktivitäten. 
Figure 7.1: Endangered species with large habitat requirements such as the lynx (Lynx lynx) 
need national and international standard-setting and coordinated conservation ac-
tivities. 
Aus ökonomischer Sicht gilt bezüglich der Bereitstellung öffentlicher Güter, zu denen der 
Naturschutz zählt, das Prinzip der fiskalischen Dezentralisierung (Oates 1972). Danach lässt 
sich die Bereitstellung der öffentlichen Güter und Dienstleistungen am effizientesten gestal-
ten, wenn sie der niedrigst möglichen Gebietskörperschaft zugewiesen wird.  
Eine Abweichung von dieser generellen Dezentralisierungsregel ergibt sich bei der Exis-
tenz räumlicher Externalitäten (Spillover) zwischen Gebietskörperschaften. Im Naturschutz 
gibt es solche positiven grenzüberschreitenden Effekte für Schutzgüter von überregionalem 
Interesse, z.B. für Schutzgebietskategorien mit internationaler Bedeutung (Nationalparks, 
FFH-Gebiete, Biosphärenreservate). Auch negative grenzüberschreitende Effekte existieren 
bei Eingriffen in Natur und Landschaft mit großräumigen Auswirkungen (z.B. Infrastruktur-
vorhaben mit grenzüberschreitenden Wirkungen). Das Prinzip der fiskalischen Äquivalenz 
gebietet jedoch, eine Übereinstimmung zwischen denjenigen herbeizuführen, die über den 
Umfang des anzubietenden Kollektivguts entscheiden, die den Nutzen aus einem kollektiven 
Gut ziehen und jenen, die für die Bereitstellung dieses Guts zahlen müssen (Olson 1969). Die 
gesellschaftliche Wohlfahrt wird durch die differenzierte Ausgestaltung öffentlicher Leistun-
gen entsprechend der räumlichen Verteilung von Kosten und Nutzen erhöht. Die Verwirkli-
chung des Prinzips der fiskalischen Äquivalenz erfordert aber nicht notwendigerweise die 
Verlagerung von Kompetenzen auf übergeordnete Gebietskörperschaften. Verhandlungen 
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zwischen den betroffenen regionalen Einheiten oder die Bildung neuer administrativer Einhei-
ten, die die räumliche Ausdehnung der Entscheider, Kosten- und Nutzenträger abbilden, kön-
nen auch zur Internalisierung räumlicher Externalitäten herangezogen werden (z.B. regionale 
Kooperation in Stadt-Umland-Verbänden oder Zweckverbände). 
Im folgenden Kapitel wird der Bereich des Naturschutzes einer differenzierten Betrach-
tungsweise unterzogen und geprüft, inwieweit aus ökonomischer Sicht, d.h. bezüglich der 
räumlichen Verteilung seiner Nutzen und Kosten, eine eher dezentrale oder zentrale Bereit-
stellung zu befürworten ist. 
7.3 Die räumliche Verteilung von Nutzen und Kosten des Naturschutzes 
7.3.1 Die räumliche Verteilung der Nutzen des Naturschutzes 
Der Gesamtwert des Guts Naturschutz ergibt sich in der umweltökonomischen Theorie aus 
der Summe seiner Teilwerte. Die verschiedenen Nutzenstiftungen des Naturschutzes werden 
in der Ökonomie aus einer anthropozentrischen Sichtweise betrachtet; dabei geht es um die 
Wertschätzung auf der Basis individueller Präferenzen von Menschen (Hampicke 1991, 
S. 107ff.; Pearce und Turner 1990, S. 141ff.). Dies schließt nicht aus, dass neben quantifizier-
baren Werten, die eine Monetarisierung erlauben, auch qualitative Elemente, die schwer oder 
nur unter großer Unsicherheit in Geldwerten auszudrücken sind, in die Bewertung eingehen.  
Prinzipiell wird bei der ökonomischen Bewertung von Naturressourcen zwischen nut-
zungsabhängigen und nicht nutzungsabhängigen Werten unterschieden (vgl. Abbildung 7.2). 
Die Nutzungswerte werden in direkte und indirekte Nutzungswerte unterteilt, wobei zu den 
direkten Nutzungswerten der Produktions-, der Konsum- und der Symbolwert des Natur-
schutzes gehören (WBGU 1999, S. 54ff.). Beispiele für den biosphärischen Produktionswert 
sind die Produktion und Vermarktung von Holz, Getreide, Baumwolle oder Fischen. In der 
Regel handelt es sich hier um private, marktgängige Güter, wobei die Rahmenbedingungen 
für eine nachhaltige Nutzung der Naturressourcen durch staatlich gesetzte Regeln zu gewähr-
leisten sind, damit es nicht zu einer Übernutzung kommt. Zum Konsumwert des Naturschut-
zes zählen der Erlebniswert, Freizeit- und Erholungswerte sowie der ästhetische Wert von 
Natur und Landschaften. Der Konsumwert zeichnet sich vorwiegend durch Kollektivgutcha-
rakter aus. Der Symbolwert fasst weitgehend religiöse und spirituelle Werte von Natur (z.B. 
heilige Tier- und Pflanzenarten) zusammen, die von Individuen bestimmten Elementen der 
Biosphäre zugewiesen werden.  
Indirekte Nutzungswerte ergeben sich aus den Funktionen und biosphärischen Leistungen 
der Ökosysteme. Hierher gehören beispielsweise zahlreiche Funktionen biogeochemischer 
Kreisläufe, das Hochwasserretentionsvermögen von Auenlandschaften oder die Rolle des 
Bodens als Filter für Schadstoffe. Oft werden diese Funktionen erst bei ihrem Verlust wahr-
genommen. Da von ihrer Nutzung niemand ausgeschlossen werden kann, handelt es sich bei 
deren Bereitstellung um öffentliche Aufgaben.  
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Abbildung 7.2: Der Nutzen des Naturschutzes in seiner räumlichen Ausprägung. 
Figure 7.2: The economic benefit of nature conservation and its spatial relevance. 
Zur Kategorie der nicht nutzungsabhängigen Werte zählt vor allem der Existenzwert. Bei ihm 
handelt es sich um Nutzenstiftungen aus dem Wissen um die Existenz von Objekten, seien 
dies bedrohte Tier- und Pflanzenarten oder außergewöhnliche und seltene Landschaften (z.B. 
Weltnaturerbe). Der Existenzwert wird im Allgemeinen unabhängig von jeglicher gegenwär-
tiger oder zukünftiger Nutzung formuliert. Des Weiteren fällt der Vermächtniswert in die Ka-
tegorie der nicht nutzungsabhängigen Werte, der aus dem Wunsch resultiert, Elemente der 
Biosphäre auf Grund ihrer Symbol- und Identifikationswerte an nachkommende Generationen 
zu vererben. 
Optionswerte beziehen sich auf künftige, potentielle Nutzenstiftungen des Naturschutzes 
und können sich sowohl auf nutzungsabhängige als auch auf nicht nutzungsabhängige Werte 
beziehen. Zu den nutzungsabhängigen Optionswerten gehören etwa Optionen der künftigen 
Nutzung des Genpotenzials für medizinische Zwecke, deren konkreter Nutzen heute aber 
noch unbekannt ist.  
Um Empfehlungen hinsichtlich der Zentralisierung oder Dezentralisierung von Natur-
schutzkompetenzen abzuleiten, sind die räumlichen Verteilungen der Nutzenstiftungen des 
Naturschutzes zu berücksichtigen (vgl. auch Döring 1998). Generell lässt sich sagen, dass 
Naturschutzaktivitäten sowohl von lokalem als auch globalem Nutzen sein können (Perrings 
und Gadgil 2003). Der räumliche Nutzenkreis nimmt aber im Allgemeinen von den direkten 
über die indirekten Nutzungswerte hin zu den Options- und Existenzwerten zu (Abbil-
dung 7.2. Allerdings können auch die Produktionswerte schon von überregionaler Bedeutung 
sein, je nach Ausmaß und Intensität von Landnutzungen bzw. Eingriffen in Natur und Land-
schaft. Darüber hinaus bestehen ökologische Wechselwirkungen von Eingriffen vor Ort mit 
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überregionalen, nationalen oder internationalen Schutzzielen, so dass es gerade im Natur-
schutz einer Koordination von Maßnahmen auf einer höheren Ebene bedarf.  
Aus ökonomischer Sicht wird als unstrittig eingeschätzt, dass insbesondere die nicht nut-
zungsabhängigen Werte natürlicher Ressourcen als Rechtfertigung einer Bundeskompetenz 
heranzuziehen sind (Oates 2001; Revesz 2000). Der Artenschutz und der Schutz der biologi-
schen Vielfalt sind damit originäre Aufgaben zentraler Gebietskörperschaften. Dezentrale 
Gebietskörperschaften verhalten sich mit hoher Wahrscheinlichkeit als Trittbrettfahrer, wenn 
die Kosten von Maßnahmen für den Artenschutz und den Schutz der biologischen Vielfalt 
selbst zu tragen sind, während ihr Nutzen teilweise oder überwiegend außerhalb der eigenen 
Gebietsgrenzen anfällt. Diese Tendenz wird auch durch empirische Studien gestützt: Eine 
Studie von List et al. (2002) hat in den USA die öffentlichen Ausgaben für bedrohte Arten 
(nach dem Endangered Species Act) auf der Ebene der Bundesstaaten im Verhältnis zur Bun-
desebene untersucht. Dabei zeigte sich, dass die Umweltbehörden der einzelnen Staaten dazu 
tendieren, weniger auszugeben, wenn es um den Schutz von Tierarten mit großem Habitatan-
spruch geht oder wenn Konflikte von Artenschutzzielen mit wirtschaftlicher Entwicklung im 
eigenen Wirkungskreis zu erwarten sind.  
Das Argument von einem „ruinösen“ Deregulierungswettbewerb ist im Naturschutz also 
nicht unbegründet und spricht für eine zentrale Standardsetzung. Gleichzeitig bedarf die zent-
rale Entscheidungskompetenz einer zentralen Finanzierungskompetenz. Überlässt man die 
Finanzierung ausschließlich den dezentralen Gebietskörperschaften, so ist auf Grund des 
grenzüberschreitenden Nutzens des Naturschutzes mit einer Unterfinanzierung und damit ei-
nem Unterangebot der entsprechenden Schutzgüter zu rechnen. Dies gilt auch, wenn die 
Durchführung der entsprechenden Aufgaben auf der Ebene der Länder angesiedelt ist. 
7.3.2 Die räumliche Verteilung der Kosten des Naturschutzes 
Naturschutz ist ein öffentliches Gut, deshalb hat der Staat mit entsprechenden Rahmenbedin-
gungen dafür zu sorgen, dass dieses Gut öffentlich bereitgestellt wird. Damit verbunden ist 
die Übernahme der Kosten des Naturschutzes durch die öffentliche Hand. Aufgrund des über-
regionalen Nutzens des Naturschutzes ist dieser eine gesamtgesellschaftliche Aufgabe, inso-
fern sind die Kosten – folgt man dem Prinzip der fiskalischen Äquivalenz – auch von der gan-
zen Gesellschaft zu tragen. In Realität verhält es sich jedoch so, dass die Kosten des Natur-
schutzes in Deutschland ungleichmäßig verteilt sind. 
Abbildung 7.3 veranschaulicht die Pro-Kopf-Ausgaben der Länder für den Naturschutz im 
Jahre 2001 und setzt diese zu der jeweiligen Einwohnerdichte ins Verhältnis. Dabei zeigt sich, 
dass die Pro-Kopf-Ausgaben der Länder ansteigen, je geringer diese besiedelt sind. Die Län-
der mit geringer Einwohnerdichte tragen also in überproportionaler Weise die Kosten des 
Naturschutzes in Deutschland. Dies hängt damit zusammen, dass Naturschutz in aller Regel 
„in der Fläche“ stattfindet.  
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Quelle: BfN, 1.1 (2004); Daten: Stratmann (2002). / Source: BfN, 1.1 (2004); Data: Stratmann (2002). 
Abbildung 7.3: Naturschutzausgaben der Länder im Verhältnis zu ihrer Einwohnerdichte (2001). 
Figure 7.3: Public conservation expenditures at state level in relation to population density 
(2001). 
Von außerordentlicher Bedeutung für den Naturschutz sind die Land- und Forstwirtschaft. 
Einerseits waren diese beiden Wirtschaftssektoren auf Grund ihrer Produktivitätssteigerung 
und zunehmenden Intensivierung der Landnutzung in überdurchschnittlichem Maße am Ar-
tenrückgang des letzten Jahrhunderts beteiligt (Hampicke 1991, S. 45). Andererseits betreffen 
die heute für den Naturschutz anfallenden Kosten vor allem diesen Bereich. Denn extensive 
Landnutzungsformen, die gleichzeitig dem Natur- und Landschaftsschutz förderlich wären, 
sind unter gegenwärtigen wirtschaftlichen Rahmenbedingungen in der Regel nicht wettbe-
werbsfähig. Ohne eine breite gesellschaftliche Unterstützung in Form der Honorierung ökolo-
gischer Leistungen der Land- und Forstwirtschaft lässt sich der Rückgang der biologischen 
Vielfalt daher nicht aufhalten. Eine Honorierung ökologischer Leistungen ist aus ökonomi-
scher Perspektive gerechtfertigt, da der Nutzen naturschutzgerechter Landnutzungsformen im 
Sinne des Erhalts der Biodiversität weit über den betroffenen Sektor hinaus reicht (Hampicke 
2005). Die Flächenstaaten mit ihrem hohen Anteil an Land- und Forstwirtschaft sind hier  
überproportional betroffen, so dass sich die entsprechenden Kosten des Naturschutzes und der 
Landschaftspflege nicht gleichmäßig auf alle Länder verteilen.  
Die ungleichmäßige Verteilung der Kosten des Naturschutzes betrifft auch die räumliche 
Verteilung der Schutzgebiete in Deutschland und die damit verbundenen Kosten. Sind die 
Landschaftsschutzgebiete in Deutschland noch relativ homogen verteilt, so zeigt sich ein Gra-
dient der zunehmenden räumlichen Konzentration von den Naturschutzgebieten über die Bio-
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sphärenreservate, Naturparks und Nationalparks (Urfei 2002). So liegen nahezu 90 % der 
deutschen Nationalparkfläche in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Niedersachsen und Schleswig-
Holstein (Abbildung 7.4).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Foto: Naturfoto-Pretscher 
Abbildung 7.4: Der Nationalpark Jasmund auf Rügen, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern. Allein die 
drei Bundesländer Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Niedersachsen und Schleswig-
Holstein stellen nahezu 90 % der bundesdeutschen Nationalparkfläche (Urfei 
2002).  
Figure 7.4: The Jasmund National Park on Rügen in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania. 
Almost 90 % of German national park area is located in the three states of Meck-
lenburg-Western Pomerania, Lower Saxony and Schleswig-Holstein (Urfei 2002). 
Die Kosten der Ausweisung und des Unterhalts, die mit großräumigen und hochwertigen 
Schutzgebietskategorien zunehmen, sind in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland nahezu vollstän-
dig durch die jeweiligen Länder zu tragen2. Hierzu zählen beispielsweise die Einrichtung ei-
genständiger Schutzgebietsverwaltungen für Nationalparks und Biosphärenreservate. Gleich-
zeitig sind mit der Ausweisung von Großschutzgebieten lokale Nutzungseinschränkungen – 
und damit Opportunitätskosten – verbunden; diese betreffen sowohl die Land-, Forst- und 
Teichwirtschaft als auch die Gemeinden vor Ort. Die Gemeinden werden in ihren Entwick-
lungsmöglichkeiten bezüglich Siedlungs- und Gewerbenutzung eingeschränkt und können 
                                                 
2  Die Bundesebene fördert z.B. Naturschutzgroßprojekte mit gesamtstaatlich repräsentativer Bedeutung (BfN 
2002, S. 165). Für den regelmäßigen Unterhalt von Großschutzgebieten ist in Deutschland die Länderebene 
zuständig. Hier liegt der Unterschied zu Österreich. Obwohl es dort kein Naturschutzgesetz auf Bundesebene 
gibt, beteiligt sich die Bundesebene zu 50 % an den Kosten für die österreichischen Nationalparks (Loiskandl 
2004, persönliche Mitteilung). 
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ihre kommunale Hoheit bezüglich der Flächennutzung nur noch eingeschränkt ausüben. Die 
privaten und öffentlichen Nutzungseinschränkungen führen dazu, dass sich häufig große loka-
le Widerstände gegen die Einrichtung beispielsweise neuer Nationalparks formieren. Aus 
ökonomischer Perspektive wäre hier ein Kostenausgleich in Form von Kompensationszahlun-
gen für private Landnutzer, aber auch für lokale Gebietskörperschaften über den kommunalen 
Finanzausgleich zu fordern (Ring 2001, 2002; Perner und Thöne 2002). Ökonomische Anrei-
ze allein können allerdings den Widerstand gegen die Ausweisung hochwertiger Großschutz-
gebiete nicht brechen, hier bedarf es zusätzlich differenzierter Studien bezüglich ihrer Wahr-
nehmung und Akzeptanz (Stoll-Kleemann 2001). Aus ökonomischer Sicht lässt sich zusam-
menfassen: Je inhomogener die räumliche Verteilung in Verbindung mit der nationalen oder 
gar internationalen Bedeutung einer Schutzgebietskategorie, desto höher ist der zentrale Ko-
ordinierungsbedarf, d.h. die Notwendigkeit einer übergeordneten Bundeskompetenz.  
Der Naturschutz hat nicht nur damit zu kämpfen, dass seine Kosten räumlich ungleichmä-
ßig verteilt sind. Problematisch für das öffentliche Gut Naturschutz ist zusätzlich seine Unter-
finanzierung (BfN 2002, S. 174; SRU 2002, S. 25). So betrugen die öffentlichen Naturschutz-
ausgaben (Bund und Länder, ohne Stadtstaaten und Kommunen) im Jahr 1998 nur 1,22 
Mrd. DM oder 0,067 % der Gesamtausgaben öffentlicher Haushalte. Im Vergleich dazu wur-
den für den Umweltschutz im selben Jahr 21,7 Mrd. DM an öffentlichen Ausgaben getätigt 
(Stratmann 2002). Die Unterfinanzierung hat zur Folge, dass z.B. Nationalparkverwaltungen 
ihren Aufgaben nicht nachkommen können, Defizite in der Ausbildung von Naturschutzfach-
kräften auftreten (Stoll-Kleemann 2001), eine zu dünne Personalausstattung in Naturschutz-
behörden vorliegt (SRU 2002, S. 25) und nicht zuletzt unzureichende Lastenausgleiche auf 
der Seite öffentlicher als auch privater Landnutzer zu beklagen sind. So führt nicht nur die 
ungleiche räumliche Verteilung der Kosten und Nutzen, sondern auch die zu geringe öffentli-
che Mittelbereitstellung für den Naturschutz zu einem Unterangebot an dem nötigen Ausmaß 
und der Qualität von Schutzgütern. 
7.4 Föderale Kompetenzverteilung auf Grund der Nutzen und Kosten des 
Naturschutzes 
Naturschutz ist ein öffentliches Gut, dessen Nutzen überwiegend von nationaler und internati-
onaler Bedeutung ist. Die Kosten des Naturschutzes sind sowohl sektoral (Land- und Forst-
wirtschaft) als auch räumlich (Schutzgebiete) ungleichmäßig verteilt. Dieser Zusammenhang 
erfordert eine übergeordnete, d.h. nationale oder gar internationale Rahmen- und Standardset-
zung im Naturschutz. Insofern ist die fortschreitende und anspruchsvolle Standardsetzung auf 
europäischer Ebene, z.B. durch die FFH-Richtlinie und den Aufbau des Natura-2000-Netz-
werks, aus ökonomischer Sicht zielführend. Ebenso ist die zunehmende europäische Ko-
Finanzierung der Agrarumweltprogramme der Länder, auch im Hinblick auf Naturschutzziele, 
im Sinn der ökonomischen Föderalismustheorie sinnvoll zu begründen (vgl. Osterburg und 
Stratmann 2002). Nun wird von Länderseite häufig argumentiert, dass zur Umsetzung der 
europäischen Standards im Naturschutz keine gesonderte nationale Naturschutzgesetzgebung 
nötig sei, denn die Umsetzung könne direkt durch die Ländernaturschutzgesetzgebung erfol-
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gen. Dieser Haltung wird von zahlreichen Autoren die mangelnde Europatauglichkeit der 
deutschen Umwelt- bzw. Naturschutzgesetzgebung entgegengesetzt (stellvertretend Pernice 
2004; Hendrischke 2004). Für die fristgemäße und qualitativ gute Umsetzung der EU-
Richtlinien ist die Bundesebene verantwortlich, unabhängig von der internen, nationalen Re-
gelung der Zuständigkeiten, die im Naturschutzrecht eine entsprechende Anpassung von 
16 Ländernaturschutzgesetzen erfordert. Aus ökonomischer Sicht vernachlässigt die Argu-
mentationslinie der Länder auch die Rolle des föderalen Wettbewerbs, der auf allen föderalen 
Ebenen stattfindet. So setzt das Bundesnaturschutzgesetz für die Länder verbindliche Stan-
dards, die über europäische Vorgaben hinausgehen. Hier sind die flächendeckende Land-
schaftsplanung, die Durchsetzung des Verursacherprinzips über die Eingriffsregelung und der 
Entwicklungsgedanke im Naturschutz, der über das europäisch vorgegebene Verschlechte-
rungsgebot von Flächen hinausgeht, zu nennen. Einerseits nimmt Deutschland damit in diesen 
Bereichen – z.T. mit einigen anderen europäischen Staaten – eine Vorreiterrolle im europäi-
schen Staatenverbund ein. Andererseits setzt die Bundesebene damit flächendeckend für das 
Bundesgebiet Standards, die in ihrem Anspruch gefährdet wären, wenn es keine Bundeskom-
petenz für den Naturschutz mehr gäbe. 
Die bislang angeführte, ökonomisch begründete Argumentation spricht für die Beibehal-
tung bzw. sogar Stärkung der gegenwärtigen Entscheidungskompetenz des Bundes im Natur-
schutz. Insofern ist die Übernahme des Naturschutztitels in die konkurrierende Gesetzgebung 
ökonomisch zu unterstützen, was den Weg für eine integrierte Behandlung des Umwelt- und 
Naturschutzrechtes auf Bundesebene bereiten könnte. Verbunden mit der Entscheidungskom-
petenz wäre allerdings auch die Finanzierungskompetenz des Bundes zu stärken. Die gegen-
wärtige Unterfinanzierung des Naturschutzes führt zu einem Unterangebot an entsprechenden 
Schutzgütern, was durch die ungleiche räumliche und sektorale Verteilung der Kosten des 
Naturschutzes noch verstärkt wird. Neben der Bereitstellung ausreichender Mittel auf allen 
föderalen Ebenen entsprechend dem räumlichen Nutzen der Naturschutzmaßnahmen sind 
ökologische Lastenausgleiche zu befürworten. Diese sollten Kompensationszahlungen sowohl 
für öffentliche Gebietskörperschaften im Rahmen des Länder- und kommunalen Finanzaus-
gleichs als auch für private Landnutzer durch die Honorierung ökologischer Leistungen ein-
schließen. 
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Zusammenfassung 
Durch die Arbeit der Kommission zur Modernisierung der bundesstaatlichen Ordnung ist die 
derzeitige Ausgestaltung der Rahmengesetzgebung in Frage gestellt worden, deren Verände-
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rung zu weit reichenden Konsequenzen für die Naturschutzgesetzgebung führen könnte. Der 
vorliegende Artikel untersucht die ökonomischen Argumente für bzw. gegen eine Ansiedlung 
von Naturschutzkompetenzen auf den verschiedenen föderalen Ebenen.  
Naturschutz ist ein öffentliches Gut, dessen Nutzen überwiegend von nationaler und inter-
nationaler Bedeutung ist. Die Kosten des Naturschutzes sind sowohl sektoral (Land- und 
Forstwirtschaft) als auch räumlich (Schutzgebiete) ungleichmäßig über die Länder verteilt. 
Dieser Zusammenhang erfordert eine nationale Rahmen- und Standardsetzung im Natur-
schutz. Aus ökonomischer Sicht ist deshalb eine Beibehaltung bzw. Stärkung der gegenwärti-
gen Entscheidungskompetenz des Bundes im Naturschutz zu fordern. 
Summary 
The Commission of the German Parliament and Bundesrat on the Modernisation of the Fed-
eral Structure has questioned the present design of framework regulation in Germany. Since 
nature conservation law in Germany is subject to framework regulation at the federal level, 
combined with implementing conservation laws at the state level (Länder), a potential change 
in framework regulation might have serious consequences for conservation law. This article 
investigates the economic arguments for and against conservation competencies at various 
governmental levels.  
Nature conservation is a public good with benefits accruing predominantly at national and 
international levels. The costs of conservation are distributed unequally – in terms of eco-
nomic sectors (agriculture and forestry) and in terms of the spatial distribution of protected 
areas across the various German Länder. These findings suggest a need for national-level 
competencies and standard setting. The economic perspective supports keeping or even 
strengthening nature conservation competencies at national level.  
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8 Biodiversity governance: 
Adjusting local costs and global benefits  
This chapter was published as “Ring, I. (2008). Biodiversity governance: Adjusting local 
costs and global benefits. In: Sikor, T. (Ed.), Public and Private in Natural Resource Govern-
ance: A False Dichotomy? Earthscan, London, pp. 107–126”. 
The publication was based on a short paper and presentation with the same title, given at 
the International Blanckensee Colloquium on “Public and Private in Resource Governance: 
Mutations and Transformations of a Grand Dichotomy” (13–15 January 2006, Potsdam, Ger-
many). 
8.1 Linking biodiversity governance to fiscal federalism 
8.1.1 Multilevel and multiactor governance in biodiversity conservation 
The concept of governance itself is associated with a wider perspective on environmental de-
cision making.1 Regarding the public side with mostly hierarchical decision making, it is no 
longer the nationstate alone that is predominantly in charge of setting the framework for envi-
ronmental decisions. Both higher and lower levels of environmental decision making come 
increasingly into play, for example, European directives have had a strong hierarchical impact 
on member states regarding the creation of the Natura 2000 network; the international Con-
vention on Biological Diversity, although more reliant on consensual decision making, still 
morally binds and influences signatory states regarding its implementation. State, regional 
and local governments can play increasingly crucial roles for environmental decision making. 
On the one hand, this depends on the type of federal system in place and its associated hierar-
chical rules. On the other hand, new alliances emerge in the form of hybrid organizations, 
such as Local Agenda 21 initiatives and networks. At the same time, environmental decisions 
are no longer the exclusive realm of governmental agencies. The private sector – including 
consumers and business, as well as hybrid organizations crossing the public–private divide 
such as NGOs or semiprivate organizations (for example, agencies and research institutes) – 
play an important role in decisions on the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity.2 
Hence, biodiversity governance has to be seen in a context of both multilevel and multiac-
tor governance. Another important issue is the development and implementation of policy 
instruments. Regulation, economic incentives, voluntary, informative and communicative 
                                                 
1  Biodiversity governance is understood as a subfield of resource governance. Environmental governance is 
used as the most generic term in this chapter and includes both of these fields. Concrete examples are mostly 
related to the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity. 
2  See Penker (2008) for a more detailed portrayal of private, public and hybrid actors related to landscape 
governance that is also valid for the field of biodiversity governance. 
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instruments on the public side as well as activities initiated by civil society continuously in-
teract and are of varying importance depending upon the concrete problem. Regulation or so-
called command and control instruments have been widely used in the early phases of envi-
ronmental policy, representing the coercive principle in public state management of environ-
mental goods. Nowadays, economic incentives and voluntary instruments are in the forerun 
wherever feasible, allowing individuals more leeway of action and contributing to increased 
economic efficiency. While they are policy instruments – meaning framed and issued mainly 
by state action – they no longer fit the perspective of the coercive state. Jordan et al. (2003) 
have framed the term ‘new environmental policy instruments’ with respect to the increasing 
use of these new instruments of environmental governance. The mix of instruments and thus 
the increasing interaction of public and private spheres, which is the larger topic of this book 
(see Sikor et al. 2008), also apply to the field of biodiversity governance. 
One of the main objectives of this chapter is to link biodiversity governance to the eco-
nomic theory of fiscal federalism. The latter is concerned with the assignment of public func-
tions, expenditures and fiscal instruments to different levels of government. Therefore, we can 
identify an important link between multilevel governance and fiscal federalism where spatial 
characteristics of biodiversity conservation are of prime importance. The environmental qual-
ity of a landscape is closely linked to its land use pattern and the type of management per-
formed by public jurisdictions and private land users. Yet, there are few incentives for local 
actors to encourage conservation activities when ecological benefits cross local boundaries 
(Perrings and Gadgil 2003). Spatial externalities or spillovers exist that – if not adequately 
compensated – lead to an underprovision of the public goods and services concerned. This is 
the case for a number of ecological services, such as nature reserves or the conservation of 
endangered wildlife. Decisions on the designation of protected areas or species protection are 
often made by institutions above the local level, whereas the concrete consequences in terms 
of restrictions in land use or the damages caused by wildlife are born by local actors, often 
without any or sufficient compensation. 
Fiscal federalism as a subfield of public finance in economics predominantly deals with the 
public aspect of environmental governance, implying identification with the kind of goods 
and services that should be provided by public institutions at different levels of government. 
In this context, the distinction between public and private clearly refers to the state as the pub-
lic sphere and the market as the private sphere of voluntary interaction (see Sikor et al. 2008). 
Fiscal federalism already involves a truly multilevel perspective on the provision of public 
goods and services; analysis is not confined to the nationstate as predominant public actor. 
Public institutions may range from international institutions down to municipalities as the 
most decentralized governmental level. It is important to note the difference between the mu-
nicipality – as the local authority representing the state and the local community – and the 
wider political community including further local associations and stakeholders. Fiscal feder-
alism deals with the local level of government. In the first part of this chapter, two important 
principles in fiscal federalism are introduced – the principle of decentralization and the prin-
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ciple of fiscal equivalence. They are applied to environmental issues, helping to decide on 
adequate levels of actions and relevant policy instruments. 
The second part of this chapter analyses the spatial characteristics of conservation benefits 
and costs in relation to governmental levels. The costs and benefits of providing public goods 
and services do not always match with jurisdictional boundaries, which call for adequate in-
struments to adjust them. It is important to check who is bearing the costs and who is benefit-
ing from certain conservation programmes or measures. In practice, public and private actors 
continuously interact and commonly contribute to the final outcome in terms of successes and 
failures of the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity. Therefore, one has to consider 
public and private actors in the course of adjusting the benefits and costs of biodiversity con-
servation. 
The third part of the chapter is devoted to a case study, presenting an innovative instrument 
implemented in the 1990s in several Brazilian states: the ICMS-Ecológico (Imposto sobre 
Circulação de Mercadorias e Serviços-Ecológico) (Grieg-Gran 2000; Loureiro 2001; May et 
al. 2002; Ring 2004b). It is an excellent and rare example of the consideration of ecological 
indicators in intergovernmental fiscal transfers from the state to the local level. The ICMS-
Ecológico (ICMS-E) renders protected areas within municipal borders into communal reve-
nues. In this way, it clearly represents an incentive for the creation of newly protected areas, 
mainly at local and state levels. Although a hierarchical, state-governed instrument, it is an 
economic instrument by nature. Furthermore, the ICMS-E emerged as an economic incentive 
for new forms of public–private interaction. Thus, the instrument and its effects are a good 
example of the shifting boundaries between notions of publics and privates in various aspects. 
8.1.2 Environmental federalism 
A central objective of fiscal federalism is to effectively and efficiently assign public func-
tions, expenditures and revenues to the central, state and local governmental levels in federal 
systems. This means deciding which public functions and instruments are best centralized and 
which are better placed at decentralized levels of government (Oates 1999). Concerning the 
allocation function of public sectors, which is of major interest for the provision of environ-
mental goods and services, the basic principle of fiscal decentralization has been put forward 
(Musgrave 1959; Oates 1972). The provision of most public goods and services is more effi-
ciently guaranteed when production and consumption are limited to the lowest governmental 
level possible. The decentralization rule is based on the following major arguments. First, the 
regionally differing preferences can be better considered at decentralized levels of govern-
ment (Tiebout 1956). Second, it is a requirement for more competition within the public sec-
tor. And third, many public goods and services experience cost degression due to lower coor-
dination and transaction costs at the local level. 
Nevertheless, there are exceptions from the general decentralization rule, as it only applies 
in the absence of economies of scale. If economies of scale exist, the provision of public 
goods and services concerned should be moved to the cost efficient centralized level (Postlep 
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and Döring 1996). In addition, due to the characteristics of nonrivalry and nonexcludability of 
many public goods and services, some of them are associated with spatial externalities or 
spillovers between jurisdictions. Concerning environmental ‘bads’, such as pollution, the ac-
tivities of one jurisdiction can lead to negative externalities in neighbouring or even remote 
jurisdictions, implying that part of the costs in question are externalized. In the context of 
biodiversity conservation, for example, building infrastructure such as roads may cause a 
fragmentation of habitats for protected endangered species, eventually leading to a decline or 
extinction of a population. Concerning environmental goods or services, spillover benefits 
may be created. In this case, a jurisdiction bears the costs of providing certain environmental 
goods and services, but the benefits thereof also accrue to people in other jurisdictions at the 
same or at higher governmental levels. For example, various types of nature reserves, such as 
national parks or biosphere reserves, lead to costs in terms of land use restrictions for local 
communities but are highly valued, even on a global scale. 
When spatial externalities exist, the principle of fiscal equivalence comes into play. It ad-
vocates achieving a match between those who decide on the provision of a collective good, 
those who receive the benefits, and those who pay for it (Olson 1969). Social welfare is in-
creased through the differentiation of public goods and services in accordance with spatially 
related costs and preferences. There are several ways of solving this problem. The implemen-
tation of fiscal equivalence may require the shifting of competence to a more centralized level 
of government. Other options involve negotiations between the parties concerned for more 
equal distribution of the costs and benefits of actions. This may include the formation of ad-
ministrative institutions that map the spatial range of costs and benefits to internalize spatial 
externalities. In the EU, the implementation of the Water Framework Directive is currently 
leading to the establishment of new river basin authorities, or alternatively to cooperative ar-
rangements among those jurisdictions that share a river basin, allowing for coordinated water 
management at the basin level (Petry and Dombrowsky 2007). Yet another option relates to 
fiscal instruments such as transfers or compensation payments that help to internalize spatial 
externalities. 
What are the basic consequences of the decentralization rule and the principle of fiscal 
equivalence for environmental issues? Following the general decentralization rule for the al-
location function of public services, the provision of environmental goods and services should 
be assigned to lower levels of government where appropriate. But what does this exactly 
mean in terms of environmental policy in general and biodiversity governance in particular? 
Not all problems can be dealt with at the local level. What could the criteria be for deciding 
on the suitability of a problem’s decentralization? 
In an initial approximation, the spatial scale of a problem and the mobility of the respective 
environmental media play an important role in deciding on the appropriate governmental level 
(Ring 2002). Consequently, small-scale public functions such as purely local public goods or 
land use related tasks are often suitable to local governmental decision making. The provision 
of drinking water or sewage and waste disposal are good examples of public services pre-
dominantly provided at the municipal level. By contrast, land related environmental problems 
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accumulating at larger spatial scales, such as nitrogen emissions in agriculture, definitely need 
centrally set standards yet require local action. Spatial scale and mobility are also very impor-
tant characteristics regarding species protection. The larger the habitat, for example, of large 
vertebrates, and the more mobile a species is (consider migrating species!), the greater the 
relevance of centrally performed services, including standards of protection. Concrete imple-
mentation of species protection policies still requires substantial local action, but this needs to 
be coordinated between public and private actors depending on the spatial distribution and 
mobility of the species concerned (Similä et al. 2006). 
A closer look at the spatial distribution of the costs and benefits of biodiversity conserva-
tion enables a further assessment regarding the assignment of public goods and services to 
adequate governmental levels and potential needs for adjustment due to spatial externalities. 
8.2 Local costs and global benefits of biodiversity conservation 
8.2.1 The spatial distribution of conservation benefits 
The total economic value of biodiversity results from adding up its partial values (see Figure 
8.1). In economics, the various benefits of biodiversity conservation are usually looked at 
from an anthropocentric perspective, hence, the value of goods and services is gained on the 
basis of individual preferences (e.g. Pearce and Turner 1990). Market prices are the preferred 
indicator of economic value and are usually available for tangible goods and services. Positive 
and negative externalities, however, are rarely included in market prices. Reflecting the value 
of ecosystem services in market prices is also very difficult – if not impossible – in many 
fields of biodiversity conservation (Gowdy 1997; Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005b). 
There are various surrogate methods to reveal individual preferences for biodiversity goods 
and services when no market prices exist (Turner et al. 2003a; Turner et al. 2003b; Hein et al. 
2006). They are widely used in economics, though one has to be aware of their implicit as-
sumptions and shortcomings. Next to quantifiable economic values that at best allow an ex-
pression in monetary terms, safe minimum standards on the ecological side and cultural val-
ues obtained by deliberation on the social side are also part of valuing biodiversity. 
The spatial distribution of conservation benefits has to be considered when decentralizing 
or centralizing competencies of biodiversity conservation (Döring 1998). The spatial distribu-
tion of beneficiaries usually increases when moving from direct to indirect use values and 
further on to option and existence values of biodiversity conservation (see Figure 8.1). At the 
most general level, conservation measures can have both local and global benefits (Perrings 
and Gadgil 2003). Even production values that can be captured at the local level may affect 
global benefits, depending on the scale and intensity of land uses and their impacts, such as 
local afforestation, which potentially leads to regionally changing weather conditions and 
helps to mitigate global climate change by carbon sequestration. There are also ecological 
feedback loops between local measures and higher level conservation objectives that require 
coordination at higher governmental levels. 
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Source: Adapted from Ring (2004a). 
Figure 8.1: The spatial distribution of the benefits of biodiversity conservation. 
It is widely uncontested in economic and legal studies of federalism that especially the non-
use values associated with natural resources justify the centralization of competencies (Revesz 
2000; Oates 2001; List et al. 2002; Ring 2004a). Therefore, decisions on biodiversity conser-
vation belong to the public tasks that have to be fulfilled at higher governmental levels, re-
quiring centralized standard setting and policies. This is a fundamental difference compared 
to other fields of resource governance covered in this volume, particularly water and food. 
The need for central standards and principles of action in biodiversity conservation is re-
flected in the Convention on Biological Diversity and related activities. In the EU, it is carried 
out by several European directives that must be implemented by member states and must set a 
binding framework for biodiversity policies (Similä et al. 2006). On the one hand, the loss of 
biodiversity belongs to the very serious problems of global change. On the other hand, decen-
tralized activities related to local land use have – if accumulated – a tremendous influence on 
the state of biodiversity worldwide. As a result, centralized standard setting still requires de-
centralized implementation of biodiversity policies. 
Perrings and Gadgil (2003) address a number of reforms necessary to reconcile both local 
and global public benefits of biodiversity conservation. One of them is adjusting incentives to 
allow local communities to be rewarded and paid for their conservation efforts (Ring 2002). 
8.2.2 The spatial distribution of conservation costs 
From an economic perspective, biodiversity conservation is a public good. Its benefits accrue 
to overall society, that is, the wider political community, which ultimately relies on function-
ing ecosystems and their services provided to society. Therefore the state as the political rep-
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resentative of society has to set the framework conditions that guarantee the sufficient provi-
sion of the related public goods and services. Following the principle of fiscal equivalence, 
the costs of biodiversity conservation should also be borne by overall society. However, in 
reality the costs of biodiversity conservation are often distributed unequally among different 
groups of society. 
First, we will consider public expenditures for nature conservation in relation to population 
density based on the example of Germany (see Figure 8.2). Empirical data for the various 
German states, or Länder, indicate that states with a lower population density bear the highest 
expenditures per capita (Ring 2004a). This is related to the fact that nature conservation nor-
mally takes place in space. The conservation value of landscapes often increases in remote 
and less inhabited areas where numerous large-scale reserves can be found. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Bundesamt für Naturschutz, department II 1.1 (January 2004); data: Stratmann (2002). 
Figure 8.2: Conservation expenditures of the German Länder (2001). 
Second, the primary sector (agriculture, forestry, fisheries) is of extraordinary importance for 
the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity. On the one hand, agricultural develop-
ment in European landscapes has particularly contributed to the decline of biodiversity during 
the last century (Hampicke 1991). According to the results of the Millennium Ecosystem As-
sessment (2005a), the primary sector will continue to be responsible for the destruction and 
degradation of valuable habitats due to substantial land use changes on a global scale in the 
near and medium term future, as the result of further intensification of production mainly to 
meet increasing global food production needs. On the other hand, the costs of biodiversity 
conservation must largely be borne by the primary sector (Hampicke 2005). Current extensive 
and sustainable land use practices are rarely competitive in an economic sense. Whereas pro-
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duction schemes for intensification and enlargement of production in agriculture and aquacul-
ture are often subsidized, payments for ecological services belong to a field in the process of 
development (Gutman 2003). Without broad societal support by rewarding ecological ser-
vices provided by land users, the loss of biodiversity cannot be reduced or halted (Millennium 
Ecosystem Assessment 2005b; Beck et al. 2006). 
Third, the unequal distribution of conservation costs also concerns the spatial distribution 
of nature reserves and related costs. These costs not only include measures for the conserva-
tion and sustainable use of biodiversity, but also the costs of long-term land use restrictions to 
be borne by communities. Depending on the protection category, local land use planning can 
be heavily restricted. As a result, most communities are not actively interested in the designa-
tion of protected areas. Taking Germany as an example once more, the lowest protection 
category of landscape reserves is still quite homogeneously distributed across the German 
states. However, there is an increasing concentration of protected areas for the categories of 
nature reserves, biosphere reserves, nature parks and national parks. Three out of 16 states 
(Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Lower Saxony and Schleswig-Holstein) hold 90 per cent 
of all German national park areas (Urfei 2002). 
8.2.3 Adjusting local costs and global benefits for public and private actors 
Biodiversity conservation is a public good with its benefits mainly accruing at centralized 
levels – be they national, European or global. The costs of biodiversity conservation are dis-
tributed both sectorally (primary sector) and spatially (conservation expenditure per capita 
and protected areas) in an unequal manner. This relationship requires a centralized standard 
setting. In this sense, the continuing and ambitious standard setting at the European level, for 
example, by the Habitats Directive and the establishment of the Natura 2000 network, is justi-
fied from the economic perspective of fiscal federalism. At the same time, the increasing 
trend to cofinance regional, state and national agri-environmental programmes as well as en-
vironmental measures in fisheries policies with European support can be underlined. 
The arguments brought forward underpin the important role of the nationstate and the in-
creasing role of international institutions for biodiversity governance. Substantial disadvan-
tages may exist when federal states underestimate the essential role of the nationstate, for ex-
ample, by assigning decision making powers predominantly to lower governmental levels. 
During the recent discussion on the reform of federalism in Germany, national conservation 
authorities and NGOs put forward strong arguments against considerations of potentially 
abolishing the federal nature conservation law (Hendrischke 2004; Ring 2004a). Nature con-
servation was and still is a rather weak policy field in the overall political arena and may – 
despite factual evidence – be sacrificed in the course of strategic political compromises. The 
political results of the reform follow this line of argument. Nature conservation will be part of 
the German Environmental Code that is presently in design. Compared to other environmental 
policy fields such as water resources and emission standards, however, the German states will 
have far-reaching legal entitlements to derogate from the national standards (SRU 2006). 
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Nevertheless, the extent to which the states will make use of these derogation rights in their 
state conservation laws remains to be seen. 
Adjusting local costs and higher level benefits of biodiversity conservation can take many 
different forms (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005b). The case study presented in the 
third part of this chapter is dedicated to protected area management, highlighting the necessity 
to integrate ecological indicators into intergovernmental fiscal relations. In Europe, it is com-
mon practice to compensate private land users for restrictions imposed by conservation poli-
cies. The same philosophy, however, applies to public actors on a local scale. Decentralized 
levels of government such as municipalities should be compensated for ecological services 
provided in the long run by having protected areas within their administrative boundaries. For 
the most part, this is still neglected in German and European fiscal relations (Ring 2002), ren-
dering the following case study an innovative example to learn from. 
8.3 The ecological ICMS in Brazil: Fiscal transfers for local ecological 
services 
8.3.1 History and basic characteristics of the ICMS-E 
Brazil is a federal country consisting of 27 states, each of which has an elected government 
with revenue-raising power. About 90 per cent of overall state tax revenues are based on the 
ICMS (Imposto sobre Circulação de Mercadorias e Serviços), a tax on goods and services 
similar to the value-added taxes in other countries (Loureiro and de Moura 1996; May et al. 
2002). The ICMS also represents a relevant source of revenue for local governments because 
the Federal Constitution of Brazil decrees that 25 per cent of the revenues raised by this tax 
have to be allocated by the state to the local level of government. According to the Federal 
Constitution, 75 per cent of the total amount passed on to the municipalities is to be distrib-
uted in accordance with the share of the state ICMS that has been collected within that mu-
nicipality. The state governments decide on the indicators for allocating the remaining 25 per 
cent. 
During the early 1990s, the state of Paraná was the first to introduce ecological indicators 
alongside other indicators commonly used for redistribution by the states – such as popula-
tion, geographical area or primary production (Grieg-Gran 2000). The new instrument of 
ICMS-Ecológico or ICMS-E (May et al. 2002) was created, through which allocation of reve-
nues is based on environmental indicators.3 Paraná started using ecological indicators in 1992, 
and soon other states followed this example. The states of Minas Gerais (1996), São Paulo 
(1996), Rondônia (1997), Mato Grosso do Sul (2002), Tocantins and Pernambuco (2003) 
started operating a similar system a few years later (Grieg-Gran 2000; May et al. 2002; Villar 
                                                 
3  The ICMS-Ecológico is also known under the term ‘ecological value-added tax’. However, this term is mis-
leading from a public finance perspective. An ecological tax would be a tax assessed on the basis of ecological 
indicators. The ICMS-Ecológico uses ecological indicators for the allocation of its revenues. Therefore, eco-
nomically speaking, the term ‘ecological fiscal transfer’ is more appropriate. 
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Martins 2003; CPRH 2003; Loureiro 2004). ICMS-E legislation also exists in the states of 
Amapá (1996), Rio Grande do Sul (1999), Mato Grosso (2001) and Rio de Janeiro (2007). 
Further Brazilian states are actively engaged in introducing ecological fiscal transfer legisla-
tion, including Santa Catarina, Espírito Santo, Goiás, Bahia and Ceará. In the states of Pará 
and Amazonas, the ICMS-E has been under serious discussion (Bernardes 1999; Freitas 1999; 
Loureiro 2001, 2005a; MMA 2002; Arantes 2006). 
Each state is independent when making decisions about the indicators for distributing the 
25 per cent of ICMS revenues to the local level. Therefore, different operating systems are in 
place regarding the consideration of ecological indicators, with one exception: all states with 
existing ICMS-E legislation have introduced the basic ecological indicator ‘conservation unit’ 
(CU), referring to the National System of Conservation Units in Brazil (Sistema Nacional de 
Unidades de Conservação). CUs include totally protected and restricted sustainable use areas 
that can be publicly managed (at the federal, state or municipal level), privately owned or 
managed by public–private partnerships. Eligible conservation areas need to be legally de-
fined and registered in order to be considered (Grieg-Gran 2000). 
The various categories of protected and sustainable use areas in Brazil – such as ecological 
research stations, biological reserves, parks, private natural heritage reserves (RPPNs) or en-
vironmental protection areas (APAs) – involve different degrees of protection and associated 
land use restrictions. Therefore, the states multiply the actual size of CUs with a weight re-
flecting its conservation value, with strictly protected areas at the top and sustainable use  
areas at the bottom of the scale (0 < conservation weight ≤ 1). Each state is autonomous in 
applying its own relative weights. 
The revenues allocated to the local level are based on an ecological index that represents 
the weighted CUs within municipal boundaries. Again, the states use slightly different calcu-
lation systems, but the general procedure can be described as follows (compare Grieg-Gran 
2000; May et al. 2002): the municipal conservation factor is based on the total area set aside 
for protection in terms of CUs in relation to the total area of the municipality. The state con-
servation factor is given by the sum of all municipal conservation factors in the state. The 
ecological index is then calculated by dividing the municipal conservation factor by the state 
conservation factor. Finally, the municipal ecological index is multiplied by the total amount 
of ICMS-E revenues dedicated to CUs. For example, the ecological share of total ICMS reve-
nues for conservation units is 2.5 per cent in Paraná, 5 per cent in Rondônia and Mato Grosso 
do Sul and 0.5 per cent in Minas Gerais and São Paulo (Grieg-Gran 2000). 
Most states use a purely quantitative measure in terms of the quantitative amount of CUs. 
Although several of the states with ICMS-E legislation call for a quality index, in most cases 
they are only partially implemented if at all. The state of Paraná succeeded first in considering 
the quality of protected areas as part of their ecological index, rendering the implementation 
of the instrument more complex but also more effective in terms of conservation objectives. 
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8.3.2 Financial incentive to create new protected areas 
The ICMS-E has been quite effective in encouraging the creation of new protected areas 
(Young 2005). In Paraná, for example, the total area in CUs grew by over 1.5 million hectares 
by the year 2000 (see Table 8.1), representing an overall increase of 165 per cent during the 
nine years since its introduction in 1992 (May et al. 2002). Municipalities in particular devel-
oped an interest in designating new public protected areas at the local level. The introduction 
of the quality evaluation of conservation units in Paraná also had a positive effect on the in-
terest of municipalities to improve their management (Grieg-Gran 2000; Loureiro 2005b). 
Table 8.1: ICMS-E in Paraná: The increase in public and private protected areas. 
 
Protected areas 
Until 1991 
(ha) 
Total by 2000 
(ha) 
Increase 
(%) 
Public    
Federal 289,582 340,428 18 
State 39,859 53,663 35 
Municipal 1,429 4,169 192 
Private/mixed    
APA 306,693 1,212,324 295 
RPPN 0 26,124  
Other 0 53,607  
Total 637,563 1,690,315 165 
Source: May et al. (2002) and own calculations. APAs can be designated at federal, state or municipal level. 
RPPNs can be designated at federal or state level. 
 
In Brazil, protected areas can be designated by public institutions at federal, state and munici-
pal levels, a procedure referred to as conservation federalism (Loureiro 2005a). They can be 
initiated by private actors or by a collaboration of private and public actors. As can be seen in 
Table 8.1, the most significant increase, both in absolute and relative numbers, is related to 
the category of APAs. These are sustainable use areas that can easily be created and involve 
relatively few land use restrictions. This is also reflected in the rather low conservation weight 
of 0.1 associated to this conservation category in Paraná, meaning that only 10 per cent of the 
actual size of an APA is relevant for ICMS-E transfers. In contrast to APAs, RPPNs are of 
higher conservation value (conservation weight 0.8). 
Since the introduction of the ICMS-E, revenues can considerably change for municipalities 
with a large share of CUs. In Paraná, the total amount passed through to municipalities aver-
aged over R$50 million (US$21 million) per year between 1994 and 2000 (May et al. 2002). 
There are positive examples like Piraquara (90 per cent of municipal area protected water-
shed, 10 per cent CUs) that increased their earnings by 84 per cent in 1995 (Loureiro cited in 
Echavarría 2000). Changing municipal revenues from the ICMS-E led to the creation of Bra-
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zil’s first municipal consortium for biodiversity protection in 1995, which resulted in the 
foundation of the Ilha Grande National Park two years later (May et al. 2002). 
8.3.3 Incentive for new forms of public–private interaction 
The ICMS-E programme is clearly targeted at the local governmental level and its public ac-
tors, for ICMS-E revenues only accrue to the municipality and not to the owner of the land. 
The incentive effect thus primarily addresses local public authorities. There is, however, an-
other incentive effect to encourage public–private partnerships in terms of more environmen-
tally sound land uses. Some of the municipalities have started supporting land users in manag-
ing CUs, including provision of staff, equipment and vehicles for managing the areas (Ber-
nardes 1999; May et al. 2002). These activities are mostly related to a specific category of 
reserves, namely the RPPNs, a private reserve category specified in the national system of 
conservation units. RPPNs are owned and administered by a wide range of institutions, such 
as NGOs, industry or private landowners. These reserves are established and run by their 
owners, who are fully responsible for their maintenance and management (Manigel 2004). 
Both Paraná and Minas Gerais have actively been promoting the establishment of RPPNs 
as part of an integrated public–private partnership in buffer zones surrounding public pro-
tected areas, representing an important link between totally protected areas and intensively 
used landscapes for agricultural production (cf. O’Riordan 2008). RPPNs originally repre-
sented a reserve category to be designated and handled at the national level by the Federal 
Brazilian Institute for the Environment and Renewable Resources (Instituto Brasileiro do 
Meio Ambiente e dos Recursos Naturais Renováveis). The states of Paraná and Minas Gerais 
established state legislation in the 1990s, allowing a less bureaucratic way of designating and 
handling the private reserves at state level. This step, together with the financial incentive 
effect of the ICMS-E, contributed to a significant increase in the number and size of RPPNs. 
By the year 2000, some 26,124 hectares were designated in Paraná and 34,069 hectares in 
Minas Gerais (Bernardes 1999). Due to the very active role of state environmental agencies in 
promoting private reserves, Paraná now holds the largest number and area of RPPNs (183 
reserves with 36,928 hectares) protecting the remaining Atlantic Forest, one of the global hot-
spots of biodiversity (Mesquita 2004). 
The ecological fiscal transfers actually motivated local governments to assist landowners 
in measures to protect and maintain the environmental quality of their areas, and also helped 
them to prepare the necessary registration documentation (Bernardes 1999). Drainage im-
provements as well as road maintenance and access improvement belong to the infrastructure 
support municipalities provide for landowners. Although RPPNs are eligible for rural land tax 
exemption, May et al. (2002) found out that this is not much of an incentive to private owners. 
The hopes for a link with municipal services and the prospects of ecotourism revenues are 
higher. 
With the rising significance of RPPNs, their owners soon founded associations of RPPN 
holders to better organize themselves, improve the management of the reserves, and speak 
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with a common voice regarding their interests. State conservation authorities (public actors) 
and conservation NGOs (hybrid organizations) actively cooperate with these new organiza-
tions or with single potential future RPPN holders (private actors) in pursuit of creating new 
RPPNs (Coneglian 2005; Loureiro 2005b). They join forces in talking to mayors to make 
them aware of the benefits from ICMS-E and encourage them to share at least part of the ad-
ditional municipal revenues to help landowners manage the CUs (Mesquita 2004; Jordan 
2005). 
Nevertheless, the public–private partnerships related to RPPNs have been subject to cri-
tique. Due to the size of property and the volume of resources involved, large farmers were 
prioritized for the most part, leading to complaints that public money was being used to bene-
fit a few large landowners (May et al. 2002), even though small landowners would also be 
interested in RPPN creation. In the meantime, new ways have been explored that also take 
smaller properties for RPPN creation into consideration, calling for a reduction of transaction 
costs associated with their management. 
At a more general level, the ICMS-E has substantially improved relations between pro-
tected areas and the surrounding inhabitants (Bernardes 1999). As with numerous other places 
in the world, protected areas were primarily seen as an obstacle to local development (e.g. in 
Germany: Bauer et al. 1996; Stoll-Kleemann 2001). With this new instrument, local actors 
started perceiving them as an opportunity to generate revenue. For some municipalities, it was 
the additional revenue that first created a basic awareness of the existence of protected areas 
within municipal boundaries. In Minas Gerais, for example, only federal and state protected 
areas were considered during the first year of the ICMS-E’s operation. Locally protected areas 
existed but still needed formal registration to be eligible for the programme. Municipalities 
reacted quickly to the new incentive programme, registering locally protected areas for inclu-
sion in the ICMS-E programme during the second year (Grieg-Gran 2000). 
Since the new revenues, the attitudes of both public municipal actors and local citizens to-
wards protected areas have begun to change. However, this is greatly dependent on the com-
munication strategies of local authorities. May et al. (2002) investigated the public–private 
relationships in municipalities belonging to the Ilha Grande National Park in Paraná, where 
the municipalities are actively communicating the benefits of the ICMS-E to the local popula-
tion. In this way, the whole community perceives the financial importance of the ICMS-E. In 
São Jorge do Patrocínio, for example, the ICMS-E represented 17 per cent of the overall mu-
nicipal budget in 1998 and 71 per cent of the total ICMS transfers in the year 2000. The local 
authorities make clear for what purposes the additional revenues are used, such as well drill-
ing to provide drinking water, cleaning and landscaping of the urban area, garbage collection, 
landfills, environmental education or enforcement of land use controls in parks and APAs 
(May et al. 2002). Local communities are thus made aware of the link between revenues, pub-
lic investments and protected areas within municipal borders. 
Federal environmental institutions – including the environmental ministry – support the 
spread of knowledge about the effects of the ICMS-E in Brazil. Conservation NGOs, such as 
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The Nature Conservancy of Brazil, actively work together with local networks of NGOs to 
promote its introduction in states where the ICMS-E does not exist yet (Veiga Neto 2005). A 
variety of actors join forces – both public and private, ecologically and socially motivated. 
Because the ICMS-E is distributed in lumpsum payments, the revenues can be spent for con-
servation purposes but can also help to alleviate social and health problems or improve the 
educational situation in the municipalities. 
8.4 Conclusions 
Biodiversity governance involves different governmental levels and a variety of actors, in-
cluding public authorities, private landowners and representatives from hybrid organizations. 
Even in the case of a purely hierarchical instrument, introduced and managed by public au-
thorities, the ICMS-E in Brazil has shown how numerous new interactions crossing the pub-
lic–private divide can follow. The rising significance of the private reserves is a good exam-
ple of the blurring boundary between public and private spheres of biodiversity conservation 
(see Sikor et al. 2008). The importance of the ICMS-E’s creation of these links, however, lies 
in the fact that there are few schemes in Brazil that directly compensate land users for eco-
logical services on their land. In this way, the ICMS-E became the major instrument for inter-
nalizing spillover benefits of biodiversity conservation by compensating municipalities for 
local costs of bearing conservation measures and land use restriction. 
The situation is different in the EU. A variety of agri-environmental and conservation pro-
grammes exist to compensate land users for environmental services (cf. Penker 2008). Here, 
instruments for compensating municipalities, that is, the local public side, for their restrictions 
in land use planning and barriers to generating income to fulfil municipal public functions are 
commonly missing, although environmental advisory councils have long asked for the intro-
duction of such instruments (SRU 1996). Ideally, both types of instruments exist, internaliz-
ing conservation spillover benefits to the local level for both public institutions and the private 
sector. But in reality, there are different political cultures calling for mutual education. At 
least in some cases, it would certainly be more cost effective in Brazil to avoid the detour via 
the municipal government in compensating private landowners for their conservation activi-
ties. In Europe, by turn, there is a need to consider decentralized levels of government by in-
troducing ecological fiscal transfers to the local level (Köllner et al. 2002; Ring 2002; Perner 
and Thöne 2005). So far, only Portugal has set up a fiscal transfer scheme that explicitly re-
wards municipalities for having designated Natura 2000 sites and other protected areas within 
their territories (de Melo and Prates 2007). 
There are also lessons at a more general theoretical level. For decades environmental eco-
nomics and the theory of environmental policy predominantly focused on environmental pol-
lution associated with negative externalities and respective policy instruments for internaliza-
tion such as taxes, charges and fees. For the sufficient provision of environmental goods and 
services, internalizing positive externalities is just as important as internalizing negative ex-
ternalities. Comparative efforts still have to be dedicated to the analysis of positive external-
ities and adequate policy instruments to address them. 
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Regarding biodiversity governance, an important task is to acknowledge and value the 
spillover benefits, especially of both public and private local conservation efforts. Conserva-
tion management is mostly management related to land use, where local communities play a 
role that is not to be underestimated. Even though some conservation related measures are 
paid by higher level institutions, local actors ultimately carry the costs, at least in terms of 
land use restrictions. Financial instruments to compensate the local costs of biodiversity con-
servation are a minimum requirement for the sufficient provision of biodiversity related goods 
and services. They can be provided by both public and private actors, although different types 
of instruments are needed for addressing each of them. 
Agri-environmental payments constitute a common instrument for compensating private 
land users for their additional costs of conservation. All too often, however, agri-
environmental payments in environmental economic literature and in the media continue to be 
summarized as subsidies (see also Sikor et al. 2008), frequently involving a negative connota-
tion of market distortion. In fact, subsidies are defined in public finance literature as public 
transfers without equivalent market relevant services by the recipient. There is a substantial 
need for better differentiation in this respect, with true economic and societal recognition of 
the farmer’s performance. If farmers provide ecological services to society in terms of biodi-
versity conservation, thereby producing positive externalities, they should be paid by society 
for these services. Otherwise, as economic reasoning tells us, there will be an underprovision 
of the respective goods and services, because markets are unable to cope with externalities. In 
economic terms, the financial instrument used for payments of environmental services should 
no longer be referred to as a subsidy. 
Intergovernmental fiscal transfers in federal systems constitute a suitable instrument for in-
ternalizing spillover benefits between public jurisdictions at different governmental levels. So 
far, they have rarely been used for environmental purposes (Ring 2002). Environmental fed-
eralism primarily deals with competencies of environmental decision making. This involves 
the question of devolution: which environmental goods and services should be provided by 
public institutions and which by private actors (e.g. Anderson and Hill 1996)? And if this de-
cision goes for public provision, the centralization/decentralization question arises (e.g. Harri-
son 1996): Which environmental standards should be set at which governmental levels? Ana-
lysing intergovernmental fiscal relations and respective policy instruments for their potential 
to compensate local governments for spillover benefits associated with the provision of envi-
ronmental goods and services is still a large field to explore and develop. The Brazilian case 
study has shown the extent of local initiative and endeavour that still lies idle in states with no 
adequate compensation of local conservation services. 
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9 Protected species in conflict with fisheries: 
The interplay between European and national regulation  
This chapter was published as “Similä, J., Thum, R., Varjopuro, R., Ring, I.1 (2006). Pro-
tected species in conflict with fisheries: The interplay between European and national regula-
tion. Journal of European Environmental and Planning Law 3(5): 432–445”. 
An earlier version appeared as “Similä, J., Thum, R., Ring, I., Varjopuro, R. (2005). Inter-
play between European regulation and national policies in biodiversity conflict reconciliation. 
UFZ Discussion Papers No. 23/2005, UFZ Centre for Environmental Research, Leipzig” and 
was presented as part of a special session on biodiversity conflict resolution at the 6th Interna-
tional Conference of the European Society for Ecological Economics (Science and Govern-
ance – The Ecological Economics Approach, 14–17 June 2005, Lisbon, Portugal). 
The article was based on interdisciplinary research results from the EU-funded 5th frame-
work programme research project “FRAP – Development of a procedural Framework for Ac-
tion Plans to Reconcile conflicts between the conservation of large vertebrates and the use of 
biological resources: Fisheries and fish-eating vertebrates as a model case”, coordinated by K. 
Henle (Department of Conservation Biology, UFZ) and I. Ring (Department of Economics, 
UFZ). The article was written by two legal scientists, an anthropologist and an ecological 
economist.  
Abstract 
Successful public conservation policies at various governmental levels have increased some 
populations of protected species to the extent that they are causing damage to human activi-
ties, like fisheries. As a reaction public authorities are developing biodiversity reconciliation 
policies. Finland and Germany have both created reconciliation policies for the conflicts be-
tween nature conservation and fisheries including a package of measures like management of 
population, support of technical measures and various types of compensation payments. All 
these measures are affected by European policy and law, though no special reconciliation pol-
icy has been adopted at European level. This article explores the options European regulation 
offers and the restrictions it imposes on Member States. Based on experiences with German 
and Finnish biodiversity reconciliation policies, the interrelationship between European and 
national regulation is elaborated, leading to suggestions for better coordination of reconcilia-
tion policies between different governmental levels. 
                                                 
1  Jukka Similä and Riku Varjopuro are senior researchers at the Finnish Environment Institute, Helsinki, 
Finland. Randi Thum was senior researcher at the Department of Environmental and Planning Law, Irene Ring is 
deputy head at the Department of Economics, both at the UFZ Helmholtz Centre for Environmental Research in 
Leipzig, Germany. 
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9.1 Introduction 
Public policy aiming at reviving the populations of threatened species has sometimes turned 
out to be so successful that the increased populations are causing damage to human activities 
such as agriculture, forestry and fisheries. Those significantly suffering from the damage have 
started to demand compensation for damage and control of protected species. Conservation-
ists are afraid that the latter would have adverse effects on biodiversity. Thus there is need for 
reconciliation between the economic interests of using natural resources and the conservation 
of nature.  
A reconciliation policy typically consists of different kinds of measures2. Three categories 
of measures to reduce the damage cover a major part of measures available: (1) management 
and control of protected species; (2) support for technical measures to prevent the damage; 
and (3) compensation payments. The use of each category of measures is linked to legal regu-
lation in two ways: legal regulation at various governmental levels provides options for or 
restricts the use of measures and, often, the measures are linked to the adoption and imple-
mentation of new legal regulation. 
In this article the relationship between different categories of measures and legal regulation 
is explored in the context of conflicts between increasing populations of fish-eating protected 
species and fisheries from a multi-level governance perspective. The cormorant (Phalacro-
corax carbo sinensis), the otter (Lutra lutra) and the grey seal (Halichoerus grypus) can be 
mentioned as examples of species causing economic losses to human activities, namely in 
aquaculture and fisheries (Carss 2003; Glahn et al. 2000; Kranz 2000, p. 357ff.; Myšiak et al. 
2004). First, we will explore what kind of options EC regulation offers and what kind of limi-
tations it imposes on Member States aiming to reconcile the conflicts. Secondly, on the basis 
of experiences from Finland and Germany, we will discuss the different approaches used in 
these two countries. In Finland the major conflict relates to damage caused by the grey seal to 
coastal fisheries, whereas in Germany damages caused by the cormorant and the otter to 
aquaculture will be investigated. Thirdly, the interrelationship between European and national 
regulation will be explored and the potential for improvement discussed. 
We have chosen the conflicts in Germany and Finland as examples, because they illustrate 
different kinds of conflicts of protected species with fisheries in terms of the nature of fisher-
ies, species involved and ecological features of the area. The German conflict, which relates 
to inland fisheries, involves the cormorant and the otter, whereas the Finnish case relates to 
coastal fisheries and involves the grey seal. In addition, the countries represent both federalist 
(Germany) and centralists (Finland) legal systems. Furthermore, the cases show that imple-
mentation of EU policies may take very different forms and are interpreted in different ways 
in the Member States. 
                                                 
2  A wide range of measures is presented in Conover (2002). 
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9.2 Relevant European policy fields and laws 
There is no European regulation specifically designed for the management of the conflicts 
under investigation here. Furthermore, certain policy fields potentially relevant, like land-use 
policies, are beyond the competences of European institutions. However, some European laws 
and regulations have links to measures for biodiversity conflict reconciliation taken at the 
national level. Certain parts of European regulation impose strict limits; others are flexible 
and provide opportunities for national policy-makers.  
Apart from fisheries policy, which we will discuss in the next chapter, there are three rele-
vant European fields for reconciliation of the conflicts covered, namely nature conservation 
law, European funds and State aid law. European nature conservation regulation is relevant 
for any domestic policy measures aiming to protect, manage or control the population of pro-
tected species. Certain European funds may be used to financially support national or regional 
policy measures, such as financial support for technical mitigation measures. European State 
aid law regulates the use of purely national subsidies, be it for technical measures or damage 
compensation payments.  
9.2.1 The Common Fisheries Policy  
Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) seems, at first glance, to be a very relevant policy field for 
the conflicts, because European institutions have a major role in designing fisheries policies in 
Europe, significant financial resources are devoted to fisheries policy and the environmental 
dimension has recently become stronger in CFP.  
Despite this development, only few instruments of fisheries policy are directly relevant for 
conflicts arising from the increase of the populations of protected species. Here, the crucial 
question is: what are the impacts of increased populations of protected species on commercial 
fisheries or aquaculture and how can conflicts arising from these impacts be reconciled? Fol-
lowing recent developments of the CFP, the relationship between protected species and fish-
ing is, instead, mainly seen from another, though very important perspective: what are the 
threats caused by fishing and fishing activities to the conservation of fish resources, or to the 
marine ecosystem?3  
However, the CFP does have some relevance for our type of conflict. First, the CFP aims 
to regulate the overall fishing effort, but it has been documented that the CFP has largely 
failed in its conservation goals (e.g. Payne 2000; Symes 2005; Hentrich and Salomon 2006). 
Many of commercially important fish stocks have declined in the European sea area which, in 
turn, has immediate consequences in terms of the amount of fish available for natural preda-
tors, like seals. Fishermen and aquatic predators are competing for the same resources and 
many fisheries may, in fact, cause conflicts between protected species and fisheries as has 
                                                 
3  This point of departure is expressed in different recitals and Articles of Council Regulation (EC) No 
2371/2002 of 20 December 2002 on the conservation and sustainable exploitation of fisheries resources under 
the Common Fisheries Policy, OJ 2002 L 358/59. 
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been indicated in many studies (Pauly et al. 2002; Gislason et al. 2000; Sinclair et al. 2002). 
In this way the CFP is generally relevant for the conflicts, but in none of the cases studied in 
this article fisheries poses a threat to these predators. Since cormorant and seal populations 
are growing fast, shortage of food is not a limiting factor. With regard to otter, pond farming 
is not a limitation but a precondition for the otter population by maintaining suitable habitats. 
Second, certain policy measures of the CFP are specifically relevant. For example, species 
like the grey seal involved in the conflicts may benefit from the by-catch regulation. The aim 
of the by-catch regulation has been two-fold from the inception of the CFP: to protect juve-
niles and to protect marine ecosystems by improving the inter-species selectivity of fishing 
gear (Long and Curran 2000, p. 18). With regard to the conflicts arising from the damage 
caused by protected species more selective fishing techniques may, in certain circumstances, 
have a double benefit: techniques may protect the protected species and reduce the damage at 
the same time. This is the case, for example, with regard to so-called seal-proof trap-nets used 
in the Northern Baltic Sea. However, the issue of selective techniques is not correspondingly 
relevant for aquaculture. Furthermore, even if the fishing gear could be developed to catch 
just the targeted species, the number of protected species, like seals, affects the size of fish 
populations and thus, the size of the fish catch. In other words, the conflicts addressed in this 
article would still persist after solving the by-catch problem.  
In addition, CFP may contribute to the reconciliation policy by making financial resources 
available. Hence, the Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance (FIFG) is an interesting 
instrument for those making reconciliation policies, though the conflicts concerned obviously 
have not been in the minds of the drafters of this instrument. We will later discuss FIFG in the 
context of European funds.  
9.2.2 Nature conservation regulation  
The reconciliation of the conflicts arising from increased population of protected species may 
require the control of the population. However, such control has to fulfil the requirements laid 
down in the nature conservation law. A mitigation measure contravening nature conservation 
law is prohibited unless it is justified under the derogation rules. According to the Habitats 
Directive mitigation measures, which involve deliberate capture or killing, deliberate distur-
bance, deliberate destruction or taking of eggs from the wild, or deterioration or destruction of 
breeding sites or resting places are prohibited with regard to strictly protected species in An-
nex IV a) of the Habitats Directive.  
A Member State may, however, allow mitigation measures, if the conditions as laid down 
in Article 16 of the Habitats Directive or Article 9 of the Birds Directive are met. With regard 
to the Habitats Directive, a mitigation measure must first fulfil two general conditions: there 
is no satisfactory alternative and mitigation is not detrimental to the maintenance of the popu-
lation at a favourable conservation status. Secondly, it must aim to one of the legitimate pur-
poses listed in the Article. Among them are the prevention of serious damage (e.g., to agricul-
ture, forestry and fisheries) and the “interest of public health and safety or other imperative 
reasons of overriding public interest, including those of a social and economic nature”. Alter-
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natively, it is possible to allow, under strictly supervised conditions, on a selective basis and 
to a limited extent, the taking or keeping of certain specimens of the strictly protected species 
in numbers specified by the competent national authorities. The Birds Directive has slightly 
different derogation rules. It stipulates that derogation, provided that there is no other satisfac-
tory solution, may be allowed for certain legitimate purposes (like damage to fisheries) or to 
permit, under strictly supervised conditions, on a selective basis the capture, keeping or other 
judicious use in small numbers.  
There are two relevant differences between the Directives. First, there is no reference in the 
Birds Directive to “other imperative reasons of overriding public interest, including those of a 
social and economic nature”. Secondly, the possibility to permit, under strictly supervised 
conditions, on a selective basis and in small numbers is limited to “the capture, keeping or 
other judicious use”. It is doubtful whether protective hunting could be considered as “judi-
cious use”. If not, it would mean that the only derogation available for the reconciliation 
would be the prevention of serious damage to fisheries. Furthermore, on the basis of German 
experience, as will be discussed later, the seriousness of the damage is relative to the eco-
nomic sector (fisheries), not to an individual farmer or fisherman. This interpretation would 
significantly limit the possibility to use this derogation, because often damage is serious 
“only” in relation to an individual operator. Apparently this is why the derogations rules of 
the Birds Directive are considered to be stricter in comparison to the Habitats Directive (Jans 
2000, p. 421) and why the provisions in the Habitats Directive are described as “relatively 
loosely drafted” (Krämer 2000, p. 141f.). 
Having said this and although European Court of Justice has required strict transposition of 
derogations and precise application of them (Jans 2000, p. 417), it must be noted that these 
provisions have not, in practice, prevented Member States from taking rather extensive meas-
ures if needed. For example, Denmark has recently started to take measures with regard to 
cormorants, which are rather extensive locally, but apparently do not yet have significant im-
pacts at population level (Olesen 2005). To which extent these measures fulfil the require-
ments of the Directives is still untested in the Court. At this point one can only conclude that 
the Directives – and the Birds Directive even more so – set strict limits for population control 
measures. 
9.2.3 State aid regulation 
Financial aid for reconciliation measures may be considered to be State aid under European 
law. In practice, State aid rules have limited the possibilities of Member States to choose 
those reconciliation measures they have deemed appropriate to reconcile the conflict by forc-
ing a Member State to adopt temporal measures, which can not do more than alleviate prob-
lems for a couple of years. Here the basic rules of State aid law are presented and the limita-
tions arising from the rules are discussed later. The starting point is that any aid fulfilling all 
the following four criteria is considered to be State aid: (1) aid is granted from public funds, 
(2) it is selective (favours certain undertakings or the production of certain goods), (3) it dis-
torts or threatens to distort competition and (4) it has trade effects between Member States 
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(Alkio and Wik 2004, p. 780ff.). From the guidelines on State aid in fisheries and aquacul-
ture4 it can be learned that State aid may take many forms. Any measure that entails a finan-
cial advantage in any form whatsoever funded directly or indirectly from the budgets of pub-
lic authorities (on any administrative level) or from other State resources is considered to be 
State aid. Thus, this criterion is easily fulfilled. The third criterion is also easily fulfilled be-
cause the mere threat that competition is distorted is enough. Instead, the fulfilment of the 
second or fourth criterion is not so self-evident. Not all aid has trade effects between Member 
States. However, the most interesting criterion for a designer of reconciliation policy is the 
second one. If a compensation scheme is of a general character, which does not favour certain 
undertakings or the production of certain goods, it should not be considered as State aid as-
suming that there is no overcompensation. Overcompensation would fall under the third crite-
rion. 
The immediate consequence of considering a measure to be State aid is that the Commis-
sion must be notified. The Commission will then decide if the measure is compatible with EU 
rules. The Member State may not put the proposed measure into effect without the approval 
of the Commission. In many sectors minor State aid is exempted from the notification obliga-
tions provided that it fulfils certain requirements under the so-called de minimis rule. Recently 
the Commission has adopted a regulation on the application of de minimis rule in the agricul-
ture and fisheries sector, which will be in force from January 2005 until December 2008. Aid 
not exceeding 3,000 Euro over a period of 3 years for any single enterprise and not exceeding 
the national ceiling (7,287,000 Euro for Germany and 460,200 for Finland) set for cumulative 
amount of aid granted is exempted from notification.5 
Article 87(2) of the Treaty includes a list of aid that is always considered to be compatible 
with the common market, meaning it is always acceptable. Of the three categories included in 
this list only one seems to have a connection to reconciliation policy, namely aid to make 
good the damage caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences. As will be discussed 
later, using this as a basis for allowing State aid is problematic.  
Article 87(3) of the Treaty includes a list of categories of aid, which the Commission may 
consider compatible with the common market. This list includes 5 different categories. Fur-
thermore, the fisheries guidelines define more specifically what kind of State aid may be 
granted. However, it is hard to find any category of permissible State aid, which would be 
generally applicable to the conflicts in our interest. However, some of them could turn out to 
be relevant under certain circumstances.  
                                                 
4  Guidelines for the examination of State aid to fisheries and aquaculture OJ 2004 C 229/5. 
5  Commission Regulation (EC) No 1860/2004 of 6 October 2004 on the application of Article 87 and 88 of the 
EC Treaty to de minimis aid in the agriculture and fisheries sectors, OJ 2004 L 325/4, The general de minimis 
regime is established by Commission Regulation (EC) No 69/2001 of 12 January 2001, on the application of 
Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty to de minimis aid, OJ 2001 L 10/30. 
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9.2.4 European funds 
During the programme period 2000-2006 there are four EU Structural Funds: the European 
Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the European Social Fund (ESF), the European Agri-
cultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF, Guidance Section) and the Financial In-
strument for Fisheries Guidance (FIFG), to support the development of EU Member States. 
So far, there are no instruments specifically aiming to reconcile biodiversity conflicts. How-
ever, the financial instruments for agriculture (EAGGF, Guidance Section), fisheries (FIFG) 
as well as environmental and nature protecting measures as part of EAGGF, Guarantee Sec-
tion, are of potential relevance and these can be used in designing conflict reconciliation as 
will be shown below.  
The importance of EAGGF for conflicts between nature conservation and the use of bio-
logical resources lies in its potential to support agri-environmental measures including envi-
ronmentally sound pond farming. Furthermore, support for “improving processing and mar-
keting of agricultural products” (excluding products made of fish) is given.6  
The Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance (FIFG) is the other and more widely ap-
plicable structural fund in the fisheries sector. Funded measures are required to7 contribute to 
achieving a sustainable balance between fishery resources and their exploitation; strengthen 
the competitiveness in the sector; improve market supply and the value added to products or 
contribute to revitalising areas dependent on fisheries and aquaculture.8 Areas for promoted 
actions are listed in Article 2(3)9. The following fields could be relevant for biodiversity con-
flicts: protection of marine resources in coastal waters, aquaculture, operations by members of 
the trade (for example operations to prevent fish stocks from damage), and innovative actions 
and technical assistance. 
The single fields to be funded are described in more detail in Council Regulation No 
2792/199910. For example, Member States may take measures to encourage capital invest-
ment aimed at the protection and development of aquatic resources and aquaculture.  
9.3 National regulation relevant for reconciliation 
In this section we will explore how measures for conflict reconciliation have been incorpo-
rated into domestic law of two EU Member States, namely Germany and Finland. We will 
                                                 
6  Art. 25–27 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1257/1999 of 17 May 1999 on support for rural development 
from the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) and amending and repealing certain 
Regulations, OJ L 1999 L 160/80.  
7  Article 2 Council Regulation (EC) No 1263/1999 of 21 June 1999 on the Financial Instrument for Fisheries 
Guidance, OJ L 161/54. 
8  Article 1 of the Council Regulation (EC) No 1263/1999, ibid.  
9  Council Regulation (EC) No 1263/1999, ibid. 
10  Council Regulation (EC) No 2792/1999 of 17 December 1999 laying down the detailed rules and arrange-
ments regarding Community structural assistance in the fisheries sector OJ L 337/10. 
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cover all the three categories of policy measures mentioned: management and control of pro-
tected species, support for technical measures and compensation schemes. In addition, we will 
study how EU rules have modified and supported domestic legislation and what kind of im-
plementation problems have arisen. 
9.3.1 The case of Finland  
The conflict in Finland concerns the conservation of the grey seal and coastal fishery. The 
fishery in question is a small-scale coastal fishing with gill-nets or trap-nets. It is typically a 
multi-species fishery targeting species like white-fish (Coregonus lavaretus), salmon (Salmo 
salar) and pike perch (Sander lucioperca). Seals cause economic losses to fisheries by taking 
fish from nets and by breaking nets to the extent that it is considered a serious threat to coastal 
fishing (MoAF 2002). A growing grey seal population (Harding and Härkönen 1999; Helle et 
al. 2005) started to cause losses to coastal fisheries in the 1990s and the losses have gradually 
increased. When the problem became serious fishermen demanded that the State should start 
mitigating activities. A right for protective hunting of seals in order to minimise damage was 
introduced in 1997 and it was followed by economic compensation in 2003 and economic 
support for technical measures in 2004. These mitigation measures and policy instruments are 
described below in more detail. 
9.3.1.1 Protective hunting of species to minimise damage 
Protective hunting of seals as a mitigation measure has been used in Finland since 1997, when 
it was reintroduced after 15 years of total ban. At first hunting was only meant to target indi-
vidual seals known to take fish from fishing gear. In the first year licences to shoot 30 grey 
seals were granted. Gradually the number has increased, so that during the hunting year 
2005/2006 it is 635 individuals (MoAF 2005). After the first years, protective hunting has 
been conducted essentially as “hunting” of seals (i.e. carcasses are utilised), not just as killing 
seals to minimise damages. 
The hunting is controlled by the Hunting Act with a quota system that determines region-
ally how many seals can be shot during a hunting year. The Ministry of Agriculture and For-
estry (hereinafter ‘MoAF’) determines the size of regional quotas based on the scientific ad-
vice provided by the Finnish Game and Fisheries Research Institute. Regional Game Man-
agement Districts grant hunting licences and monitor hunting. The hunters have an obligation 
to report each kill and the hunting is stopped when the quota is full. In addition to the quota, 
hunting is regulated by a closed season to protect breeding and by the technical requirements 
of hunting. This measure meets the requirements of derogation rules under the Habitats Direc-
tive. 
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9.3.1.2 Compensation schemes 
There are two compensation schemes in Finland to cover damage that seals cause to profes-
sional fishermen11. These are a compensation for loss of catch and an insurance that covers 
damage to nets.  
A compensation scheme for loss of catch due to seals for professional fishermen was first 
planned as a permanent compensation scheme to be funded entirely from national sources, but 
the European Commission did not accept it due to EU State aid law. Hence, Finland modified 
the compensation scheme to cover only damage sustained in the years 2001 and 2002. The 
Commission stressed in its decision12 that the compensation scheme was allowed due to its 
temporary nature and due to the fact that the damage was considered exceptional (unexpected 
increase in seal population). The Commission noted that according to legal practice13 com-
pensation paid for damage caused by public bodies to private persons is not State aid. How-
ever, it claimed that in this case the nature of the compensation was different. Taking also into 
consideration that it had trade effects, it was to be considered State aid.  
The amount of compensation was calculated as a function of average loss of catch in a 
given fishing ground, days of fishing, type and amount of nets, average catch per unit and a 
price of the fish species in question. However, fishermen had to meet the first 250 Euros per 
year themselves. Compensation totalling 7.4 million Euros was paid to professional fishermen 
who had suffered over 20 % loss of catch.  
Since 1930s there has been an insurance system for any physical damage to fishing gear of 
professional fishermen, including seal-induced damage, which is, in fact, the most common 
physical damage today in many coastal areas (e.g. Österbottens fiskeriförsäkringsförening 
2003). The insurance system is partly financed by insurance premiums and partly by the state. 
Compensation is granted by regional insurance associations. Fishermen have to cover part 
of the damage themselves. It is 25 % of the estimated damage in the case of gill-nets. Regard-
ing other fishing gear the deductible proportion varies from 5 % to 25 %, depending on the 
value of the damage. State subsidy to the insurance association is 40 % of the damage on gill-
nets and in case of other gear it is 40 % of the amount paid up to 504 Euros and 90 % of the 
rest of the compensation (Österbottens fiskeriförsäkringsförening 2003). 
The insurance mechanism is at the moment under review from the perspective of State aid 
law. The process was initiated due to the change of the relevant State aid guidelines in 2004, 
which resulted in a general overview of all possible State aid mechanisms. According to pre-
                                                 
11  Professional fishermen are those who get 30 % or more of their income from fishery. 
12  N102 /2001 Finland, 7.5.2002, C(2002) 1598 final. 
13  Commission referred to ECJ, Judgement in case C-106/87 – Asteris AE and others v Hellenic Republic and 
European Economic Community [1988] ECR I-5515. 
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liminary and indicative information the Commission is inclined to think that the insurance 
mechanism violates State aid law14. 
9.3.1.3 Support for technical measures 
Technical measures to reduce damage to catch and fishing gear have been developed in Swe-
den and Finland and the most promising of these are modified trap-nets (e.g. Suuronen et al. 
2004). In Finland, the development and testing of fishing gear has taken place mainly in pro-
jects of a fisheries research institute funded from national or Nordic sources. In addition, re-
gional fishermen’s associations have carried out projects to test the trap-nets and to inform 
fishermen about the new technology. These projects have been funded nationally, but in some 
cases co-financed by the EU through a programme called Community initiative concerning 
trans-European cooperation intended to encourage harmonious and balanced development of 
the European territory (INTERREG).  
In 2004, the MoAF announced a change of policy involving the use of European funds for 
technical development. The new subsidy helps fishermen to invest in “seal-proof” trap-nets, 
which are expensive, but technically effective. FIFG funds cannot be used to subsidise in-
vestment in fishing gear and therefore permission from the Commission was requested before 
adopting the new regulation. Permission was given because this gear can be used in selective 
salmon fishing and thus its use enhances protection of naturally breeding salmon. In other 
words, protection of salmon and protection of coastal fishing from seals are linked in this de-
cision (MoAF 2004, 2005) 
The subsidy became available in 2004 when professional fishermen were allowed to apply 
for it from the regional fisheries authorities. Altogether 90 fishermen submitted applications 
for subsidies to purchasing 250 trap-nets totalling in an amount of 2.5 million Euros. The 
MoAF gives the applications final approval and the money is paid to fishermen after they 
have purchased the trap-net. They will be subsidised only once and the subsidy is 70 % of 
value of the first two sets of gear and 50 % for the rest (MoAF 2005). 
9.3.2 The case of Germany 
In Germany, the focus is on cormorants and otters, two fish-eating protected species in con-
flict with aquaculture. The region investigated is situated in Upper Lusatia in the German 
state of Saxony. Its landscape is characterised by numerous artificial ponds for carp farming, 
allowing for a viable otter population, and attracting an increasing number of migrating cor-
morants (Seiche 2002). Otter damage to aquaculture is less relevant compared to damage 
caused by cormorants and herons (Sächsische Landesanstalt für Landwirtschaft 2003). How-
ever, this may become locally significant, especially when otters prey on carp in small ponds 
used for wintering. People sustaining damage are professional fisherman, people with fishery 
                                                 
14  Information is based on personal communication with the Ministry of the Agriculture and Forestry (May 
2005). 
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as a secondary occupation and amateurs. Other relevant stakeholders are recreational anglers, 
but they are not yet covered by policy measures addressing the conflict.  
The German legal system is characterised by its federal structure. For the relevant policy 
fields of nature conservation and hunting, there is one federal framework law, which frames 
the different 16 more detailed and implementing State laws. Each State (Länder) further is-
sues its own regulation and administrative ordinances regarding biodiversity conflict mitiga-
tion. 
9.3.2.1 Exceptions from the protection status 
Whereas in Finland the main legal provision for the conflict refers to hunting law, in Germany 
protection of species is predominantly provided for by nature conservation law (as part of the 
Federal Nature Conservation Act) and only to a lesser extent by hunting law. The binding 
federal regulation concerning species protection is very detailed and thus the laws of the vari-
ous States (Länder) are largely uniform in this respect. In German conservation law, there are 
basically three categories of protected species: “strictly” and “specially” protected species, 
whereas the “strictly” status is the higher one (e.g., it is prohibited to disturb them in certain 
sites). The third category relates to “European birds”. They are in general “specially” pro-
tected species, but partially their protection status is analogous to strictly protected species. 
Following this system, the cormorant clearly belongs among the European birds, whereas the 
otter is a strictly protected species. 
The German legislator aimed to transpose the European derogation rules without imposing 
further restrictions of national origin. But he did not transpose all of the European deroga-
tions. The general derogation clauses, i.e. “the taking or keeping of certain specimens of 
strictly protected species under strictly supervised conditions, on selective basis and to limited 
extent” (Habitats Directive) and “to permit under strictly supervised conditions, on a selective 
basis, the capture, keeping and other judicious use of certain birds in small numbers” (Birds 
Directive) are not transposed into German law. Hence, German law may be considered to be 
stricter than European law.  
The exception to prevent damage to the fisheries sector may be granted either in every sin-
gle case or, provided that the animals concerned do not belong to strictly protected species, 
generally by a State law. This means that exceptions for the strictly protected otter may only 
be granted by a single permission, whereas exceptions for the cormorant may also be granted 
by statutory ordinances (“cormorant regulation”). Regarding cormorants there is a marked 
difference between administrative practice and the judgements of the courts of justice. Au-
thorities usually grant requested single permissions for shooting cormorants. For example, in 
the administrative region of Dresden, which is part of the German State of Saxony between 
700 and 800 single permits were granted annually and some 600–700 animals were culled as 
a result of these permits.15 Sometimes authorities refused to grant single permits. Appellants 
                                                 
15  Data source: Saxon State Ministry for Environment and Agriculture (2004). 
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could then appeal to the courts against the refusal of single permits by authorities. In these 
cases, all courts appealed to refused requests for single permissions to cull cormorants, 
thereby confirming the authorities’ decision, because the protective hunting could not prevent 
damage to the fisheries sector as a whole. Courts justified their decisions with the arguments 
that the connection between the presence of cormorants and damage was not yet clear and it 
was expected, that other cormorants would take over the free habitats. Moreover, in contrast 
to court judgements, several State authorities have allowed the protective hunting of cormo-
rants by statutory ordinances (“cormorant regulations”). As a result of such a cormorant regu-
lation 858 cormorants were culled in Baden-Württemberg in winter 2002/2003 (Thum 2004). 
In the case of cormorant regulations, the courts do not come into play, because there is no 
right to take the matter to court. This shows that in practice the strong demands for permits 
are not barriers for even far-reaching measures based on single or more general permissions. 
This also shows that there is no consistent implementation of legal requirements effected at 
the European level. Administrative courts and authorities use the same legal requirements in 
different ways and there is no possibility for harmonisation. For example the questions which 
damage could justify exceptions to the protection status of animals and how such damage can 
be correctly quantified (Seiche and Wünsche 1996) are still open.  
In contrast to the protective seal hunting in Finland, the culling of cormorants is not per-
ceived as hunting but as an exception to the protection status in order to minimise damage. 
Actually, for most protected animals population control by hunting is not allowed under Ger-
man law. As a basic principle hunting law and nature protection law exist independently in 
parallel. Hunting is permitted if a species is subject to hunting law (defined in the Federal 
Hunting Act and the particular State Hunting Act) and if a hunting season is defined (Federal 
and State Hunting Season Regulation). Thus in principle every State (Land) is competent to 
determine which species may be hunted individually. However, both federal and State legisla-
tors are bound to European law. As long as the use of species is not permitted by Article 14 of 
the Habitats Directive or Article 7 of the Birds Directive, hunting of otters and cormorants is 
neither allowed in Europe nor Germany. 
9.3.2.2 Support for environmentally sound agriculture 
The Saxon Support Programme for Environmentally Sound Agriculture16 is based on the 
European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF), section Guarantee. To use 
this fund, the States (Länder) set up development plans. The Saxon Development Plan for 
Agrarian Regions17 includes the funding of agri-environmental measures, which are now part 
of the Saxon Support Programme for Environmentally Sound Agriculture. Its main impor-
tance in the context of conflicts concerning protected species lies in the funding for the main-
                                                 
16  Richtlinie des Sächsischen Staatsministeriums für Umwelt und Landwirtschaft zur Förderung einer umwelt-
gerechten Landwirtschaft im Freistaat Sachsen (UL) of 8 November 2000; RL-Nr.: 73/2000; last modified on 10 
Juli 2003. 
17  Entwicklungsplan für den ländlichen Raum in Sachsen 2000-2006. 
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tenance of important habitats. The programme part “Nature Conservation and Protection of 
the Cultural Landscape” (NAK) supports the conservation of threatened, historically valuable 
ponds. All benefits are only granted within the scope of funds available and no legal claim 
can be made. In this context, Saxon aquaculture has been supported with 2.3 to 2.6 million 
Euro per year between 2000 and 2003, covering more than 95 % of Saxon pond area used for 
farming. NAK funds represent the major part of public support to aquaculture that adds up to 
approximately 20–30 % of the total gross income per hectare (Klemm 2001). One measure of 
the programme is unofficially called “otter bonus” and pond farmers are paid 103 Euro/ha per 
year for extra stocking of ponds with fish to provide a feeding habitat for the otter. Between 
2000 and 2003, this single measure provided pond businesses applying it with overall 230,000 
to 311,000 Euro per year in Upper Lusatia.18 The otter bonus is the most important policy 
instrument in Saxony to reconcile the conflict between otter conservation and aquaculture. 
Mostly due to this instrument, the majority of Saxon pond farmers do not perceive the otter as 
a conflicting species any more, “the otter belongs to the landscape” (Zwirner and Wittmer 
2004, p. 132). From an economic perspective, the NAK programme rewards aquaculture for 
the additional costs it carries due to environmentally sound production that in this way is born 
by society as a whole.  
9.3.2.3 Compensation scheme for damage caused by protected species 
Saxony is the only German State that pays for damage caused by wild animals. Contrary to 
the previously mentioned agri-environmental compensation scheme, the damage compensa-
tion scheme is only funded from the budget of the State of Saxony without any link to Euro-
pean funds. Both the Saxon environmental ministry and the State conservation authority do 
not see a link between this conservation-oriented damage compensation scheme and European 
State aid regulation, therefore no permission was requested from the European Commission 
when inaugurating the scheme. The basis for damage compensation is the “Compensation for 
Cases of Hardship Regulation”. Payments require significant hardship for the owner or user of 
resources: damage exceeding approximately 100 Euro per hectare per annum (in agriculture 
and fisheries) or 50 Euro (in forestry) and the aggregated damages exceed 1,000 Euro (in ag-
riculture and fisheries) or 50 Euro (in forestry). The amount of compensation is usually 60 % 
and may rise up to 80 % of the overall damage. Based on this regulation, Saxon damage com-
pensation for cormorants ranged between 670,000 and 800,000 Euro in the years 2000 to 
2002. In this way, it is the main instrument to compensate for cormorant related damages. 
However, pond farmers and respective associations still perceive the cormorant as the main 
conflicting animal with aquaculture, and measures for conflict mitigation involving popula-
tion control measures are asked for by this stakeholder group (Zwirner and Wittmer 2004). 
For the otter, damage compensation payments in Upper Lusatia (highest otter densities in 
Saxony) ranged between 23,000 and 70,000 Euro between 2000 and 2002.19 Therefore, the 
                                                 
18  Data source: Sächsische Landesanstalt für Landwirtschaft, Referat Fischerei (2004). 
19  Data source: Sächsische Landesanstalt für Landwirtschaft (2004). 
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previously mentioned otter bonus is the more important instrument regarding the otter. The 
damage compensation scheme still seems to be necessary for locally high damages. Pond 
farmers not sustaining great damage from otters could obtain restitution in kind from some 
district authorities. The basis for this procedure was a special guideline no longer in force. At 
the moment local authorities are looking for a new solution to cover small-scale damage.20 
Sociological analysis has shown that the existence of the various compensation instruments in 
Saxony is the most important reason why the conflict about the fish-eating vertebrates with 
aquaculture is calmed down (Zwirner and Wittmer 2004). 
9.3.2.4 Financial support for technical measures to avoid damage 
In Saxony, financial support is provided for measures aimed at avoiding damage caused by 
protected species in the framework of the Financial Instruments for Fisheries Guidance 
(FIFG) of the European Union. To use FIFG, the operational programme for Germany’s Ob-
jective 1 region21 was set up. Regarding aquaculture, the programme stresses the increasing 
number of cormorants. In Saxony the operational programme was implemented by the Sup-
port Programme for Aquaculture, which funds technical measures to protect fish stocks from 
cormorants, herons and otters. Support is given as direct project support for 60 % of the total 
costs. Measures currently supported are fences against otters, surging measures with nets 
against cormorants and anti-cormorant equipment. Between 2001 and 2003, only 7 projects 
have been supported in Saxony (from 3,000 to 78,000 Euro). The reason may be that the type 
of equipment utilised is very expensive and the remaining investment costs for the pond farm-
ers are mostly too high compared to the return of an average pond farm (Klemm 2001). 
9.4 Interplay between European regulation and national reconciliation 
policies 
In this final section we aim to identify key problems obstructing effective reconciliation poli-
cies, related to the design of regulation as well as its implementation. The main focus is on the 
European level, for European regulation constitutes the binding framework to be considered 
and implemented by Member States. However, the national experiences are used as examples 
to illustrate the practical consequences of European regulation. We will discuss how the exist-
ing European regulation could be further developed and improved in order to better meet the 
challenges of biodiversity conflict reconciliation policy.  
9.4.1 Nature conservation regulation 
European nature conservation law covers most species potentially involved in conflicts. Many 
of those species are strictly protected, meaning that reduction of damage caused by protected 
species through methods of killing and disturbance of them are prohibited, though they may 
                                                 
20  Sächsische Landesanstalt für Landwirtschaft (2004), personal communication. 
21  Operationelles Programm FIAF 2000-2006. 
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be allowed for reconciliation purposes under the derogation rules of the European nature con-
servation law.  
In practice, Member States have adopted culling schemes, as in the cases of seals and cor-
morants, to prevent local damage. The culling schemes adopted in both countries studied have 
been somewhat restrained. Regarding cormorants, France pursues a very extensive culling 
policy, shooting tens of thousands of cormorants each year (Marion 2003), and Denmark has 
recently made its first attempts to regulate the species at the population level by way of egg-
oiling in specially selected breeding colonies (Olesen 2005).  
However, the legality of culling as a reconciliation measure has never been tested in the 
European Court of Justice, but some derogation rules of European origin have been inter-
preted by the courts of Member States, like those of Germany. Interestingly, the German 
courts have never granted permits to cull cormorants based on a strict interpretation of nature 
conservation law, whereas implementing authorities grant permits more easily within their 
realm of legitimate decision-making (Thum 2004). So far the German practice has formally 
been based on national law. However, given reasons and taking into account the reservations 
explained above, the German legal practice can be used at least as a rough indication of how 
courts could apply European law.  
There are two important points to be raised with regard to different mitigation practices 
pertaining to all species. The first concerns the concept of “considerable damage” in German 
legal practice. This concept is considered to be relative to the economic sector (like fisheries), 
not to an individual farmer or farm. Because the individual claimants could not prove that the 
damage was considerable at the level of the whole economic sector, the authorities’ refusal to 
grant a permit to kill cormorants was confirmed by the courts. Secondly, the derogation 
measures, including protective hunting, can be allowed only if they can be assumed to be ef-
fective in relation to the purpose for which they are used. Because the effectiveness of culling 
or hunting species as a measure to prevent damage is often doubtful this requirement may turn 
out to be important. For example in the case of Finland, the hunting of seals aims to expel the 
seal from fishing grounds, not to affect the size of the population. However, it is not clear if 
hunting will have such an effect (see Westerberg et al. 2000). If further scientific evidence 
supports these doubts, the justification for using protective hunting as a means to prevent con-
siderable damage to fisheries disappears. The same principle applies to cormorant culling in 
Germany, where it has influenced the court decisions.  
The approach of the Birds Directive is stricter than that of the Habitats Directive. Both 
provide for a general mechanism to allow, in limited numbers and on a selective basis, dero-
gations from general protection without restrictions explained above. However, the Birds Di-
rective restricts this possibility only to “capture, keeping and other judicious use of certain 
birds”, whereas the Habitats Directive also allows “taking”. Because it is doubtful if killing a 
bird is “judicious use” of it, this derogation may not be available for culling schemes.  
At political level, a sound reaction to the situation would be to consider if there is a need to 
change the conservation status of now abundant species. If the derogation rules do not allow 
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reasonable reconciliation policy, the problem is not necessarily the courts intepreting the rules 
precisely and specifically, but the wrong conservation status. In fact, the increasing number of 
cormorants already caused an amendment to European law in 1997: Member States are no 
longer required to protect the habitats of cormorants by establishing special protected areas. 
Due to the stable population level of cormorants, one could envisage a further change in their 
conservation status and allow controlled hunting by removing this species to Annex II of the 
Birds Directive. Similarly, if the present steady growth in the seal population (Helle et al. 
2005) continues, the issue may become topical also in the case of Baltic Sea grey seals. 
9.4.2 State aid regulation 
State aid law has affected reconciliation policies in Member States. In the countries studied 
there are three different policy measures aiming to grant compensation from national sources 
for damage caused by protected species: (1) the compensation of loss of catch in Finland, (2) 
the Finnish insurance system that compensates physical damage to fishing gear, and (3) the 
Saxon hardship compensation regulation. As a result of negotiation between the Commission 
and Finland the first scheme was made temporary, covering only two years. The other Finnish 
instrument is currently under review and on the basis of preliminary information available, the 
Commission tends to think that the scheme violates State aid law. The permanent German 
regulation on compensation for cases of hardship is in place and has never been notified as a 
State aid to the Commission. The Saxon State Ministry for Environment and Agriculture does 
not consider these payments as subsidies subject to European State aid law.22 In addition to 
the state of Saxony, some other countries compensate damage to fisheries caused by wild 
animals. For instance, Sweden compensates coastal fishermen for damage caused by grey 
seals (Bruckmeier and Höj Larsen 2005) and a compensation scheme for cormorant damage is 
in place in the Province of Ferrara in Italy (Moretti et al. 2005). Apparently only the Finnish 
schemes have been notified according to the State aid rules. Furthermore, in Finland, too, 
there are compensation schemes for damage caused by wild animals in other economic sec-
tors than fishery. Hence, not all the schemes have been investigated by the Commission – not 
to mention the European Court of Justice.  
Until now one compensation scheme, namely the compensation for loss of catch in 
Finland, has been considered to be State aid and in that case the aid was allowed, though only 
temporarily. In addition the Finnish insurance system is under review. One may ask what the 
legally relevant difference is between the Finnish schemes considered to be State aid and oth-
ers. In this regard we draw attention to criterion 2 (selectiveness) explained above. A compen-
sation scheme, which does not favour certain undertakings, could be permanent.  
Even if aid is State aid, it can be compatible with the common market, and thus, accepted. 
Certain aid is always compatible with the common market and the Commission may consider 
others to be compatible. For example, aid aiming to make good the damage caused by natural 
                                                 
22  Saxon State Ministry for Environment and Agriculture (2005), personal communication.  
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disaster or exceptional occurrences is always compatible and the Finnish scheme was tempo-
rarily allowed on this ground. Furthermore, the Commission may consider compatible other 
aids belonging to one of five categories listed in the Article 87(3) of the EU Treaty. However, 
none of these categories is visibly related to reconciliation policy, though some of them may 
in certain circumstances turn out to be relevant.  
Any aid deemed to be State aid must be temporary to be compatible with the common 
market. However, for the purposes of reconciliation policy this may be problematic. The eco-
nomic damage caused especially by seals and cormorants is nowadays greater than ever and 
there is no mitigation measure available to bring a solution to this in the near future. Exten-
sive hunting, which has previously reduced the population of protected species to an unac-
ceptably low level, is – and should remain – out of the question due to nature conservation 
goals. Fishermen and protected species will compete for the use of same resources in the fu-
ture, too. Thus, the problem is likely to persist.  
In practice, there may be only few options for mitigation measures to reduce the economic 
losses caused by protected species. This is especially the case for very strictly protected and 
seriously endangered species such as the otter. State aid regulations should generally support 
nature conservation and species protection that are ecological services to society as a whole. 
In our view State aid law should not prevent Member States from creating national compensa-
tion schemes related to damage caused by protected species when this option is supported by 
serious reasons. However, market distortions and trade effects should be avoided as far as 
possible and the preference should always be for preventive measures that may result in a 
permanent mitigation of damage and thus conflicts. However, it is unlikely that trade effects 
would be on a large scale and, therefore, reconciliation of the conflicts should take preference 
over trade effects. Thus, there are grounds to suggest that this issue should be discussed when 
the relevant State aid guidelines are next reviewed.  
9.4.3 European funds 
The various European funds can be used for the reconciliation of the conflicts. For example, 
FIFG funding has recently been directed at the investments in seal-proof fishing gear in 
Finland. The Saxon “otter bonus”, which is a part of an EU-based agri-environmental pro-
gramme, is another example. As part of this programme both the maintaining of valuable 
habitats, i.e. fish-ponds of high environmental quality, and the provision of feeding habitats 
for otters are seen as ecological services to society. Thereby they are justified on economic 
grounds (Hofman et al. 1995).  
However, a lack of special provision in the fund regulations regarding reconciliation poli-
cies and measures may lead to problems. Without such a provision it may become compli-
cated to design proper measures, which really can achieve reconciliation and, at the same 
time, meet all the other requirements of the regulation. For example, many instruments under 
European funds are geographically limited and these restricted areas are not necessarily the 
same as those of the conflicts. Thus, a clarification of the regulation concerned in this point 
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would be preferable. This becomes even more important because the laws on European funds 
and State aid are, from a policy-making point of view, interlinked. The State aid law does not 
apply to European funding. Thus, a proper European funding regulation may help to over-
come possible problems related to State aid law. Because State aid law does restrict the possi-
bilities of the Member State to adopt national compensation schemes, an alternative policy 
response to the change of State aid law discussed above would be to create a European fund-
ing mechanism for the compensation of damage. Furthermore, European Structural Funds are 
especially well suited for funding activities to develop or invest in preventive measures.  
9.4.4 Need for better coordination 
Effective reconciliation of conflicts arising from damage caused by protected species requires 
several measures often administered by different administrative sectors and regulated by dif-
ferent laws. At the moment reconciliation policy is to a large extent a national matter in 
Europe, though certain fields of European law and policy are relevant. They both provide op-
tions and set limitations for reconciliation policies as discussed above. Hence, there is a need 
for coordination at both levels. 
The need for coordination is obvious in both cases studied. In Finland, the lack of coordi-
nation of policy measures has impeded effective management of the conflict in spite of 10 
years of mitigation. In Germany the federal structure stresses the importance of coordination 
for both nature conservation law and funding mechanisms differ from one State to another. 
However, this may be both an advantage and a disadvantage, depending on the specific con-
flict. On the one hand, the federal system in Germany allows for spatial differentiation and 
regionally adapted management of conflicts, providing options for increased cost-
effectiveness. On the other hand, transboundary problems require coordinated action, as is the 
case with migrating or spatially more widely distributed species (Ring 2004).  
European institutions could have a more active role in coordination. First, many conflicts 
have implications for Europe as a whole, as is obvious in the cases of migrating species like 
cormorants or species moving in large sea areas crossing borders of many Member States like 
the grey seal. European institutional structures and funding mechanisms could provide a 
sound basis for coordination of activities in the Member States. Second, European law, like 
nature conservation law and State aid law, is anyhow involved in national reconciliation pol-
icy and possible conflicts between law and the needs for reconciliation could be avoided by a 
more active Europe-wide policy. Furthermore, through coordination it would be possible to 
avoid or minimise different interpretations of European law at Member State level. Different 
interpretations may even occur within a Member State, as the case of Germany shows.  
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